DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/03/1993

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) ANAND, A.S. (J) VENKATACHALA N. (J)

CITATION:
1993 AIR 1960 1993 SCR (2) 581
1993 SCC (2) 746 JT 1993 (2) 503
1993 SCALE (2)309

ACT:

Constitution of India, 1950-Article 32-Letter of a mother informing Supreme Court death of her son in custody-Writ petition-Appreciation of evidence-Whether the death of petitioner’s in in police custody due to police brutality.

Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 32, 226-Death in police custody-Power of Supreme Court/High Court to award compensation for contravention of fundamental tight to life guaranteed under Article 21-Purpose of public law proceedings-Remedy in public law proceedings-Role of Courts- Payment of Compensation-Fixation-Directions of Supreme Court on mode of payment and appropriate actions against individuals responsible for custodial death.

HEADNOTE:

Petitioner’s son, aged about 22 years was taken from his home In police custody at about 8 a.m. on 1.12.1987 by respondent No.6, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police of the Police Outpost in connection with the investigation of an offence of theft. He was detained at the Police outpost On 2.12.1987, at about 2 p.m. the petitioner came to know that the dead body of her son was found on the railway track There were multiple injuries on the body and his death was unnatural, caused by those injuries.

The petitioner alleged in her letter dated 14.9.1988, which was treated as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, that it was a case of custodial death since her son died as a result of the multiple injuries inflicted to him while he was in police custody and thereafter his dead body was thrown on the railway track. It was prayed in the petition that award of compensation be made to her, for contravention of the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The defence of the respondents was that petitioner’s son managed to 582 escape from police custody at about 3 a.m. on 2.12.1987 from the Police. Outpost, where he was detained; that thereafter he could not be apprehended in spite of a search and that his dead body was found on the railway track on 2.12.1987 with multiple injuries, which indicated that he was run over by a train. The respondents denied the allegation of custodial death and their responsibility for the unnatural death of petitioner’s son.

On 4.3.1991, this Court directed the District Judge to hold an inquiry into the matter and to submit a report. After hearing the parties and appreciating the evidence the District Judge submitted the Inquiry Report dated 4.9.1991.

The District Judge found that petitioner’s son died on account of multiple injuries inflicted to him while he was in police custody at the Police Outpost.

The correctness of the finding of the District Judge in his report was assailed in this Court.

The respondents contended that petitioner’s son managed to escape from police custody at about 3 a.m. on 2.12.1987;

that he was run over by a passing train and sustained the fatal injuries; that the responsibility of the respondents for his safety came to an end the moment he escaped from police custody; and that the factual foundation for State’s liability for payment of compensation for violation of the fundamental right to life under Article 21 was absent.

Allowing the petition, this Court,

HELD: (per LS. Verma, J. on his behalf and on behalf of N. Venkatachala, J) 1.01. There is no cogent independent evidence of any search made by the police to apprehend petitioner’s son, if the defence of his escape from police custody be true. On the contrary, after discovery of the dead body on the railway track in the morning by some railwaymen, it was much later in the day that the police reached the spot to take charge of the dead body. This conduct of the concerned police officers is also a significant circumstance to assess credibility of the defence version. [591 G-H] 1.02. The medical evidence comprising the testimony of the doctor, who conducted the postmortem, excludes the possibility of all the injuries to the deceased being caused in a train accident while indicating that all of 583 them could result from the merciless beating given to him.

[594 H-595 A] 1.03. An inquiry under Section 176 Cr.P.C. is contemplated independently by a Magistrate and not jointly with a police officer when the role of the police officers itself is a matter of inquiry. [595 F] 1.04. There was hand-cuff on the hands of the deceased when his body was found on the railway track with rope around it. It is significant that the Report dated 11.3.1988 of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory mentions that the two cut ends of the two pieces of rope which were sent for examination do not match with each other in respect of physical appearance. This finding about the rope negatives the respondents’ suggestion that the petitioner’s son managed to escape from police custody by chewing off the rope with which he was tied. 1595 G-H] 1.05. It is a case of custodial death, and the deceased died as a result of the injuries inflicted to him voluntarily while he was In police custody at the Police Outpost. [596 A] 2.01. Award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which compensation is awarded in such proceedings. [596 G] 2.02. Enforcement of the constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of compensation as part of the legal consequences of its contravention. [602 A] 2.03.. A claim in public law for compensation for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection, of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity 584 being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaran- teed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. [602 B-D] 2.04. The Court is not helpless and the wide powers given to this Court by Article 32, which itself is a fundamental right, imposes a constitutional obligation on this Court to forge such new tools, which may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution, which enable the award of monetary compensation In appropriate cases, where that is the only mode of redress available. [603 D] 2.05. The power available to this Court under Article 142 is also an enabling provision in this behalf The contrary view would not merely render the court powerless and the constitutional guarantee a mirage, but, may, in certain situations, be an incentive to extinguish life, if for the extreme contravention the court is powerless to grant any relief against the State, except by punishment of the wrongdoer for the resulting offence, and recovery of damages under private law, by the ordinary process. [603 E- F] 2.06. If the guarantee that deprivation of life and personal liberty cannot be made except in accordance with law, is to be real, the enforcement of the right in case of every contravention must also be possible in the constitutional scheme, the mode of redress being that which is appropriate In the facts of each case. [603 F] 2.07. This remedy in public law has to be more readily available when invoked by the havenots, who are not possessed of the wherewithal for enforcement of their rights in private law, even though its exercise is to be tempered by judicial restraint to avoid circumvention of private law remedies, where more appropriate. [603 G] 2.08. The principle of which the Court’s power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for 585 contravention of a fundamental right. [604 B] Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Another, [1983] 3 S.C.R.

508; Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India and Others, [1983] INSC 187; [1984] 1. S.C.R. 904 and [1984] INSC 87; [1984] 3 S.C.R. 544; Bhim Singh v.

State of J. & K, [1984] Supp. S.C.C. 504 and [1985] 4 S.C.C. 677; Saheli, A Women’s Resources Centre and Others v.

Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters and Others, [1989] INSC 384; [1990] 1 S.C.C. 422; State of Maharashtra and Others v. Ravikant S. Patil, [1991] 2 S.C.C. 373; Maharaj v.

Attomey-General of Trinidad and Tobago, (No.2), (1978) 3 All.E.R. 670;, Khatri and Others (IV) v. State of Bihar and Others, [1981] 2 S.C.C. 493 and Union Carbide Corporation and Others v. Union India and Others, [1991] INSC 252; [1991] 4 S.C.C. 584, referred to.

Kasturilal Ralia Rain Jain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1964] INSC 207; [1965] 1 S.C.R. 375, distinguished.

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Torts, 22nd Edition, 1992, by Justice G.P. Singh, at pages 44 to 48, referred to.

2.09. In the present case, on the finding reached, It Is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son. [604 D] 2.10. The deceased was aged about 22 years and had a monthly income between Rs.1200 to Rs.1500. A total amount of Rs.1,50,000 would be appropriate as compensation, to be awarded to the petitioner in the present case. [604 E] 2.11. The respondent-State of Orissa is directed to pay the sum of Rs.1,50,000 lo the petitioner as compensation and a further sum of Rs.10,000 as costs to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. The mode of payment of Rs.1,50,000 to the petitioner would be, by making a term deposit of that amount in a scheduled bank in the petitioner’s name for a period of three years, during which she would receive only the Interest payable thereon, the principal amount being payable to her on expiry of the term.

The Collector of the District will take the necessary steps in this behalf, and report compliance to the Register (judicial) of this Court within three months. [604 H, 605-A] 2.12.The State of Orissa is expected to take the necessary further action to ascertain and fix the responsibility of the Individuals responsible 586 for the custodial death of petitioner’s son and also take all available appropriate actions against each of them. [605 C] Per Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (Concurring) 1.01. Convicts, prisoners or under-trials are not denuded of their fundamental rights under Article 21 and It is only such restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be imposed on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights by such persons. It is an obligation of the State, to ensure that there is no infringement of the indefeasable rights of a citizen to life, except in accordance with law while the citizen is in its custody. [607 E] 1.02. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, under- trials or other prisoners in custody, except according to procedure established by law. [607 E] 1.03. There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life. His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State is strict and admits of no exceptions.

[607 F] 1.04.The wrongdoer is accountable and the State is responsible if the person in custody of the police is deprived of his life except according to the procedure- established by law. [607 G] 1.05.The death of petitioner’s son was caused while he was in custody of the police by police torture. A custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in a civilised society governed by the Rule of Law.

1.06. The defence of ‘sovereign immunity”in such cases is not available to the State. [607 G] 2.01. Adverting to the grant of relief to the heirs of a victim of custodial death foe the infraction or invasion of his rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is not always enough to relegate him to the ordinary remedy of a civil suit to claim damages for the tortious act of the State as that remedy in private law indeed is available to the aggrieved party. [608 A] 587 2.02. The citizen complaining of the infringement of the indefeasable right under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be told that for the established violation of the fundamental right to life, he cannot get any relief under the public law by the courts exercising writ jurisdiction.

[608-B] 2.03. The primary source of the public law proceedings stems from the prerogative writs and the courts have, therefore, to evolve ‘new tools’ to give relief in public law by moulding it according to the situation with a view to preserve and protect the Rule of Law. [608 C] 2.04. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasable rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. [608 H, 609 A] 2.05. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasable right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasable rights of the citizen.

[609 B] 2.06. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, which the court moulds the relief by granting” compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 1609 C] 2.07. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights 588 of the citizen. [609 D] 2.08.The compensation is in the nature of the exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrong-doer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law. [609 E] 2.09. This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of the civil liberties of the citizen, have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the citizen, notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings. [609 F-G] 2.10. The State, of course, has the right to be indemnified by and take such action as may be available to it against the wrongdoer in accordance with law through appropriate proceeding. Of course, relief in exercise of the power under Article 32 or 226 would be granted only once it is established that there has been an infringement of the fundamental rights of the citizen and no other form of appropriate redressal by the court in the facts and circumstances of the case, is possible. [609 H, 610 A] 2.11. Law is in the process of development and the process necessitates developing separate public law procedures as also public law principles. It may be necessary to identify the situations to which separate proceedings and principles ‘apply and the courts have to act firmly but with certain amount of circumspection and self restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32 or 226 are misused as a disguised substitute for civil action in private law. [610 D-E] “Freedom under the Law. By Lord Denning First Hamlan Lecture, 1949, referred to.

Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Anr., [1983] INSC 87; [1983] 3 S.C.R. 508, referred to.

2.12. In the facts of the present case the mode of redress which 589 commends appropriate is to make an order of monetary amend, in favour of the petitioner for the custodial death of her son by ordering payment of compensation by way of exemplary damages. [610 F] 2.13. The State of Orissa should pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000 to the petitioner and a sum of Rs.10,000 by way of costs to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. [610 G]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 488 of 1988.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

M.S. Ganesh for the Petitioner.

Altaf Ahmed, Addl. Solicitor General, A.K. Panda and Naresh Kumar Sharma for the Respondents.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by VERMA, J. A letter dated 14.9.1988 sent to this Court by Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera, was treated as a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for determining the claim of compensation made therein consequent upon, the death of petitioner’s son Suman Behera, aged about 22 years, in police custody. The said Suman Behera was taken from his home in police custody at about 8 a.m. on 1.12.1987 by respondent No.6, Sarat Chandra Barik, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police of Jaraikela Police Outpost under Police Station Bisra, Distt. Sundergarh in Orissa, in connection with the investigation of an offence of theft and detained at the Police Outpost. At about 2 p.m. the next day on 2.12.1987, the petitioner came to know that the dead body of her son Suman Behera was found on the railway track near a bridge at some distance from the Jaraikela railway station. There were multiple injuries on the body of Suman Behera when it was found and obviously his death was unnatural, caused by those injuries. The allegation made is that it is a case of custodial death since Suman Behera died as a result of the multiple injuries inflicted to him while he was in police custody; and thereafter his dead body was thrown on the railway track.

The prayer made in the petition is for award of compensation to the petitioner, the mother of Suman Behera, for contravention of the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The State of Orissa and its police officers, including Sarat Chandra 590 Barik, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and Constable No.127, Chhabil Kujur of Police Outpost Jeraikela, Police Station Bisra, are impleaded as respondents in this petition. The defence of the respondents is that Suman Behera managed to escape from police custody at about 3 a.m.

on the night between the 1st and 2nd December, 1987 from the Police Outpost Jeraikela, where he was detained and guarded by Police Constable Chhabil Kujur; he could not be apprehended thereafter in spite of a search; and the dead body of Suman Behera was found on the railway track the next day with multiple injuries which indicated that he was run over by a passing train after he had escaped from police custody. In short, on this basis the allegation of custodial death was denied and consequently the respondents’ responsibility for the unnatural death of Suman Behera.

In view of the controversy relating to the cause of death of Suman Behera, a direction was given by this Court on 4.3.1991 to the District Judge, Sundergarh in Orissa, to hold an inquiry into the matter and submit a report. The parties were directed to appear before the District Judge and lead the evidence on which they rely. Accordingly, evidence was led by the parties and the District Judge has submitted the Inquiry Report dated 4.9.1991 containing his finding based on that evidence that Suman Behera had died on account of multiple injuries inflicted to him while he was in police custody at the Police Outpost Jeraikela. The correctness of this finding and Report of the District Judge, being disputed by the respondents, the matter was examined afresh by us in the light of the objections raised to the Inquiry Report.

The admitted facts are, that Suman Behera was taken in police custody on 1.12.1987 at 8 a.m. and he was found dead the next day on the railway track near the Police Outpost Jeraikela, without being released from custody, and his death was unnatural caused by multiple injuries sustained by him. The burden is, therefore, clearly on the respondents to explain how Suman Behera sustained those injuries which caused his death. Unless a plausible explanation is given by the respondents which is consistent with their innocence, the obvious inference is that the fatal injuries were inflicted to Suman Behera in police custody resulting in his death, for which the respondents are responsible and liable.

To avoid this obvious and logical inference of custodial death, the learned Additional Solicitor General relied on the respondent’s defence 591 that Suman Behera had managed to escape from police custody at about 3 a.m. on the night between the 1st and 2nd December, 1987 and it was likely that he was run over by a passing train when he sustained the fatal injuries. The evidence adduced by the respondents is relied on by the learned Additional Solicitor General to support this defence and to contend that the responsibility of the respondents for the safety of Suman Behera came to an end the moment Suman Behera escaped from police custody. The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, rightly does not dispute the liability of the State for payment of compensation in this proceeding for violation of the fundamental right to life under Article 21, in case it is found to be a custodial death. The argument is that the factual foundation for such a liability of the State is absent. Shri M.S. Ganesh, who appeared as amicus curiae for the petitioner, however, contended that the evidence adduced during the inquiry does not support the defence of respondents and there is no reason to reject the finding of the learned District Judge that Suman Behera died in police custody as a result of injuries inflicted to him.

The first question is: Whether it is a case of custodial death as alleged by the petitioner? The admitted facts are:

Suman Behera was taken in police custody at about 8 a.m. on 1.12.1987 by Sarat Chandra Barik, Asstt. Sub-Inspector of Police, during investigation of an offence of theft in the village and was detained at Police Outpost Jeraikela; Suman Behera and Mahi Sethi, another accused, were handcuffed, tied together and kept in custody at the police station;

Suman Behera’s mother, the petitioner, and grand-mother went to the Police Outpost at about 8 p.m. with food for Suman Behera which he ate and thereafter these women came away while Suman Behera continued to remain in police custody-, Police Constable Chhabil Kujur and some other persons were present at the Police Outpost that night; and the dead body of Suman Behera with a handcuff and multiple injuries was found lying on the railway track at Kilometer No.385/29 between Jeraikela and Bhalulata railway-stations on the morning of 2.12.1987. It is significant that there is no cogent independent evidence of any search made by the police to apprehend Suman Behera, if the defence of his escape from police custody be true. On the contrary, after discovery of the dead body on the railway track in the morning by some railwaymen, it was much later in the day that the police reached the spot to take charge of the dead body. This conduct of the concerned police 592 officers is also a significant circumstance to assess credibility of the defence version.

Before discussing the other evidence adduced by the parties during the. inquiry, reference may be made to the injuries found on the dead body of Suman Behera during postmortem.

These injuries were the following:- “Extemal injuries (1) Laceration over with margin of damaged face.

(2) Laceration of size 3″ x 2″ over the left temporal region upto bone.

(3) Laceration 2′ above mastoid process on the right-side of size 1 1/2″ x 1/4″ bone exposed.

(4) Laceration on the forehead left side of size 1 1/2″ x 1/4″ upto bone in the mid-line on the forehead 1/2″ x 1/4″ bone deep on the left lateral to it 1″ x 1/4″ bone exposed.

(5) Laceration 1″ x 1/2″ on the anterior aspect of middle of left arm, fractured bone protruding.

(6) Laceration 1″ x 1/2″ x V2″ on medial aspect of left thigh 4″ above the knee joint.

(7) Laceration 1/2″ x 1/2″ x 1/2″ over left knee joint.

(8) Laceration 1″ x 1/2″ x 1/2″ on the medial aspect of right knee joint.

(9) Laceration 1″ x 1/2″ x 1/2″ on the posterior aspect of left leg, 4″ below knee joint.

(10) Laceration 1″‘ x 1/4″ x 1/2″ on the plantar aspect of 3rd and 4th toe of right side.

(11) Laceration of 1″ x 1/4″ x 1/2″ on the dorsum of left foot.

Injury on the neck 593 (1) Bruises of size 3″ x 1″ obliquely alongwith sternocleidomastoid muscle 1″ above the clavical left side (2) lateral to this 2″ x 1″ bruise (3) and 1″ x 1″ above the clavial left side (4) posterial aspect of the neck 1″ x 1′ obliquely placed right to mid line.

Right shoulder (a) Bruise 2″ x 2″, 1″ above the right scapula.

(b) Bruise 1″ x 1′ on the tip of right shoulder.

(c) Bruise on the dorsum of right palm 2″ x 1″.

(d) Bruise extenses surface of forearm left side (e) Bruise on right elbow 4″ x 1″ (f) Bruise on the dorsum of left palm 2″ x 1″.

(g) Bruise over left patela 2″ x 1″.

(h) Bruise 1″ above left patel 1″ x 1″.

(i) Bruise on the right illiac spine 1″ x 1/2″.

(j) Bruise over left scapula 4″ x 1″.

(k) Bruise 1″ below right scapula 5″ x 1″.

(l) Bruise 3″ medial to inferior angle of right scapula 2″x 1″.

(m) Bruise 2″ below left scapula of size 4″ x 2″.

(n) Bruise 2″ x 6″ below 12th rib left side.

(o) Bruise 4″ x 2″ on the left lumber region.

(p) Bruise on the buttock of left side 3″ x 2″.

(q) On dissection found (l) Fracture of skull on right side parietal and occipital bone 6″ length.

594 (2) Fracture of frontal bone below laceration 2″ depressed fracture.

(3) Fracture of left temporal bone 2″ in length below external injury No.2 i.e.

laceration 2″ above left mastoid process.

(4) Membrane ruptured below depressed fracture, brain matter protruding through the membrane.

(5) Intracraneal haemorrhage present.

(6) Brain lacerated below external injury No.3, 1″ x 1/2″ x 1/2″.

(7) Bone chips present on temporal surface of both sides.

(8) Fracture of left humerous 3’ above elbow.

(9) Fracture of left femur 3″ above knee joint.

(10) Fracture of mendible at the angle mendible both sides.

(11) Fracture of maxillary.

The face was completely damaged, eye ball present, nose lips, cheeks absent. Maxila and a portion of mendible absent.

No injury was present on the front side of body trunk.

There is rupture and laceration of brain.” The doctor deposed that all the injuries were caused by hard and blunt object the injuries on the face and left temporal region were postmortem while the rest were ante-mortem. The doctor excluded the possibility of the injuries resulting from dragging of the body by a running train and stated that all the ante-mortem injuries could be caused by lathi blows.

It was further stated by the doctor that while all the injuries could not be caused in a train accident, it was possible to cause all the injuries by lathi blows. Thus, the medical evidence comprising the testimony of the doctor, who conducted the postmortem, excludes the possibility of all the injuries 595 to Suman Behera being caused in a train accident while indicating that all of them could result form the merciless beating given to him. The learned Additional Solicitor General placed strong reliance ore the written opinion of Dr. K.K. Mishra, Professor & Head of the Department of Forensic Medicine, Medical College, Cuttack, given on 15.2.1988 on a reference made to him wherein he stated on the basis of the documents that the injuries found on the dead body of Suman Behera could have been caused by rolling on the railway track in-between the rail and by coming into forceful contact with projecting part of the moving train/engine. While adding that it did not appear to be a case of suicide, he indicated that there was more likelihood of accidental fall on the railway track followed by the running engine/train. In our view, the opinion of Dr. K.K.

Mishra, not examined as a witness, is not of much assistance and does not reduce the weight of the testimony of the doctor who conducted the postmortem and deposed as a witness during the inquiry. The opinion of Dr. K.K. Mishra is cryptic, based on conjectures for which there is no basis, and says nothing about the injuries being both anti-mortem and post- mortem. We have no hesitation in reaching this conclusion and preferring the testimony of the doctor who conducted the postmortem.

We may also refer to the Report dated 19.12.1988 containing the findings in a joint inquiry conducted by the Executive Magistrate and the Circle Inspector of Police. This Report is stated to have been made under Section 176 Cr.P.C. and was strongly relied on by the learned Additional Solicitor General as a statutory report relating to the cause of death. In the first place, an inquiry under Section 176 Cr.P.C. is contemplated independently by a Magistrate and not jointly with a police officer when the role of the police officers itself is a matter of inquiry. The joint finding recorded is that Suman Behera escaped from police custody at about 3 a.m. on 2.12.1987 and died in a train accident as a result of injuries sustained therein. There was hand-cuff on the hands of the deceased when his body was found on the railway track with rope around it. It is significant that the Report dated 11.3.1988 of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (Annexure ‘R-8′, at p. 108 of the paper book) mentions that the two cut ends of the two pieces of rope which were sent for examination do not match with each other in respect of physical appearance. This finding about the rope negatives the respondents’ suggestion that Suman Behera managed to escape from police custody by chewing off the rope with which he was tied. It is no necessary for us to refer to the other evidence including 596 the oral evidence adduced during the inquiry, from which the learned District Judge reached the conclusion that it is a case of custodial death and Suman Behera died as a result of the injuries inflicted to him voluntarily while he was in police custody at the Police Outpost Jeraikela. We have reached the same conclusion on a reappraisal of the evidence adduced at the inquiry taking into account the circumstances, which also support that conclusion. This was done in view of the vehemence with which the learned Additional Solicitor General urged that it is not a case of custodial death but of death of Suman Behera caused by injuries sustained by him in a train accident, after he had managed to escape from police custody by chewing off the rope with which he had been tied for being detained at the Police Outpost. On this conclusion, the question now is of the liability of the respondents for compensation to Suman Behera’s mother, the petitioner, for Suman Behera’s custodial death.

In view of the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Another, [1983] INSC 87; [1983] 3 S.C.R. 508, Sebastian M.

Hongray v. Union of India and Others, [1983] INSC 187; [1984] 1 S.C.R. 904 and [1984] INSC 87; [1984] 3 S.C.R. 544, Bhim Singh v. State of J&K [1984] Supp. S.C.C. 504 and [1985] 4 S.C.C. 677, Saheli, A Women’s Resources Centre and Others v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters and Others, [1989] INSC 384; [1990] 1 S.C.C. 422 and State of Maharashtra and Others v. Ravikant S.Patil, [1991] 2 S.C.C. 373, the liability of the State of Orissa in the present case to pay the compensation cannot be doubted and was rightly not disputed by the learned Additional Solicitor General. It ,would, however, be appropriate to spell out clearly the principle on which the liability of the State arises in such cases for payment of compensation and the distinction between this liability and the liability in private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort. It may be mentioned straightaway that award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which compensation is awarded in such proceedings. We shall now refer to the earlier decisions of this Court as well as some other decisions before further discussion of this principle.

597 In Rudul Sah (supra), it was held that in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court can grant compensation for deprivation of a fundamental right. That was a case of violation of the petitioner’s right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Chandrachud, C.J., dealing with this aspect, stated as under:- “It is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced effecaciously through the ordinary processes of Courts, Civil and Criminal A money claim has therefore to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a court of lowest grade competent to try it.

But the important question for our consideration is whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 32, this Court can pass an order for the payment of money if such an order is in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right. The instant case is illustrative of such cases……..

ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial, in the sense that a civil court may or may not have upheld his claim. But we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover damages for his illegal detention, a decree for damages would have to be passed in that suit, though it is not possible to predicate, in the absence of evidence, the precise amount which would be decreed in his favour. In- these circumstances, the refusal of this Court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lip-service to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated.

Article 21’which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders to release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violaters in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis lead- 598 ing to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the state as shield. If Civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others too well-known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of in- dividuals is the true bastion of democracy.

Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner’s rights. It may have recourse against those officers” (pp.513-14) (emphasis supplied) It does appear from the above extract that even though it was held that compensation could be awarded under Article 32 for contravention of a fundamental right, yet it was also stated that ‘the petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial’ and ‘Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes’. These observation may tend to raise a doubt that the remedy under Article 32 could be denied ‘if the claim to compensation was factually controversial’ and, therefore, optional not being a distinct remedy available to the petitioner in addition to the ordinary processes. The later decisions of this Court proceed on the assumption that monetary compensation can be awarded for violation of constitutional rights under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution, but this aspect has not been adverted to. It is, therefore, necessary to clear this doubt and to indicate the precise nature of this remedy which is distinct and in addition to the available ordinary processes, in case of violation of the fundamental rights.

Reference may also be made to the other decisions of this Court after Rudul Sah. In Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India and Others, (1)[1983] INSC 187; , [1984] 1 S.C.R. 904, it was indicated that in a petition for writ of habeas 599 corpus, the burden was obviously on the respondents to make good the positive stand of the respondents in response to the notice issued by the court by offering proof of the stand taken, when it is shown that the person detained was last seen alive under the surveillance, control, and command of the detaining authority. In Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India & Ors., (11)[1984] INSC 87; , [1984] 3 S.C.R. 544, in such a writ petition, exemplary costs were awarded on failure of the detaining authority to produce the missing persons, on the conclusion that they were not alive and had met an unnatural death. The award was made in Sebastian M. Hongray-II apparently following Rudul Sah, but without indicating anything more. In Bhim Singh v. State of J&K and Others, [1985] 4 S.C.C. 677, illegal detention in police custody of the petitioner Bhim Singh was held to constitute violation of his rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) and this Court exercising its power to award compensation under Article 32 directed the State to pay monetary compensation to the petitioner for violation of his constitutional right by way of exemplary costs or otherwise, taking this power to be settled by the decisions in Rudul Sah and Sebastian M. Hongray. In Saheli, [1989] INSC 384; [1990] 1 S.C.C. 422, the State was held liable to pay compensation payable to the mother of the deceased who died as a result of beating and assault by the police. However, the principle indicated therein was that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. In State of Maharashtra and Others v. Ravikant S. Patil, [1991] 2 S.C.C. 373, the award of compensation by the High Court for violation of the fundamental right under Article 21 of an undertrial prisoner, who was handcuffed and taken through the streets in a procession by the police during investigation, was upheld. However, in none of these cases, except Rudul Sah, anything more was said. In Saheli, reference was made to the State’s liability for tortious acts of its servants without any reference being made to the decision of this Court in Kasturilal Ralia Ram fain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh[1964] INSC 207; , [1965] 1 S.C.R. 375, wherein sovereign immunity was upheld in the case of vicarious liability of the State for the tort of its employees. The decision in Saheli is, therefore, more in accord with the principle indicated in Rudul Sah.

In this context, it is sufficient to say that the decision of this Court in Kasturilal upholding the State’s plea of sovereign immunity for tortious acts of its servants is confined to the sphere of liability in tort, which is distinct from the State’s liability for contravention of fundamental rights to 600 which the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application in the constitutional scheme, and is no defence to the constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution which enables award of compensation for contravention of fundamental rights, when the only practicable mode of enforcement of the fundamental rights can be the award of compensation. The decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah and others in that line relate to award of compensation for contravention of fundamental rights, in the constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. On the other hand, Kasturilal related to value of goods seized and not returned to -he owner due to the fault of Government servants, the claim being of damages for the tort of conversion under the ordinary process, and not a claim for compensation for violation of fundamental rights. Kasturilal is, therefore, inapplicable in this context and distinguishable The decision of Privy Council in Maharaj v.’Attomey-General of Trinidad and Tobago, (No.2), [1978] 3 All ER 670, is useful in this context. That case related to Section 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 1962, in the chapter pertaining to human rights and fundamental freedoms, wherein Section 6 provided for an application to the High Court for redress. The question was, whether the provision permitted an order for monetary compensation. The contention of the Attorney-General therein, that an order for payment of compensation did not amount to the enforcement of the rights that had been contravened, was expressly rejected. It was held, that an order for payment of compensation, when a right protected had been contravened, is clearly a form of ‘redress’ which a person is entitled to claim under Section 6, and may well be the ‘only practicable form of redress’.

Lord Diplock who delivered the majority opinion, at page 679, stated.:- “It was argued on behalf of the Attorney- General that s.6(2) does not permit of an order for monetary compensation despite the fact that this kind of redress was ordered in Jaundoo v. Attorney-General of Guyana, [1971] SC 972. Reliance was placed on the reference in the subsection to ‘enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the said foregoing sections’ as the purpose for which orders etc. could be made. An order for payment of compensation, it was submitted, did not 601 amount to the enforcement of the rights that had been contravened. In their Lordships’ view an order for payment of compensation when a right protected under s.1 ‘has been’ contravened is dearly a form of ‘redress’ which a person is entitled to claim under s.

6(1) and may well be the only practicable form of redress, as by now it is in the instant case. The jurisdiction to make such an order is conferred on the High Court by para (a) of s.6(2), viz. jurisdiction ‘to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of sub-section (1) of this section. The very wide powers to make orders, issue writs and give directions are to this.’ Lord Diplock further stated at page 680, as under:- “Finally, their Lordships would say something about the measure of monetary compensation recoverable under s.6 where the contravention of the claimant’s constitutional rights consists of deprivation of liberty otherwise than by due process of law. The claim is not a claim in private law for damages for the tort of false imprisonment under which the damages recoverable are at would include damages for loss of reputation. It is a claim in public law for compensation for deprivation of liberty alone . …… .

(emphasis supplied) Lord Hailsham while dissenting from the majority regarding the liability for compensation in that case, concurred with the majority opinion on this principle and stated at page 687, thus:- expression ‘redress’ in sub-s(1) of s.6 and the expression ‘enforcement’ in sub-s(2), although capable of embracing damages where damages are available as part of the legal consequences of contravention, do not confer and are not in the context capable of being construed so as to confer a right of damages where they have not hitherto been available, in this case against the state for the judicial errors of a judge. …” 602 Thus, on this principle, the view was unanimous, that enforcement of the constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of compensation as part of the legal consequences of its contravention.

It follows that ‘a claim in public law for compensation’ for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is ‘distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort’ resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inap- plicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights.

A useful discussion on this topic which brings out the distinction between the remedy in public law based on strict liability for violation of a fundamental right enabling award of compensation, to which the defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable, and the private law remedy, wherein vicarious liability of the State in tort may arise, is to be found in Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Torts, 22nd Edition, 1992, by Justice G.P. Singh, at pages 44 to 48.

This view finds support from the, decisions of this Court in the Bhagalpur blinding cases: Kharti and Others (II) v.

State of Bihar and Others, [1980] INSC 239; [1981] 1 S.C.C. 627 and Kharti and Other (TV) v. State of Bihar and Others, [1981] 2 S.C.C.

493, wherein it was said that the court is not helpless to grant relief in a case of violation of the right to life and personal liberty, and it should be prepared to forge new tools and devise new remedies’ for 603 the purpose of vindicating these precious fundamental rights. It was also indicated that the procedure suitable in the facts of the case must be adopted for conducting the inquiry, needed to ascertain-the necessary facts, for granting the relief, as the available mode of redress, for enforcement of the guaranteed fundamental rights. More recently in Union Carbide Corporation and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1991] INSC 252; [1991] 4 S.C.C. 584, Misra, C.J. stated that ‘we have to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future…… there is no reason why we should hesitate to evolve such principle of liability …. .

To the same effect are the observations of Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was), who rendered the leading judgment in the Bhopal gas case, with regard to the court’s power to grant relief.

We respectfully concur with the view that. the court is not helpless and the wide powers given to this Court by Article 32, which itself is a fundamental right, imposes a constitutional obligation on this Court to forge such new tools, which may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution, which enable the award of monetary compensation in appropriate cases, where that is the only mode of redress available. The power available to this Court under Article 142 is also an enabling provision in this behalf The contrary view would not merely render the court powerless and the constitutional guarantee a mirage but may, in certain situations, be an incentive to extinguish life, if for the extreme contravention the court is powerless to grant any relief against the State, except by punishment of the wrongdoer for the resulting offence, and recovery of damages under private law, by the ordinary process. It the guarantee that deprivation of life and personal liberty cannot be made except in accordance with law, is to be real, the enforcement of the right in case of every contravention must also be possible in the constitutional scheme, the mode of redress being that which is appropriate in the facts of each case. This remedy in public law has to be more readily available when invoked by the have not, who are not possessed of the wherewithal for enforcement of their rights in private law, even though its exercise is to be tempered by judicial restraint to avoid circumvention of private law remedies, where more appropriate.

We may also refer to Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which indicates that an enforceable right to 604 compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right. Article 9(5) reads as under:- “Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” The above discussion indicates the principles on which the Court’s power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. This was indicated in Rudul Sah and certain further observations therein adverted to earlier, which may tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated therein, do not really detract from that principle. This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah and others in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal distinguished therefrom. We have considered this question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to resort to the ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case, on the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son.

The question now, is of the quantum of compensation. The deceased Suman Behera was aged about 22 years and had a monthly income between Rs.1200 to Rs.1500. This is the finding based on evidence recorded by the District Judge, and there is no reason to doubt its correctness. In our opinion, a total amount of Rs.1,50,000 would be appropriate as compensation, to be awarded to the petitioner in the present case. We may, however, observe that the award of compensation in this proceeding would be taken into account for adjustment, in the event of any other proceeding taken by the petitioner for recovery of compensation on the same ground, so that the amount to this extent is not recovered by the petitioner twice over. Apart from the fact that such an order is just, it is also in consonance with the statutory recognition of this principle of adjustment provided in Section 357(5) Cr.P.C. and Section 141(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Accordingly, we direct the respondent-State of Orissa to pay the sum of Rs.1,50,000 to the petitioner and a further sum of Rs.10,000 as to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. The mode of payment of Rs.1,50,000 to the petitioner would be, by making a term 605 deposit of that amount in a scheduled bank in the petitioner’s name for a period of three years, during which she would receive only the interest payable thereon, the principal amount being payable to her on expiry of the term.

The Collector of the District will take the necessary steps in this behalf, and report compliance to. the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court within three months.

We clarify that the award of this compensation, apart from the direction for adjustment of the amount as indicated, will not affect any other liability of the respondents or any other person flowing from the custodial death of petitioner’s son Suman Behera. We also expect that the State of Orissa would take the necessary further action in this behalf, to ascertain and fix the responsibility of the individuals responsible for the custodial death of Suman Behera, and also take all available appropriate actions against each of them, including their prosecution for the offence committed thereby.

The writ petition is allowed in these terms.

DR. ANAND, J. (CONCURRING) The lucid and elaborate judgment recorded by my learned brother Verma J. obviates the necessity of noticing facts or reviewing the case law referred to by him. I would, however, like to record a few observations of my own while concurring with his Lordship’s judgment.

This Court was bestirred by the unfortunate mother of deceased Suman Behera through a letter dated 14.9.1988, bringing to the notice of the Court the death of her son while in police custody. The letter was treated as a Writ- Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. As noticed by Brother Verma J., an inquiry was got conducted by this Court through the District Judge Sundergarh who, after recording the evidence, submitted his inquiry report containing the finding that the deceased Suman Behera had died on account of multiple injuries inflicted on him while in police custody. Considering, that it was alleged to be a case of custodial death, at the hands of those who are supposed to protect the life and liberty of the citizen, and which if established was enough to lower the flag of civilization to fly half-mast, the report of the District Judge was scrutinized and analysed by us with the assistance of Mr. M.S. Ganesh, appearing amicus 606 curiae for the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee and Mr.

Altaf Ahmad, the learned Additional Solicitor General carefully.

Verma J., while dealing with the first question i.e. whether it was a case of custodial death, has referred to the evidence and the circumstances of the case as also the stand taken by the State about the manner in which injuries were caused and has come to the conclusion that the case put up by the police of the alleged escape of Suman Behera from police custody and his sustaining the injuries in a train accident was not acceptable. I respectfully agree.A strenuous effort was made by the learned Additional Solicitor General by reference to the injuries on the head and the face of the deceased to urge that those injuries could not be possible by the alleged police torture and the finding recorded by the District Judge in his report to the contrary was erroneous. It was urged on behalf of the State that the medical evidence did establish that the injuries had been caused to the deceased by lathi blows but it was asserted that the nature of injuries on the face and left temporal region could not have been caused by the lathis and, therefore, the death had occurred in the manner suggested by the police in a train accident and that it was not caused by the police while the deceased was in their custody. In this connection, it would suffice to notice that the Doctor, who conducted the postmortem examination, excluded the possibility of the injuries to Suman Behera being caused in a train accident. The injuries on the face and the left temporal region were found to be post-mortem injuries while the rest were ante-mortem. This aspect of the medical evidence would go to show that after inflicting other injuries, which resulted in the death of Suman Behera, the police with a view to cover up their crime threw the body on the rail-track and the injuries on the face and left temporal region were received by the deceased after he had died. This aspect further exposes not only the barbaric attitude of the police but also its crude attempt to fabricate false clues and create false evidence with a view to screen its offence. The falsity of the claim of escape stands also exposed by the report from the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory dated 11.3.1988 (Annexure R-8) which mentions that the two pieces of rope sent for examination to it, did not tally in respect of physical appearance, thereby belying the police case that the deceased escaped from the police custody by chewing the rope. The theory of escape has, thus, been rightly disbelieved and I agree with the view of Brother Verma J. that the death of Suman Behera was caused while he was in custody of the police by police torture. A custodial death is perhaps one of the worst 607 crimes in a civilised society governed by the Rule of Law.

It is not our concern at this stage, however, to determine as to which police officer or officers were responsible for the torture and ultimately the death of Suman Behera. That is a matter which shall have to be decided by the competent court. I respectfully agree with the directions given to the State by Brother Verma, J. in this behalf.

On basis of the above conclusion, we have now to examine whether to seek the right of redressal under Article 32 of the Constitution, which is without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which way be lawfully available, extends merely to a declaration that there has been contravention and infringement of the guaranteed fundamental rights and rest content at that by relegating the party to seek relief through civil and criminal proceedings or can it go further and grant redress also by the only practicable form of redress by awarding monetary damages for the infraction of the right to life.

It is exiomatic that convicts, prisoners or under-trials are not denuded of their fundamental rights under Article 21 and it is only such restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be imposed on the enjoyment of the fundamental right by such persons. It is an obligation of the State, to ensure that there is no infringement of the indefeasible rights of a citizen to life, except in accordance with law while the citizen is in its custody. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, under trials or other prisoners in custody, except according to procedure established by law. There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life. His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State is strict and admits of no exceptions. The wrongdoer is accountable and the State is responsible if the person in custody of the police is deprived of his life except according to the procedure established by law. I agree with Brother Verma, J. that the defence of “sovereign immunity’ in such cases is not available to the State and in fairness to Mr. Altaf Ahmed it may be recorded that he raised no such defence either.

608 Adverting to the grant of relief to the heirs of a victim of custodial death for-the infraction or invasion of his rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is not always enough to relegate him to .the ordinary remedy of a civil suit to claim damages for the tortuous act of the State as that remedy in private law indeed is available to the aggrieved party. The citizen complaining of the infringement of the indefeasible right under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be told that for the established violation of the fundamental right to fife, he cannot get any relief under the public law by the courts exercising writ jurisdiction. The primary source of the public law proceedings stems from the prerogative writs and the courts have, therefore, to evolve ‘new tools’ to give relief in public law by molding it according to the situation with a view to preserve and protect the Rule of Law. While concluding his first Hamlyn Lecture in 1949 under the title ‘Freedom under the Law’ Lord Denning in his own style warned:

“No one can suppose that the executive will never be guilty of the sins that are common to all of us. You may be sure that they will sometimes do things which they ought not to do: and will not do things that they ought to do. But if and when wrongs are thereby suffered by any of us what is the remedy? Our procedure for securing our personal freedom is efficient, our procedure for preventing the abuse of power is not. Just as the pick and shovel is no longer suitable for the winning of coal, so also the procedure of mandamus, certiorari, and actions on the case are not suitable for the winning of freedom in the new age. They must be replaced by new and up to date machinery, by declarations, injunctions and actions for negligence… This is not the task for Parliament….. the courts must do this. Of all the great tasks that lie ahead this is the greatest. Properly exercised the new powers of the executive lead to the welfare state; but abused they lead to a totalitarian state. None such must ever be allowed in this Country.” The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible Fights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts 609 and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations.

The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights.

Therefore, when the court molds the relief by granting “compensation” in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of exempellary damages’ awarded against the wrong doer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and persecute the offender under the penal law.

This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of the civil liberties of the citizen, have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to repair the damage done by its officers.to the fundamental rights of the citizen, notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings. The State, of course has the right to be indemnified by and take such action as may be available to it against the wrongdoer in accordance with law through appropriate proceedings. Of 610 course, relief in exercise of the power under Article 32 or 226 would be granted only once it is established that there has been an infringement of the fundamental rights of the citizen and no other form of appropriate redressal by the court in the facts and circumstances of the case, is possible. The decisions of this Court in the line of cases starting with Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Anr., [1983] INSC 87; [1983] 3 SCR 508 granted monetary relief to the victims for deprivation of their fundamental rights in proceedings through petitions filed under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the rights available under the civil law to the aggrieved party where the courts found that grant of such relief was warranted. It is a sound policy to punish the wrongdoer and it is in that spirit that the Courts have molded the relief by granting compensation to the victims in exercise of their writ jurisdiction. In doing so the courts take into account not only the interest of the applicant and the respondent but also the interests of the public as a whole with a view to ensure that public bodies or officials do not act unlawfully and do perform their public duties properly particularly where the fundamental rights of a citizen under Article 21 is concerned. Law is in the process of development and the process necessitates developing separate public law procedures as also public law principles. It may be necessary to identify the situations to which separate proceedings and principles apply And the courts have to act firmly but with certain amount of circumspection and self restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32 or 226 are misused as a disguised substitute for civil action in private law. Some of those situations have been identified by this Court in the cases referred to by Brother Verma, J.

In the facts of the present case on the findings already recorded, the mode of redress which commends appropriate is to make an order of monetary amend in favour of the petitioner for the custodial death of her son by ordering payment of compensation by way of exemplary damages. For the reasons recorded by Brother Verma, J., I agree that the State of Orissa should pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000 to the petitioner and a sum of Rs.10,000 by way of costs to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Board. I concur with the view expressed by Brother Verma, J. and the directions given by him in the judgment in all respects.

V.P.R.

Petition allowed.

The post Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa and Ors appeared first on B&B Associates LLP.

ACT:
Evidence Act 1872: Section 3–Appreciation of evidence–Criminal trial–Case based on circumstantial evidence–Proof–Court’s duty to scrutinize evidence–Motive, oral dying declarations, medical evidence, conduct of accused immediately and after the evidence, absconding of accused–Whether prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Evidence Act, 1872: Section 32–Dying declaration–proof of–Acceptance by Court when–More than two dying declarations–Trustworthy test–Court’s duty.

The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Object and purpose of–Cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young brides–Causes–Solutions to such situations–Court’s role what to be.

HEADNOTE:

The prosecution case was that on 23.8.1981 between 12-30 1.00 p.m., on hearing screams and cry of the deceased, aged about 18 years, P.W.2 alongwith her father PW3, and PW4 rushed to the house of the appellant They saw the father of appellant No. 1 (father-in-law of the deceased) alongwith the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased hurriedly coming out of the kitchen while the deceased was lying on the floor engulfed in flames.

As the appellant No. 1, did not respond to the request of PW2 to give her something to extinguish the fire, PW2 requested the father of the appellant No. 1 to give a bedsheet or blanket while the father of the appellant No. 1 was passing on a bed sheet to PW2, the appellant No. 2 (motherin-law of the deceased) objected. In the meanwhile PW2 took the bed sheet from the father of the appellant No. 1 and tried to extinguish the fire. The deceased asked PW2 for some water. PW3 removed the burning petticoat from the body of the deceased to save her from further burning. While doing so he also received some burn injuries. PW2 poured water into the deceased’s mouth and enquired from her as to what had happened.

The deceased told PW2 that her mother-in- law had poured kerosene over her and her husband had set fire to her. The deceased asked for more water, which was again given to her by PW2. The deceased’s statement made to PW2 was overheard by PW3 PW5 and some others who also reached the spot on hearing her cries.

PW5 went away to inform the matenal uncle of the deceased with one Ramakrishna on his motor cycle. There PW5 found PW1, the brother of the deceased and informed about the burning of the deceased and also what he had heard the deceased telling PW2.

PW1 reached the house of the appellant with Ramakrishna on his motor cycle. He saw a number of persons including PWs 2 and 3 gathered there. The deceased was lying on the floor and she had no clothes on her. PWl noticed that she had received burn injuries from her breasts downwards to her legs. On seeing her plight, PWl started crying and hitting his head against a piller. When the deceased noticed PW1 had come, she asked PW2 to bring her brother inside. PW2 went out and brought PWI to the kitchen. The deceased took the palm of her brother, PWl into her own palms and told him to tell mother and father that her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and her husband set her or fire. She requested him that he should not fight, “anyhow she was dying.” She also told PWl to take back the cash given to her and to divide it amongst her sisters in equal share and to get them married to nice persons. The appellant No. 1, the husband of the deceased came inside the kitchen with folded hands and begged her for forgiveness saying that he would not repeat what he had done. PWI got wild and caught hold of the neck of the appellant No. 1. FIW2 and PW3 rushed towards them and released the appellant No. 1 from the hold of PW1. They sent PWI to another uncle’s house and told the uncle to take care of PW1. When PWI returned to the house of the deceased after one hour he saw that PW6, a local Doctor, was giving first-aid to the deceased and she was lying on a cot in the verandah. PW6 advised at about 3.30 p.m. to remove the deceased to the Government Hospital. The deceased was brought to the hospital at about 5 p.m. At about 5.30 p.m., PW9, a doctor examined the deceased and declared her dead.

PWl along with his uncle went to the Police Station, adjacent to the hospital and lodged the FIR. A case under section 302 IPC was registered and police investigation was started.

Both the appellants were not found in the village when search for them was made by the investigating officer. The appellant No. 1 surrendered in the Court on 10.11.1981 while the appellant No. 2 surrendered in the Court on 7.12.1981. The Trial Court held that there was no motive for the appellant to commit the crime; that the evidence of PWs 2 to 4 could not be relied upon; that PW1 had made improvements in his statements recorded at the trial and, therefore the oral dying- declaration made to him could not be relied upon. The Trial Court also held that there was unexplained delay in lodging report with the policy. It acquitted the appellants, holding that the case was one of suicide and not of murder.

The State filed appeal in the High Court. The High Court held that the chain of the established circumstances was complete and the circumstances were sufficient to establish that the appellants alone had committed the crime of murder of the deceased. The High Court convicted both the appellants for the offence under section 302/34 IPC and sentenced each one of them to imprisonment for life. Hence this appeal before this Court under section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970.

The appellants contended that since the Trial Court had acquitted the appellants, the High Court was not justified in recording an order or conviction, as the findings recorded by the Trial Court could not be said to be perverse; that the dying declarations were not worthy of reliance and the motive was feeble and not established; that the surrendering of the appellants themselves in the court on 10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was enough to show that they had no guilty-conscious and the prosecution was not justified in relying upon this conduct as an adverse conduct against the appellants; and that since all neighbors had become hostile, out of fear the appellants did not act either to put off the fire or remove the deceased to the hospital.

The respondent-State submitted that the findings of the Trial Court were not only conjectural but also perverse and the evidence of the wit nesses was disbelieved on mere surmises; that the Trial Court did,not properly discuss the two dying declarations made by the deceased and since the dying declarations have been proved by reliable evidence, these by themselves could form the basis of conviction of the appellants; that the High Court after a careful appraisal of the evidence had rightly set aside the judgment of the Trial Court which suffered from illegality as well as manifest error and perversity,, and that the prosecution had established the case against the appellants beyond every reasonable doubt and their appeal deserved to be dismissed. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD:1.01. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and these circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the established circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap in the chain of evidence. The proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused alone and totally inconsistent with his innocence. The courts have, therefore, the duty to carefully scrutinize the evidence and deal with each circumstance carefully and thereafter find whether the chain of the established circumstances is complete or not before passing an order of conviction. [679 E-F]

1.02.In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance as its existence is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning. The motive in this case is alleged to be the greed of dowry. [679 H]

1.03.The evidence led by the prosecution to establish, the existence of motive is wholly reliable and is also consistent. The prosecution has successfully established that the appellants had strong and compelling motive to commit the crime because of her parents not agreeing to get the land registered in the name of the first appellant and their insistence to have the land registered in the name of their own daughter instead. The motive, has, been conclusively established by the prosecution. [682 D]

1.04.Both the dying declarations are oral. They have been made to friends and to the brother of the deceased respectively. In view of the close relationship of the witnesses to whom the oral dying declarations were made, it becomes necessary for the court to carefully scruitinize and appreciate the evidence of the witnesses to the dying declarations- [683. B]

1.05.PW1 is the brother of the deceased and therefore a very close relation, but mere relationship cannot be a ground to discard his testimony, if it is otherwise found to be reliable and trustworthy. In the natural course of events, the deceased who was on the verge of her death would have conveyed to her near and dear ones the circumstances leading to her receiving the burn injuries. PW1 has given a very consistent statement and has reproduced the words of the deceased clearly and truthfully. Nothing has been brought out in the cross examination to discredit his testimony at all. [683 C-D]

1.6.Despite searching cross-examination of both PW2 and PW3, nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to discredit them or doubt their veracity at all. After carefully analysing their evidence, it is found that PWs 2 and 3 as witnesses worthy of credence and trustworthy.[684 F]

1.07.From the evidence of PWs 1,2 and 3, both the dying declarations are provedto have been made by the deceased. They are the statements made by thedeceased and relate to the circumstances leading to her death. Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other and appear to have been made by the deceased voluntarily and in the natural course of events. They have a ring of truth about them. [684 G]

1.08The medical evidence, fully corroborates the prosecution case and lendssupport to the dying declaration and more particularly the manner inwhich the deceased had been set on fire.[686 D]

1.09.The normal human conduct of any person finding someone engulfed in flames would be to make all efforts to put off the flames and. save the life of the person. Though, the appellants were the closest relations of the deceased, they did not do anything of the kind. They rendered no first-aid to the deceased. Their conduct at the time of the occurrence, therefore, clearly points towards their guilt and is inconsistent with their innocence. The appellants did not even accompany the deceased to the hospital in the matador van. Had the husband not been a party to the crime, one would have expected that he would be the first person to take steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and leave no stone unturned to save her life. An innocent mother-in- law would have also done the same, even if she had no love or emotional feelings for her daughter-in-law. Neither the husband nor the mother-in-law of the deceased took any steps to remove the deceased to the hospital let alone accompany her to the hospital. This conduct also is inconsistent with their innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis, as stated by the deceased in her dying declarations, that the motherin-law had poured kerosene on her while her husband had lit fire and put her on flames. [686 H, 687 A-D]

1.10.The prosecution has, thus, successfully established that the conduct ofboth the appellants both at the time of the occurrence and immediatelythereafter is consistent only with the hypothesis-of the guilt of the appellants and inconsistent with their innocence. [688 B]

1.11.Absconding by itself may not be a positive circumstance consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not unknown that even innocent persons may run away for fear of being falsely involved in a criminal case and arrested by the police, but coupled with the other circumstances, the absconding of the appellants assumes Importance and significance. The prosecution has successfully established this circumstance also to connect the appellants with the crime. [688 E-F]

1.12.The prosecution has successfully established all the circumstances appearing in the evidence against the appellants by clear, cogent and reliable evidence and the chain of the established circumstances is complete and has no gaps whatsoever and the same conclusively establishes that the appellants and appellants alone committed the crime of murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the manner suggested by the prosecution. All the established circumstances are consistent only with the hypothesis that it was the appellants alone who committed the crime and the circumstances are inconsistent with any hypothesis other than their guilt. [688 G-H, 687 A]

2.01.Under Section 32, when a statement Is made by a person, as to the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances which result In his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. The statement made by the deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in that category provided it has been made by the deceased while in a lit mental condition. [684 H, 685 A-B]

2.02.A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement The shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth of the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person and the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any embelishment such a dying declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction even without looking for any coroboration. If there are more than one dying declarations, then the court has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these passes the test of being trustworthy. The Court must further find out whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same. [685 C-E]

2.03.Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other in all material facts and particulars. That the deceased was in a proper mental condition to make the dying declaration or that they were voluntary has neither been doubted by the defence in the course of cross-examination of the witnesses nor even in the course of arguments both in the High Court and before this Court. Both the dying declarations have passed the test of credit worthiness and they suffer from no infirmity whatsoever. [685 F-G]

2.04.The prosecution has successfully established a very crucial piece of circumstantial evidence in the case that the deceased had voluntarily made the dying declarations implicating both, the appellants and disclosing the manner in which she had been put on fire shortly before her death. This circumstance, therefore, has been established by the prosecution beyond every reasonable doubt by clear and cogent evidence. [685 G-H]

3.01.There has been an alarming increase in cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides. This growing cult of violence and exploitation of the young brides, though keeps on sending shock waves to the civilised society whenever it happens, continues unabated. There is a constant erosion of the basic human values of tolerance and the spirit of “live and let live’. Lack of education and economic dependence of women have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime. It is the woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime against the younger woman, as in this case, with the husband either acting as a mute spectator or even an active participant in the crime, in utter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. [689 C-D]

3.02.Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need of the day. Change of heart and attitude is what is needed. If man were to regain his harmony with others and replace hatred, greed, selfishness and anger by mutual love, trust and understanding and if woman were to receive education and become economically independent, the possibility of this pernicious social evil dying a natural death may not remain a dream only. [690-D]

3.03.The legislature, realising the gravity of the situation has amended the laws and provided for stringent punishments in such case and even permitted the raising of presumptions against the accused in cases of unnatural deaths of the brides within the first seven years of their marriage. [690 H]

3.04.The Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has been amended from time to time, but this piece of social legislation, keeping in view the growing menance of the social evil, also does not appear to have served much purpose as dowry seekers are hardly brought to book and convictions recorded are rather few. [691 A]

3.05.Laws are not enough to combat the evil. A wider social movement of educating women of their rights, to conquer the menace, is what is needed more particularly in rural areas where women are still largely uneducated and less aware of their rights and fall an easy prey to their exploitation. [691 B]

3.06.The role of courts, under the circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities or insignificant lacune in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women. [691 C] State (Delhi Administration) v. Lavnan & Ors., Crl. Appeals 93 and 94 of 1984 decided on 23.9.1985, referred to.

JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 629 of 1985.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1985 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 637 of 1983. K.Madhava Reddy, A. Subba Rao and A.D.N. Rao for the Appellants.

G. Prabhakar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR.ANAND, J. The curse of dowry has claimed yet another victim. Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam, the husband of the deceased-Kundula Koti Nagbani and his mother Kundula Annapurna (mother-in-law of the deceased) have filed this appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, dated 25.6.1985, setting aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge, East Godavari Division and convicting both the appellants for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for life.

On 23rd of August, 1981, between 12.30.1.00 p.m. on hearing screams and cry of deceased-Kundula Koti Nagbani, at that time aged about 18 years, Pulapa Lakshmi PW2, Vempati Paparao PW3 and Vempati Radha PW4, rushed to the house of the appellant and found both the appellants along with the father of appellant No. 1 (father-in-law of the deceased) hurriedly coming out of the kitchen while the deceased was lying on the floor engulfed in flames. Since, the appellants or the father-in-law of the deceased were making no attempts to put off the flames, PW2 asked appellant No. 1 to give her something so that she could extinguish the fire. He, however, did not respond. She then requested first appellant’s father to give something to her so that the fire could be put off. The father of appellant No. 1 enquired if he should get a bucket of water. PW2, thereupon, requested him to give either a bed-sheet or a blanket. The father of appellant No. 1 then brought out a bed sheet (Bontha) from the cot and as he was passing it on, to PW2, the mother-in-law of the deceased, appellant No. 2, told her husband not to give the bontha to PW2. PW2, in the meanwhile, took the bontha from the father of the first appellant and tried to extinguish the fire. The deceased turned her side. She was alive. The deceased asked PW2 for some water. Since, the petticoat of the deceased was burning, PW3, the father of PW2, who had also rushed along with her to the house of the appellant broke the thread of the petticoat to save her from further burning and threw away the burning garments In the process, he also received some burn injuries. PW2 poured water into the mouth of the deceased and enquired from her as to what had happened. The deceased told her that “her mother-in-law had poured kerosene over her and her husband had set fire to her”. The deceased again felt thirsty and asked for more water which was again given to her by PW2. The above statement made by the deceased to PW2 was overheard by PW3 and some others, who had also reached on hearing the cries. Vempati Nagabhushanam PW5, another immediate neighbor of the appellants living only about 2 yards away also heard the cries of the deceased and rushed to the house of the appellant. He noticed PW3 was pulling out the petticoat of the deceased while PW2 was attempting to extinguish fire. He saw PW2 pouring water into the mouth of the deceased. He also heard the statement made by the deceased to PW2 about the manner in which she had been set on fire. PW5 thereupon went away to inform the maternal uncle of the deceased at Malakapalli. On the way, he met one Ramakrishna coming on a motor-cycle and at his request Ramakrishna gave him a ride to Malakapalli. On reaching the house of the maternal uncle of the deceased, they found the brother of the deceased Vempati Sreerama Krishna Sreeram PWl was also present there.

He conveyed to them the information regarding the burning of the deceased and also what he had heard the deceased telling PW2. Ramarao and PWl then went on the same motorcycle to Dharmavaram. PWl reached the house of the appellant and saw a number of persons including PWs 2 and 3 gathered there. The deceased was lying on the floor and at that time she had no clothes on her. He noticed that she had received burn injuries from her breasts downwards to her legs. On seeing her plight, PW1 started crying and hitting his head against a pillar. When the deceased noticed that PW1 had come, she asked PW2 to call her brother PWl inside. PW2 thereupon went out and brought PW1 to the kitchen where the deceased took the palm of PWl into her own palms and told him in Hindi “please tell mother and father as I am telling you. My mother-in- law poured kerosene on me and my husband set fire. You tell father and mother about this. Don’t fight. Anyhow I am dying.” She also told her brother PW1 to take back the cash given to her and divide it amongst the sisters in equal share and get them married off to nice persons. At this juncture, the first appellant, husband of the deceased came inside the kitchen and with folded hands begged the deceased for forgiveness saying that he would not repeat what he had done and therefore he may be pardoned. PWl got wild and caught hold of the neck of the first appellant. PW2 and PW3 rushed towards them and released the first appellant from the hold of PW1 and sent PWl to another uncle’s house and told the uncle that since PWl was in an agitated mood he should take care of him. Within an hour, however, PWl went back to the house of the deceased and by that time, a local Doctor PW6, Dr. R. Radha krishnamurthy had arrived at the house and was giving first-aid to her and she was lying on a cot in the verandah. PW6 at about 3.30 p.m. advised the removal of the deceased to the Government Hospital at Kovvur. A matador van was secured and at about 4.30 p.m. PW1, Ramarao, his maternal uncle, the wife of Ramarao and some other neighbors took the deceased to the Government Hospital at Kovvur in the matador van reaching there at about 5 p.m. At about 5.30 p.m., Dr. K. Parameswaradas PW9 examined the deceased and declared her dead. PWl thereupon went to the police station which is adjacent to the hospital alongwith his uncle and lodged the report Ex.P4 with the Head Constable Md. Navabjani PW12. A case under section 302 IPC was registered and information was sent to Inspector of Police G. Scendavce Rao PW14 on telephone. After collecting a copy of the FIR, PW14 proceeded to the Government Hospital and from there went to the scene of occurrence. He seized M.0’s 1 to 3, drew the site plan of the scene of occurrence and examined PWs 1 to 5 and PW9 at Dharmavaram. He also held the inquest proceedings from 6.30 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. on August 24 1981 and after getting the postmortem conducted handed over the dead-body to the family of the deceased. PW9 Dr. K. Parameswaradas who conducted the postmortem examination in his report Ex.Pl8 noted extensive burns to the extent of 90% on the body of the deceased and opined that the deceased had died due to the extensive burns all over the body and that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. During the investigation, the investigating officer made a request for the preservation of viscera of the deceased so that it could be sent for chemical examination, as according to the state ment of PW6, the deceased had allegedly told him that she had consumed dettol to commit suicide and since she could not bear the pain she had set herself on fire. The report of the chemical examiner Ex.Pl6, however, revealed that no poison was detected and that the death had been caused due to extensive burns. Further investigation into the case was, carried out by Md. Baduruddin PW15, Inspector of the Crime Branch. During the investigation, the father of the deceased Venkataramana handed over letters Exs.Pl-P3 to the investigating officer. Both the appellants had made themselves scarce and were not found in the village when search for them was made by the investigating officer. The first appellant surrendered in the court on 10.11.1981 while the second appellant surrendered in the court on 7th of December, 1981.

After the investigation was over, challan was filed and both the appellants were sent up for trial in the Court of Sessions Judge East Godavari Division at Rajahmundry.

At the trial, the prosecution inter alia relied upon the following circumstances with a view to connect the appellant with the crime:-

(1) Motive;

(2) Two dying declarations made to PW2 and to PW1;

(3) Medical Evidence;

(4) Conduct of the appellant immediately and after the occurrence;

(5) Absconding of the appellants.

The appellants when examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code denied their involvement and stated the case to be a false one. They, however, produced no defence.

The learned Trial Court did not accept the prosecution version and held that there was no motive for the appellant to commit the crime; that the evidence of PWs 2 to 4 could not be relied upon; that PWI had made improvements in his statements recorded at the trial and, therefore, the oral dying declaration made to him could not be relied upon. The Trial court also held that there had been unexplained delay in lodging report with the police. The Trial Court placed reliance on the testimony of hostile witness PW6 and held that the case was one of suicide and not of murder. On those findings, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted both the appellants.

On an appeal, filed by the State, a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh set aside the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and convicted both the appellants for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC. Speaking for the Division Bench, K. Ramaswamy J. (as His Lordship then was) found no hesitation to hold PWl as a witness of truth and a wholly reliable witness and also opined that the evidence of ’PWs 2 and 3 was trustworthy and reliable. The dying declarations made by the deceased to PW2 and subsequently to PWl were believed and relied upon. It was held that report Ex.P4 had been given by PWl immediately after the deceased was declared dead by the Doctor and therefore there was no delay much less unexplained delay in lodging the report. While dealing with the conduct of the appellant, it was opined that their conduct was inconsistent with their innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis that appellant no. 2 had committed the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased and appellant No. 1 had lit fire. With regard to the existence of motive, it was held that the appellants were actuated with a motive to do away with the life of the deceased for not getting the land registered in the name of the first appellant. Finally, the High Court found that the chain of the established circumstances was complete and the circumstances were sufficient to conclusive establish that the appellants and the appellants alone had committed the crime of murder of the deceased. The High Court held that the consideration of evidence on record and the reasoning of the Trial Court was most unsatisfactory and could not be sustained and therefore set aside the order of acquittal and convicted both the appellants for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced each one of them to imprisonment for life.

Appearing for the appellants before us, Mr. Madhav Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel urged that since the Trial Court had acquitted the appellants, the High Court was not justified in recording an order of conviction as the findings recorded by the Trial Court could not be said to be perverse. It was argued that the dying declarations were not worthy of reliance and the motive was feeble and not established. Learned counsel submitted that the surrendering of the appellants themselves in the court on 10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was enough to show that they had no guilty conscious and the prosecution was not justified in relying upon the conduct as an adverse conduct against the appellants. While explaining the conduct of the appellants at the time of and after the occurrence, he submitted that since all neighbors had become hostile, out of fear the appellants did not act either to put off the fire or remove the deceased to the hospital.

In reply, learned counsel for the State argued that the findings of the Trial Court were not only conjectural but also perverse and the evidence of the witnesses was disbelieved on mere surmises. It was submitted that the Trial Court did not property discuss the two dying declarations mad by the deceased and since the dying declarations have been proved by reliable evidence, those by themselves could form the basis of conviction of the appellants. It was then submitted that the High Court after a careful appraisal of the evidence had rightly set aside the judgment of the Trial Court which suffered from illegality as well as manifest error and perversity. Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution had established the case against the appellants beyond every reasonable doubt and their appeals deserve to be dismissed. Admittedly, there is no eye-witness in the case. The case is sought to be established by the prosecution from circumstantial evidence. In a case based on circumstantial, evidence, the settled law is that the circumstance from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved an these circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the established circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap in the chain of evidence. The proved circumstances must be consistent only wit the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused alone and totally inconsistent wit his innocence. The courts have, therefore, the duty to carefully scrutinize the evidence and deal with each circumstance carefully and thereafter fin whether the chain of the established circumstances is complete or no before passing an order of conviction. It is in the light of the above principles that we shall deal with various circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. (1)Motive: In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive as sums great significance as its existence is an enlightening factor in process of presumptive reasoning. The motive in this case is alleged to be the greed of dowry.

On 18.5.1979, marriage between the appellant and the deceased was solemnised. The deceased aged about 18 years was prosecuting her Intermediate course of study at that time. She was the eldest of the five children of one Vempati Venkataramana, who at the relevant time was working as an Assistant Engineer with the Railways at Gorakhpur. At the time of the marriage, the parents of the deceased had agreed to give Rs. 50,000 in cash, 50 sovereigns of gold and two acres of land as dowry. The cash was paid at the time of the marriage itself alongwith 15 sovereigns of gold. The parents of the deceased had promised to give the remaining 35 gold sovereigns and get the land also registered subsequently, though the possession of the land measuring about 3.70 acres was given to the appellant No. 1. The mother-in-law of the deceased and her husband had been pressurising the deceased all along to bring the remaining sovereigns and also to get the land registered in the name of the first appellant. She conveyed it to her mother PW7. While the parents of the deceased agreed to get the land registered in the name of the deceased, the first appellant and his parents were insisting that the land should be got registered in his name and not in the name of the deceased. Since that desire was not fulfilled, the deceased was being continuously harassed and ill-treated. A strick vigil was kept on her at the house of her in-laws and she was not even allowed to meet anybody nor were the neighbors permitted to come and meet or talk to her. She was being prevented from writing letters to her family also, but stealthy, she wrote letters Exs.Pl-3 and got them posted through a neighbor.

The contents of those letters are rather revealing and expose the extent of the harassment to which the deceased was being subjected to by her mother-in-law and her husband. After seeing the contents of the letters and with a view to find out the cause of her distress, PW1, her brother went to Dharmavaram on August 22, 1981, to the house of the deceased. The deceased, however, was so terrorised that she could not speak to him freely. She was surrounded by her husband and her mother-in-law, who did not talk to PWl at all to show their indifference. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and particularly that of the mother of the deceased PW7, the immediate provocation was the insistence of the appellants that the land be got registered in the name of the husband and the reluctance’ of the parents of the deceased to do so and instead their desire to get it registered in the name of the deceased. The oral evidence led by the prosecution in this behalf is wholly consistent. In her letter Ex.P2, the deceased had clearly mentioned that she was getting her letters posted through PW4. She requested her sisters to write letters to her in Hindi so that her in-laws, who did not know Hindi, could not know what was being written. In one of her letters, a part of which was addressed to her sister, she wrote:

“…….I am not going to anybody’s house. One day I went to the house of sister-in-law Radha to deliver the letter secretly. Their mood was changed on account of going to their house. That is why I stopped going.” Do not mention even a single word in your letter that I have been writing to you. Ask mother not to worry. On hearing about your results write a letter without fail. If I get an opportunity I will definitely write a letter…”

In her letter Ex.P1 to her father, she wrote: Father I am feeling much bore here because no one come to our house nor I am allowed to go their house Please always write letters. So that I may be satisfied in seeing your letters. If I may not give reply to your letter then you please don’t mind it. You know here’s conditions. Rest is O.K. Father you also take care of your health.”In the same letter while addressing her sisters, she wrote:

The lock is opened. I am writing this letter secretly. In reply do not write that you have received the letter. If you write like that these people will become more angry She also wrote to her sister: not at house and there is no watch over me. I am getting the letters posted through sister- in-law Radha secretly. You write letters mostly in Hindi only so that even if they chanced to fall in the hands of any one, they cannot understand

The tenor of her letters disclose the distressing state of affairs at the house of her-in-laws. These letters coupled with the evidence of her mother go to show how the deceased was being tormented and harassed. It is indeed a shame and pity that within just two years of her marriage, her dream of a happy married life was shattered and she found herself almost as a prisoner and ’a frightened chicken’ who had to write letters to her parents and sisters ’secretly’ for the fear that if her in- laws came to know they would “become more angry’. She had to request her sisters to reply to her letters in Hindi so that “even if they chanced to fall in the hands of anyone, they cannot understand”. One can only imagine the plight of this young bride and the sadistic behavior born out of greed for dowry of her husband and mother-in-law. Not having been able to get the land registered in the name of the first appellant appears to have frustrated them to the extent of murdering the young wife.

The evidence led by the prosecution to establish the existence of motive is wholly reliable and is also consistent. The prosecution has successfully established that the appellants had strong and compelling motive to commit the crime because of her parents not agreeing to get the land registered in the name of the first appellant and their insistence to have the land registered in the name of their own daughter instead. The motive, has, been conclusively established by the prosecution and we have no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the existence of the motive for both the appellants to commit the crime conclusively and positively and we agree with the finding of the High Court in that behalf.

2.Dying Declarations: The next piece of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution are two dying declarations made by the deceased. According to the prosecution case, the deceased made the first dying declaration before PW2 when she after hearing her cries came to the house and found both the appellants and the father of appellant No. 1 coming out of the kitchen and the deceased lying on the floor engulfed in flames. According to PW2, the deceased told her that her mother- in-law had poured kerosene on her and her husband had set her on fire. This statement was also heard by PW3 & PW5. The second dying declaration was made by the deceased to her brother PW1, after he was called by her to the kitchen. The deceased, according to the prosecution case, on meeting her brother, took the palm of PWl into her own palms and inter-alia told to him that “her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and her husband set fire to her”. The statement made by the deceased to PW1 was in Hindi. Both the statements, as noticed above, relate to the circumstances leading to the cause of her death, as according to the medical evidence, the deceased died of 90% burn injuries. Both the dying declarations are oral. They have been made to friends and to the brother of the deceased respectively. In view of the close relationship of the witnesses to whom the oral dying declarations were made, it becomes necessary for us to carefully scrutinize and appreciate the evidence of the witnesses to the dying declaration.

We have already adverted to the evidence of these witnesses (PW1, PW2, PW3) while narrating the prosecution case. Indeed, PWl is the brother of the deceased and therefore a very close relation, but mere relationship cannot be a ground to discard his testimony, if it is otherwise found to be reliable and trustworthy. In the natural course of events, the deceased who was on the verge of her death would have conveyed to her near and dear ones the circumstances leading to her receiving the burn injuries. PW1 has given a very consistent statement and has reproduced the words of the deceased clearly and truthfully. Nothing has been brought out in the cross examination to discredit his testimony at all. He had at the earliest point of time disclosed as to what the deceased had told to him. The discrepancy pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants as to whether the dying declaration was made to him by his sister when she was lying on the cot in the verandah, as stated in FIR Ex.P4, or while she was lying on the floor of the kitchen, is of an insignificant nature and could be either out of confusion or the gap of time between the making of the two statements. Moreover, PW1 was not at all cross-examined on the alleged discrepancy when he gave evidence in Court. No explanation whatsoever was sought from him about the so called discrepancy. PW1, the brother of the deceased appears to us to be a truthful witness and his testimony has impressed us. He did not implicate the father of the appellant and gave evidence only about what he was actually told by his sister. From our appreciation of the evidence of PW1, we agree with the view expressed by the High Court that “considering the case from all perspectives we have no hesitation to hold that P.W.1 is a witness of truth worthy of acceptance and so he is wholly a reliable witness. Ex.P4 is a voluntary statement given by P.W.1 and it lends corroboration to the evidence of P.W.1.”Coming now to the evidence of PWs2 and 3. The substratum of their evidence with regard to the dying declaration is that while that they were in the kitchen of their own house, taking tea, they heard the cry of a lady and rushed to the house of the deceased, being her close neighbors. They saw the deceased engulfed in flames sprawled on the floor of the kitchen. They also saw both the appellants as well as the father of appellant No. 1 coming out of the kitchen to the verandah. The distance between the house of PWs2 and 3 from the house of appellant is only 2 yards. After PW2 took a bontha from the father-in-law of the deceased, to the annoyance of appellant No. 2, with a view to extinguish the fire, the deceased, on enquiry by the witness as to what had happened told her that ’my mother-in-law poured kerosene on me and my husband set me on fire”. The deceased had not implicated her father-inlaw, though he was also present there’ PW3, father of PW2, had assisted PW2 to extinguish the flames and it was he who broke the string of the petticoat of the deceased and threw it away. In the process PW3 himself suffered burn injuries. His injuries were examined by the Doctor and found to be caused by fire. The Trial Court doubted the testimony of PW3 on the ground that he had made some improvement in his evidence in court when he stated that he had heard the deceased screaming and saying that she was “being killed”. He had not stated so in his statement recorded during the investigation. This, in our opinion, is hardly an improvement of any consequence because both in his statement in court as well as the one recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC he has deposed that it was on hearing the ’screams’ of the deceased that he and his daughter rushed to the house of the decased. In any event the so called improvement was not sufficient to discard his testimony. Despite searching cross-examination of both these witnesses, nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to discredit them or doubt their veracity at all. After carefully analysing their evidence, we find PWs 2 and 3 as witnesses worthy of credence and trustworthy.

From the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3, both the dying declarations are proved to have been made by the deceased. They are the statements made by the deceased and relate to the circumstances leading to her death. Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other and appear to have been made by the deceased voluntarily and in the natural course of events. They have a ring of truth about them.

Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible evidence and unless evidence is tested by cross-examination, it is not credit-worthy. Under Section 32, when a statement is made by a person, as to the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances which result in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. The statement made by the deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in that category provided it has been made by the deceased while in a fit mental condition. A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth of the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person and the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any embellishment such a dying declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction even without looking for any corroboration. If there are more than one dying declarations, then the court has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these passes the test of being trustworthy. The Court must further find out whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same. Having read the evidence of PWs 1-3 with great care and attention, we are of the view that their testimony is based on intrinsic truth. Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other in all material facts and particulars. That the deceased was in a proper mental condition to make the dying declaration or that they were voluntary has neither been doubted by the defence in the course of cross-examination of the witnesses nor even in the course of arguments both in the High Court and before us. Both the dying declarations have passed the test of creditworthiness and they suffer from no infirmity whatsoever. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has successfully established a very crucial piece of circumstantial evidence in the case that the deceased had voluntarily made the dying declarations implicating both the appellants and disclosing the manner in which she had been put on fire shortly before her death. This circumstance, therefore, has been established by the prosecution beyond every reasonable doubt by clear and cogent evidence.

3.Medical Evidence: The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the medical evidence which has been provided by the testimony of Dr. Parameswaradas PW9. He deposed that the deceased had died of 90% burns and that kerosene smell was emitting from the deadbody. According to the report of the chemical examiner, no poison was found in the viscera. The chemical examiner’s report, coupled with the other evidence on record belies the suggestion made by the defence during the cross-examination of some witnesses that with a view to commit suicide, the deceased had drunk dettol and when she could not bear the pain on account of consumption of dettol, she herself poured kerosene oil on herself and set herself on fire. Rightly, this defence case was not pursued before us with any amount of seriousness by the learned counsel for the appellants.. The medical evidence, therefore fully corroborates the prosecution case and lends support to the dying declaration and more particularly the manner in which the deceased had been set on fire.

4. Conduct of the appellant immediately and after the evidence:

The conduct of the appellants, son and mother, both at the time when the deceased lay burning on the floor of the kitchen and afterwards till she succumbed to the burn injuries is the next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution to connect the appellants with the crime. From the testimony of PWs 2, 3 and 4, who are the immediate neighbors of the appellant and the deceased, they had heard the cry of the deceased and rushed to her house. PWs 2 and 3 found the deceased lying on the floor of the kitchen engulfed in flames while both the appellants and father-inlaw of the deceased were coming out of the kitchen in the verandah. None of the two appellants or the father-in-law made any attempt whatsoever to extinguish the fire and save the deceased. The raised no alarm. They stood there as if waiting for her death, rather than make any effort to save her. Their conduct, thus, runs consistent with the hypothesis of their guilt and betrays that of an innocent persons. In their statements under Section 313 of Cr. PC they did not deny their presence in the house at the time of the occurrence, but denied their involvement in the crime. The normal human conduct of any person finding someone engulfed in flames would be to make all efforts to put off the flames and save the life of the person. Though, the appellants were the closest relations of the deceased, they did not do anything of the kind. Let alone making any effort to extinguish the fire, according to PW2 when the father-in-law of the deceased, at her request, was giving her the bontha to extinguish the flames, appellant no. 2, the mother-in-law of the deceased, objected to the same. This conduct speaks volumes about the extent of hatred which the mother-in-law exhibited towards her daughter-in-law. They rendered no first-aid to the deceased. Their conduct at the time of the occurrence, therefore, clearly points towards their guilt and is inconsistent with their ingnocence the appellants did not even accompany the deceased to the hospital in the matador van. Had the husband not been a party to the crime, one would have expected that he would be the first person to take steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and leave no stone unturned to save her life. An innocent mother-inlaw would have also done the same, even if she had no love or emotional feelings for her daughter-in-law. Neither the husband nor the mother-in-law of the deceased took any steps to remove the deceased to the hospital, let alone accompany her to the hospital. This conduct also is inconsistent with their innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis, as stated by the deceased in her dying declarations, that the mother-in-law had poured kerosene on her while her husband had lit fire and put her on flames. Mr. Reddy, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that since the neighbors and other relations of the deceased had almost taken over the house and the person of the daughterin-law, the appellants were afraid of being beaten and as such they rendered no aid to the deceased needs a notice only to be rejected. No suggestion whatsoever on these lines was made to any of the witnesses and in any event such an explanation betrays common sense. Since, the deceased had admittedly suffered burn injuries in the kitchen of her house, there was an obligation on the part of the appellants and the father-in-law of the deceased, who have admitted their presence in the house at the time of occurrence, to explain the circumstances leading to the deceased dying of 90% burn injuries. None has been offered. The theory of suicide was put up only as an argument of despair. While discussing the motive and the dying declarations, we have come to the conclusion that the deceased died as a result of the designed move on the part of both the appellants to put an end to her life and she did not commit suicide as was sought to be suggested during cross-examination by the defence to some witnesses. The theory of suicide has no legs to stand upon. The conduct of the appellants who did not try to extinguish the fire or render any first-aid to her, also totally betrays the theory of suicide and we agree with the High Court that the theory as set up by the appellants is highly unbelievable or acceptable. The prosecution has, thus, successfully established that the conduct of both the appellants both at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellants and inconsistent with their innoncence.

5) Absconding. Prosecution has also relied upon the circumstances of the absconding of the appellants to prove its case.

A closer link with the conduct of the appellants both at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter is also the circumstance relating to their absconding. Md. Badruddin PW15, the investigating officer, deposed that he had taken up the investigation of the case and having examined PWsl-4 had caused search to be made for the accused but they were not found in the village and despite search, they could not be traced. Appellant No. 1 surrendered before the court on 10.11.1981 while appellant No. 2 surrundered in the court on 7.12.1981. No explanation, worth the name, much less a satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the appellants about their absence from the village till they surrendered in the court in the face of such a gruesome ’tragedy’. Indeed, absconding by itself may not be a positive circumstance consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not unknown that even innocent persons may run away for fear of being falsely involved in a criminal case and arrested by the police, but coupled with the other circumstances which we have discussed above, the absconding of the appellants assumes importance and significance. The prosecution has successfully established this circumstance also to connect the appellants with the crimeIn view of the above discussion and our appraisal and analysis of-the evidence on record, we have no hesitation to hold that the.prosecution has successfully established all the circumstances appearing in the, evidence against the appellants by clear, cogent and reliable evidence and the chain of the established circumstances is complete and has no gaps whatsoever and the same conclusively establishes that the appellants and appellants alone committed the crime of murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the manner suggested by the prosecution. All the established circumstances are consistent only with the hypothesis that it was the appellants alone who committed.the crime And the circumstances are inconsistent with any hypothesis other than their guilt. It is most unfortunate that the husband of the deceased not only failed to perform his duties and obligations as husband to protect and take care of his wife as per the marriage vows and instead joined his mother in the most degrading and cold blooded murder of the young innocent bride. Of late there has been an alarming increase in cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides. This growing cult of violence and exploitation of the young brides, though keeps on sending shock waves to the civilised society whenever it happens, continues unabated. There is a constant erosion of the basic human values of tolerance and the spirit of “live and let live’. Lack of education and economic dependence of women have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime. It is more disturbing and sad that in most of such reported cases it is the woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime against the younger woman, as in this case, with the husband either acting as a mute spectator or even an active participant in the crime, in utter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. In many cases, it has been noticed that the husband, even after marriage, continues to be ’Mamma’s baby and the umbilical cord appears not to have been cut even at that stage. We are here tempted to recall the observations of R.N. Mishra, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman & Ors. Cr. Appeals 93 and 94 of 1984 decided on 23.9.1985, while dealing with a bride burning case. It was observed:

“Marriage, according to the community to which parties belong, is sacramental and is believed to have been ordained in heaven. The religious rites performed at the marriage altar clearly indicate that the man accepts the woman as his better-half by assuring her protection as guardian, ensuring food and necessaries of life as the provider, guaranteeing companionship as the mate and by resolving that the pleasures and sorrows in the pursuit of life shall be shared with her and Dharma shall be observed. If this be the concept marriage, there would be no scope to look for worldly considerations, particularly dowry. When a girl is transplanted from her natural setting into an alien family, the care expected is bound to be more than in the case of a plant. Plant has fife but the girl has a more developed one. Human emotions are unknown to the plant life. In the growing years in the natural setting the girl- now a bride-has formed her own habits, gathered her own impressions, developed her own aptitudes and got used to a way of life. In the new setting some of these have to be accepted and some she has to surrender. This process of adaptation is not and cannot be one-sided. Give and take, live and let live, are the ways of life and when the bride is received in the new family she must have a feeling of welcome and by the fond bonds of love and affection, grace and generosity, attachment and consideration that she may receive in the family of the husband, she will get into a new mould; the mould which would last for her life. She has to get used to a new set of relationships one type with the husband, another with the parents-in-law, a different one with the other superiors and yet a different one with the younger ones in the family. For this she would require loving guidance. The elders in the family, including the mother-in-law, are expected to show her the way. The husband has to stand as a mountain of support ready to protect her and espouse her cause where she is on the right and equally ready to cover her either by pulling her up or protecting her willingly taking the responsibility on to himself when she is At fault. The process has to be a natural one and there has to be exhibition of cooperation and willingness from every side. Otherwise how would the transplant succeed?”

Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need of the day. Change of heart and, attittide is what is needed. If man were to regain his harmony with others and replace hatred, greed, selfishness and anger by mutual love, trust and understanding and if woman were to receive education and become economically independent, the possibility of this pernicious social evit dying a natural death may not remain a dream only. The legislature, realising the gravity of the situation has amended the laws and provided for stringent punishments in such cases and even permitted the raising of presumptions against an accused in cases of unnatural deaths of the brides within the first seven years of their marriage., The Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has been amended from time to time, but this piece of soicial legislation, keeping in view the growing menance of the social evil also does not appear to have served much purpose as dowry seekers are hardly brought to book and convictions recorded are rather few. Laws are not enough to combat the evil. A wider social movement of educating women of their rights, to conquer the menance, is what is needed more particularly in rural areas where women are still largely uneducated and less aware of their rights and fall an easy prey to their exploitation. The role of courts, under the circumstances assumes greater importance and-it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities or insignificant lacunas in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women. The verdict of acquittal made by the Trial Court in this cast is an apt illustration of the lack of sensitivity on the part of the Trial Court. It recorded the verdict of acquittal on mere surmises and conjectures and disregarded the evidence of the witnesses for wholly insufficient and insignificant reasons. It ignored the vital factors of the case without even properly discussing the same.

The High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in convicting the appellants for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 readwith Section 34 IPC and sentencing each one of them to suffer imprisonment for life. We uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellants for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and dismiss their appeal. The appellants were directed to be released on bail by this Court on 30.3.1989. Their bail bonds are cancelled and they are directed to be taken in to custody to suffer the remaining period of their sentence.

V.P.R.

Appeal dismissed.

The post Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh appeared first on B&B Associates LLP.

Mr. Justice B.S. Yadav, Member ?

The facts leading to this Petition are that Shri Pawan Kumar Bairalia took a life policy from the Opposite Party – Life Insurance Corporation (for short the Corporation) on 28th December, 1975 for the sum of Rs. 50,000/-. He was husband of the present Complainant, Smt. Maina Devi Bairalia who was nominee under the policy. The insured paid the yearly premium at the time of taking the policy. He did not pay next yearly premium which fell due on 28th December, 1976. However, before he could pay the premium within the period of grace, he died on 11th January, 1977 in the Darbhanga Medical College and Hospital on account of sudden illness. Earlier to that he was keeping good health. The Complainant who is said to be 27 years of age at that time lodged a claim with the Corporation under the policy. She was not given any reply by the Divisional Office and did not acknowledge her letters in spite of reminders. She then wrote to the Chairman of the Corporation. Thereafter the Divisional Office of the Corporation sent a letter dated 18th November, 1982 to the Complainant which reads as follows:

“With reference to your complaint to our Chairman we have to inform you that the life assured died shortly after commencement of the policy and as such we have to undergo certain additional formalities in this case. As these formalities have not been completed, we have not been able to finalise consideration of the claim. We, however, assure you that we are trying our best to expedite completion of such formalities and as soon as these are over we shall write to you further in the matter.”

2. It is surprising that the Corporation could not complete the formalities for a period of more than 5 years. Thereafter, the Corporation again kept quiet and did not send any letter to the Complainant. On 30th October, 1984 even Mr. S.P. Singh, Agent of the Life Insurance Corporation, Darbhanga Branch wrote a letter to one Mr. Sarkar (some senior Officer of the Life Insurance Corporation). It will be useful to reproduce hereunder contents of that letter also to show the carelessness of the Corporation in the matter of settlement of the Complainant’s claim.

“Today when I contacted some responsible persons of this place to canvass for life insurance, they complained to me that the claim of the above deceased policy-holder is lying pending for the last so many years with the Muzaffarpur D.O. The widow who is the nominee in the above policy, I understand, wrote several times to the D.O. as also to the CO. but in spite of this the claim is still lying pending. The D.O. has not even acknowledged the letters of the nominee. I shall be highly obliged if you may kindly examine the matter at your level and see that the claim matter is settled without any further loss of time as already 6 or 7 years has lapsed since the submission of the claim forms by the nominee.”

However, in spite of it the claim of the complainant was not settled. She continued writing letters to the higher-ups in the Corporation as well as to the Minister of Finance, Government of India and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. Lastly the Complainant got a letter published in the Editor’s column of newspapers Jansatta and Indian Express dated 2nd July, 1990 about her misery. On 2nd July, 1990 Zonal Manager, on reading the letter published in Jansatta, informed the Complainant that a copy of the letter was being sent to the Muzaffarpur Divisional Office for necessary action. The matter was also taken up by a couple of Members of Parliament with the Finance Minister, Government of India. On reading those letters published in the newspapers on 8th August, 1990, Deputy Secretary (Mktg./PS) of the Life Insurance Corporation wrote a letter to the Complainant. The relevant portion of the letter reads as follows:

“We have received a copy of your complaint dated 10.7.1990 addressed to the Finance Minister, through the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi.

We have already taken up the matter with the Sr. Divisional Manager, Muzaffarpur D.O. and we have sent him a reminder today, advising him to give immediate attention to your complaint.”

The above narration of facts shows that the Corporation woke up from the long slumber only when the matter was taken up by the Finance Minister, Government of India. Thereafter, the Life Insurance Corporation on 19th November, 1990 wrote a letter to the Complainant informing her that the liability under the policy has been admitted by them on ‘ex-gratia basis’. Along with that letter a voucher of discharge was also sent for being executed by the claimant to enable the Corporation to arrange for payment of Rs. 50,310/- by a cheque. It may be mentioned here that in that letter it was not at all made clear why the liability has been admitted on ex-gratia basis. On that voucher which was to be executed by the complainant in full satisfaction of the claim under the policy, she made a mention about her being entitled to penal interest and then executed the voucher and sent it back. On December 13,1990 another voucher for execution was sent to the Complainant asking her not to make any additions or alterations. It appears that being frustrated by the conduct of the Corporation, the claimant executed the voucher and sent it back to the Corporation. A cheque for Rs.50,310/- was then sent to the complainant by the Corporation with a covering letter dated 4th February, 1991. Thereafter, the Complainant served a notice through a counsel upon the Corporation narrating her tale of woe and harassment and claimed the following amounts from the Corporation.

1. (a) Interest on the insured amount i.e. Rs. 50,000/- @ 15% for the period of 13 years

(11.1.1977 to 4.2.1991) Rs. 2,89,125/-

(b) Bonus for the period of 24 years –

(c) Expenses incurred in pursuance of the claim. Rs. 10,000/-

2. Compensation for the following:

(a) Mental torture Rs. 1,00,000/-

(b) Physical harassment Rs. 1,00,000/-

(c) Economical suffering Rs. 1,00,000/-

(d) Loss of business Rs. 5,00,000/-

3. The Corporation chose to ignore that notice. Thereupon, the Claimant filed the present complaint complaining about the negligence on the part of the Corporation in the rendering of the service. She prays for the aforementioned amounts. She also added one more item for Rs. 7,884/- as bonus on the amount assured.

4. The Corporation contested the complaint. In their counter they have pleaded that the Complainant had received the sum of Rs. 50,310/- against receipt in full and final settlement of her claim under the policy in question. It was also pleaded that complaint was time barred as the assured had died on 11th January, 1977and the complaint was being filed in 1992. On merit it was pleaded that at the time of taking the policy the assured had suppressed and concealed material facts with regard to his state of health. That in fact as per the investigations carried out by the Officer of the Corporation the deceased was admitted in Darbhanga Medical College and Hospital on 28th July, 1975 under registration serial No. 277.

5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. It has to be mentioned at the outset that the conduct of the Corporation in this case has been thoroughly objectionable and unfair. The complainant who is a widow had to fight for her claim under the policy for about 14 years. She had to approach high Officers in the Corporation as well as the Finance Minister, Government of India and also to get published letters in the editorial columns of Jansatta and Indian Express before the Corporation ultimately woke up.

6. In the counter it is mentioned that the assured had suppressed and concealed material facts. It is not clear from the counter that at what point of time the Corporation came to know about the alleged admission of the assured in the Darbhanga Medical College and Hospital on 28th July, 1975 under registration serial number 277. No documentary evidence has been filed about the alleged admission of the assured in the said Medical College and Hospital nor it is stated as to what was the nature of the disease the assured was suffering from at the time of his alleged admission.

7. At no point of time the claim of the Complainant was properly investigated nor was it brought to the Complainant’s notice at any time that the assured had suppressed or concealed any material fact at the time of submitting the proposal for insurance. The Corporation did not also repudiate the claim at any time. If any material fact had been suppressed or concealed by the assured at the time of taking the policy the Complainant ought to have been informed about that. However, this was not done. In the voucher earlier sent for execution to the Complainant the words “ex-gratia” have not been used. The Complainant wrote on the voucher “the penal interest on the above amount should also be paid to me” and signed below that endorsement. The Corporation sent another voucher Photostat copy of which is at page 55.

In that the words “on ex-gratia’ basis were introduced. As noticed above Complainant signed that voucher in utter frustration and under duress and coercion as otherwise the Corporation was unwilling to pay her even the amount of Rs. 50,310/- after the long lapse of time.

We hold that in the present case the Corporation has been highly negligent in the performance of its services. The Complainant has suffered hardship and loss on account of the deficiency in service. We hold that the Complainant is entitled to recover interest @ 12% per annum on the amount of Rs. 50,310/- from the date of expiry of three months from the death of the assured till the amount was paid to her on 4th February, 1990. The signing of the discharge voucher by the Complainant will not disentitle her to claim interest since we have found that she had executed the receipt under duress and coercion. The Complainant is also awarded Rs. 15,000/- as compensation for mental torture and harassment. She is also awarded Rs. 3,000/- as her costs of the present proceedings. Her claim in respect of other items is disallowed.

The post Maina Devi Bairalia Vs. Life Insurance Corporation appeared first on B&B Associates LLP.

B.S. Yadav, Member
1. Both the Revision Petition Nos. 175 and 247 of 1992 can be disposed of by this common order as the point involved is similar.

2. In Revision Petition No. 175 of 1992 the Complainant, Dr. U. Shanker Rao, Medical Director, M/s. National Medical Hospital, Second Line Beach, Madras decided to celebrate the Fifteenth Anniversary of his hospital on 11th March, 1990 at Hotel Woodlands, Madras. It was presided over by the Minister of Health of the Government of Tamil Nadu. It is alleged that about 600 invitation letters were issued and put into post at the Central Post Office, Madras on 5th and 6th March, 1990 which were addressed to Industrialists and Bankers etc. Most of the invitations are said to have reached the invitees on 13th and 14th March, 1990 and the function on 11th March, 1990 proved to be a poor show as only 200 persons attended it. According to the Complainant there was gross deficiency in service and negligence on the part of the Postal Department. He claimed damages in the sum of Rs. 75,661.50.

3. The complaint was resisted by the Opposite Parties. It was contended that no record of unregistered article is kept. The number of invitations posted by the complainant could not be ascertained by the Department. The delay, if any, was not wilful or intentional. The Opposite Parties also relied upon Section 6 of the Post Office Act and the guidelines prepared by the Department to defeat the claim.

4. The District Forum, Madras believed the averments contained in the claim petition and awarded Rs. 12,929/- as compensation to the Claimant. It was further ordered that the said amount be paid within 30 days of the despatch of the order failing which the Opposite Parties were ordered to suffer simple imprisonment for three months.

5. Feeling aggrieved the Opposite Parties filed an appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Tamil Nadu, Madras. On behalf of the Department, reliance was placed upon Section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act and guidelines of the Department. It was held by the State Commission that those provisions constituted no defence when an action for compensation for deficiency of service or negligence is instituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short the Act). Accordingly the appeal was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the officers of the Postal Department mentioned above in the heading of Revision Petition (No. 175 of 1992) have come up before this Commission.

6. In Revision Petition No. 247 of 1992, Consumer Rights Protection Council representing Mr. Pitcharaman, had filed a complaint before the Consumer District Forum, Madurai against the officers of the Postal Department who are now Petitioners in the Revision Petition. The facts of the case are that the Complainant, Mr. Pitcharaman had sent one consignment of handloom towels to M/s. Renuka Hosiery, Calcutta through Economic Roadways Corporation under Lorry Receipt No. 1653835. The original Lorry Receipt was sent by the Complainant to Syndicate Bank, Calcutta by registered post with acknowledgement due through the Post Office, Sellur to the Syndicate Bank, Calcutta to be received by the Consignee before taking delivery. The acknowledgement was not received back by the Complainant. The Complainant learnt that the registered letter was not received by the Bank. He further learnt that some other person had taken delivery of the consignment from M/s. Economic Roadways Corporation on the basis of the said lorry receipt. It was alleged that due to the carelessness, negligence and misconduct of the Postal Authorities, the registered letter containing the original lorry receipt had fallen into the hands of some unscrupulous person who used it. The Complainant claimed Rs. 3,185/- as compensation for the value of the consignment plus Rs. 3,000/- for mental agony etc. plus Rs. 500/- towards expenses incurred. The Opposite Parties in their counter admitted the booking of the registered letter and averred that on inquiry it was found that the registered letter had reached the Calcutta R.M.S. but its further disposal was not known. According to the Opposite Parties the letter had been lost in the Calcutta R.M.S. In that case also Opposite Parties placed reliance upon Section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act and pleaded that the Government was not liable for any loss of any postal article in the course of transmission and no officer of the Post Office incurs any liability by reason of such loss unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by wilful act or default.

7. The District Forum directed the Postal Department to pay the amounts claimed by the Complainant plus Rs. 250 as costs of the proceedings.

8. Feeling aggrieved against that order the Postal Authorities filed appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Tamil Nadu, Madras. The Opposite Parties placed reliance upon Section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act and guidelines issued by Postal Department. That plea was brushed aside by the State Commission by remarking that it was no longer available to the Postal Department, after the passing of the Act, which has been put on the Statute Book specifically for the purpose of providing the consumers a cheap, speedy, inexpensive and expeditious remedy against deficiency in service, whether that deficiency is committed by the Government or any private body provided only that the services are hired by the consumer. It was also remarked that the Lorry Receipt was an important document and was sent by registered post but in a casual and cavalier manner, the Opposite Parties averred that though the letter had reached Calcutta RMS but from there it was lost and thus it only indicated extreme apathy and indifference, want of due negligence and care amounting to gross negligence on the part of the Postal Department. Accordingly the appeal filed by the Postal Authorities was dismissed and the award of the District Forum was upheld.

9. Feeling aggrieved against that order the Postal Authorities have come before this Commission in revision (No. 247 of 1992).

10. After hearing the parties we are of the opinion that the argument of the learned counsel for the respective Revision Petitioners has force. It was rightly argued that Section 3 of the Act clearly lays down that the Provisions of the Act are “in addition to but not in derogation of the” provisions of any other law for the time being in force. This shows that the Act provides additional means of obtaining remedy by a consumer but if the remedy is barred under any other Act, then the various Forums constituted under the Act cannot grant the remedy prayed for.

11. Section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act reads as follows : “The Government shall not incur any liability it reasons of the loss, misdelivery or delay or damage to, any postal article in course of transmission by post, except in so far as such liability may in express terms be undertaken by the Central Government as hereinafter provided, and no officer of the Post Office shall incur any liability by reason of any such loss, misdelivery, delay or damage, unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default.” Counsel for the Revision Petitioner inter alia relies on the said provision and contends that no claim will lie against the Postal Department or its officers merely on the ground that there has been loss misdelivery, delay or damage of any postal article in the course of transmission by the Postal Department unless the same has been caused fraudulently by the officer complained against of the post office or by his wilful act or any default. Under the scheme of the Act the claim for compensation will lie at the instance of the consumer only if there is deficiency in service. According to the Revision Petitioners the statutory protection to the Central Government which is in absolute terms stands as an exception to the general law relating to the commercial carriers. Post office is a branch of public service functioning under a statute and the liability for misdelivery or late delivery of an article can be fastened on the postal department or its officers only on the basis of express provisions of the Post Office Act. The services rendered by the Post Office are merely statutory and there is no contractual liability. Establishing the Post Offices and running the postal service the Central Government performs a governmental function and the Government does not engage in commercial transaction with the sender of the article through post and the charges for the article transmitted by post is in the nature of charges imposed by the State for the enjoyment of the facilities provided by the Postal Department and not in consideration of any commercial contract. The Post Office cannot be equated with a common carrier.

12. We are of the opinion that both the claim petitions referred to above are not maintainable in view of Section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act. As noticed earlier there is no allegation that the loss, misdelivery or delay occurred on account of fraudulent or wilful act of any particular postal employee.

13. We do not think it necessary to go into the averments of facts contained in those claim petitions in view of the legal position discussed above. However, we may point out that the order of the District Forum which has been referred while narrating the facts of Revision Petition No. 175 of 1992 is bad in the eye of law to the extent that the Forum has passed a composite order. While awarding compensation to the claimant, the Forum has also passed an order under Section 27 of the Act for non-payment of the amount within a certain period. It has been repeatedly held by this Commission that such a composite order should not be passed by the various forums constituted under the Act. Before passing an order under Section 25 and 27 of the Act, an opportunity should be given to the defaulting party to show cause that why such an order should not be passed. The party can show reasonable grounds. After taking into consideration those grounds the Forum can pass an appropriate order. However, we do not want to dwell on that part of the order any further. 14. For the foregoing reasons we accept both the Revision Petitions and set aside the orders of the State Commission as well as of the District Forum in each of those Revision Petitions and dismiss the complaints. In both the Revision Petitions we do not make any order as to costs.

The post Presidency Post Master Vs. U Shanker Rao appeared first on B&B Associates LLP.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J & K PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION …PETITIONER
Vs.
DR NARINDER MOHAN …RESPONDENT
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/12/1993
BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. SINGH N.P. (J)
CITATION:
1994 AIR 1808 1994 SCC (2) 630
JT 1993 (6) 593 1993 SCALE (4)597

J U D G M E N T

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.RAMASWAMY, J.- In SLP (C) Nos. 16496-502 of 1993 the delay is condoned. Special leave is granted in all the cases. The appeals arise from the common judgment dated May 13, 1993 of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court, in LPA No. 76 of 1990 and batch.

2.Dr Narinder Mohan (R. 1) and Dr Tariq Parvez (R. 2), were appointed as lecturers on December 12, 1986 and January 21, 1987, respectively. Dr Jatinder Singh, Dr K. Mengi, Dr J.P. Singh, R. 3 to 5, were appointed in the same year 1986 and Dr Bharat Bhushan Gupta (R. 6) was appointed on May 12, 1988. All their appointments were on ad hoc basis in different disciplines of Medical Education. The Government relaxed the rules of recruitment and appointed on regular basis the Respondents I and 2 on September 19, 1988 and May 16, 1989 respectively. Their appointments and of the Respondents 3 to 6 were challenged in several writ petitions by Dr Vinay Rampal, appellant in C.A. …. of 1993 (arising out of SLP No. 13043 of 1993) and others. For regular recruitment when applications were invited, the recruitment also came to be challenged. The respondents in turn filed writ petitions for directions to regularise their services.

The learned Single Judge by his judgment dated September 19, 1990 declared that the appointments of respondents should be in accordance with the Jammu and Kashmir Medical Education (Gazetted) Services Recruitment Rules, 1979 (for short ‘the Rules’). The Government neither have power to relax the rules of recruitment nor have power to regularise the appointment of Respondents I and 2 on regular basis.

Accordingly he quashed their appointments. The appointments of the other respondents were also quashed as being ultra vires of the Rules. However, he directed their continuance in the posts for a period of three months thereafter and the Government was directed to fill up the 634 posts of lecturers on permanent basis as per the Rules through the Public Service Commission within three months from the date. The respondents were permitted to apply for regular recruitment and in case anyone becomes overaged, the cases may be sympathetically considered by relaxing age qualification under Rule 9(3). The posts of lecturers in Medical Education shall be filled up as per the Rules. If no regular appointments are made within three months, on its expiry, the appointments of the respondents shall stand lapsed. On appeal, the Division Bench by the impugned order held that as the Rules provide for appointment of ad hoc lecturers, their appointments were according to Rules. The respondents are possessed of the requisite qualifications to hold the posts. The Government have no power under Section 133 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution (Article 320 of the Constitution of India) to relax the rules of recruitment. The respondents are not members of the service, since they were not recruited according to the Rules. Therefore, directions were given as under:

“We direct the respondents in terms of decision in A.K. Jain v. Union of India’ to regularise the services of all the appellants in consultation with the Public Service Commission on evaluation of their work and conduct based on the confidential reports within three months. Such evaluation shall be done by the Public Service Commission. The doctors so regularised shall be appointed as Lecturers with effect from the date from which they had been continuously working as Lecturers.The respondents shall be at liberty to terminate the services of those appellants who are not so regularised.” 3.Calling in question these directions the Public Service Commission (for short ‘PSC’) the appellant filed the appeals, Dr Vinay Rampal who claimed for his appointment but was not granted relief, filed a separate appeal. The State came in appeal against the finding that Government have no power to relax the Rules and jurisdiction to make appointment of the respondents in disregard of the Rules.

4.Shri V.R. Reddy, the learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the PSC contended that Dr A.K Jain case’ is not a precedent that the PSC should recruit ad hoc doctors de hors the Rules, which envisaged their appointment only by the process of direct recruitment. The ad hoc appointments being contrary to the Rules, the direction to regularise the services by the PSC is illegal. It is also contended that the PSC has to conduct its functions under Section 133 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution (Article 320 of the Constitution of India), any direction to make recruitment is in derogation of the Constitution. The Rules do not provide any power to regularise the services of ad hoc doctors. The direction, therefore, is clearly de hors the law. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel, sought to support the impugned decision on two grounds. The ad hoc appointments, though strictly are not according to the Rules, by virtue of their long service for over four years and by now seven years, the respondents gained enough experience. Equally they settled their lives in the 1 1987 Supp SCC 497: [1987] INSC 266; 1988 SCC (L&S) 222: (1988) 1 SCR 335 635 service, and so they are entitled to be regularised. The non-appointment of them is also denial of the service to the society. Dr A.K. Jain case’ provides not only the norm but also ratio under Article 141 which the High Court has rightly followed in giving the impugned directions. It is notorious that the regular recruitment takes unduly long period. The Rules prescribe three years’ experience as a condition for appointment as lecturer and unless ad hoc appointment has been made, it is difficult to have requisite experience. This Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh2 gave directions to regularise services of all the ad hoc employees continuing in service for number of years. The Rules put no limitation on the power of the Government to make recruitment of the doctors by ad hoc appointment.

Adopting rational approach, the directions given by the Division Bench cannot be termed to be illegal.

Alternatively, it is contended that direction may be issued to the State Government to advertise yearwise vacancies for recruitment of the candidates who became eligible in that year so that the candidates having had requisite qualifications would be selected and absorbed from the respective dates and the left over vacancies’ would be thrown open for general recruitment. Shri M.H. Baig, the learned senior counsel, appearing for Respondents I and 2, while stating that Dr A. K. Jain case’ is not a ratio under Article 141, but to meet out justice, in other words to prevent injustice, this Court had given directions under Article 142 to continue the ad hoc doctors in service by regularisation through PSC. To buttress his argument he stated that during the year 1986 the State Government had imposed ban on private practice of government doctors.

Consequently many doctors had resigned from service. Though Respondents I and 2 who were recruited as doctors in ‘B’ grade service to serve in rural areas with higher scale of pay, they were asked to and the respondents opted for teaching side. Accordingly they have been continuing on ad hoc basis. On completing requisite number of years’ service, they would automatically become eligible for promotion as associate professors. Now directing them to stand in the queue for regular recruitment will result in depriving them of the long years of service they have put in. The State Government has power under these circumstances to relax the rules and to regularise the appointments. Therefore, to prevent injustice suitable direction should be given in that behalf. The learned counsel for the State sought to support the Government’s power of relaxation of the rules and the offending action by regularising the service of Respondents 1. and 2.

5.Rule 3 of the Rules empowers the State Government to constitute Jammu and Kashmir Medical Education (Gazetted) Service comprising of (i) teaching (ii) administrative and (iii) general. The service shall consist of such posts and classes and categories and such number of them to be determined by the Government from time to time. At the commencement of the Rules on September 19, 1979, the existing posts, classes and categories were specified in Schedule-I. Rule 4 provides membership of the service. The members of 2 (1992)4SCC118:1992SCC(L&S)825:(1992)21ATC403 636 the service shall be such persons “as are appointed to the service under the Rules”. The proviso says that the members continuing immediately before the Rules under Jammu and Kashmir Medical Education (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1974 shall be deemed to have been appointed to the corresponding posts in the service specified in Schedule-II.

Clause (b) of the explanation to Rule 4 provides that for the purpose of this Rule “any persons appointed to any post in service only by virtue of such deputation, contract, or ad hoc appointment, shall not be members of the Service”.

Thereby it is clear that unless a member either appointed under 1974 Rules and continuing as such or appointed to the service in accordance with the Rules, be shall not become a member of the service. The Explanation (b) expressly amplifies that the persons appointed on ad hoc basis, by virtue thereof, shall not become members of the service.

6.Rule 5 provides the mode of recruitment. Recruitment and appointment to the service shall be made by (a) direct recruitment; or (b) promotion by selection in the manner indicated against each post in Schedule-Ill. The eligibility of the person for recruitment or promotion to a post in the service has been specified in Rule 7, the details whereof are not material. The method of recruitment has been provided in Rule 8. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 postulates that while making selections (i) to the post in the teaching wing of the service, the Commission/Departmental Promotion Committee shall have regard to the qualifications etc., the details of which are not material. Under Rule 9, the upper age has been prescribed for eligibility of a candidate for recruitment and sub-rule (3) gives power to the Government to relax upper age-limit in any case or category of cases. Rule 10 prescribes seniority of the members of the service as regulated under J & K Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1956. Rule I 1 provides rule of reservation for appointment for recruitment either by selection, by direct recruitment or by promotion, to the members of Scheduled Castes or any other category, or class or permanent residents of the State for whom such reservation may be made under orders of the Government. The persons so appointed shall be on probation as prescribed in Rule 13 and Schedule-I. In Schedule-HI read with Rule 5(b) of the Rules for recruitment to the posts of Lecturers, including Clinical, Psychologist (NonMedical), the method of recruitment prescribed in column-V is “by direct recruitment”. A reading of these rules clearly indicates that a person appointed to the service shall be a member of any of the services namely teaching wing, administrative wing and general wing. Appointment shall be only either by direct recruitment or by promotion by selection. On making recruitment by the PSC and appointment by the State Government, such person shall be on probation and on successful completion he becomes a member of the service and he gets his seniority from the date of the appointment in terms of CCA Rules. Though the Rules do not expressly give power to the State Government to make an ad hoc appointment but Rule 4 visualises appointment on ad hoc basis but such ad hoc appointees, by virtue of such appointment only do not become members of the service. It would 637 appear that Rule 25 of CCA Rules read with Rule 4, Explanation (b), claimed to be the source of power to make ad hoc appointments. Rule 25 speaks of “temporary promotion” for short duration of three months but it does not appear to be a direct source of power for initial ad hoc appointment. A contention was raised and accepted by the Division Bench that the State under Article 162 of the Constitution has power to exercise executive power to make ad hoc appointments.

7.Existence of statutory rules is not a condition precedent to appoint an eligible and fit person to a post.

The executive power is co-extensive with legislative power of the State and under Article 162, the State can create civil posts and fill them up according to executive instructions consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is settled law that once statutory rules have been made, the appointment shall be only in accordance with the rules. The executive power could be exercised only to fill in the gaps but the instructions cannot and should not supplant the law, but only supplement the law. The Governor exercising the power under proviso to Section 125 (Article 309 of the Constitution of India) made the rules which do not expressly give the power to the State Government to make ad hoc appointments. No such rule has been brought to our notice. No express power was conferred and in fact cannot be conferred to relax the rules of recruitment. Having made the rules the executive cannot fall back upon its general power under Article 162 to regularise the ad hoc appointments under the Rules. Rule 9(3) empowers only to relax the qualification of age in particular exigencies which cannot be called in aid to relax the rules of recruitment. To tide over unforeseen exigencies, power to make ad hoc appointments, may be visualised as envisaged by Explanation (b) to Rule 4 but it expressly states that by virtue of such appointment, the ad hoc appointee does not become member of the service. The Rules prescribe direct recruitment/promotion by selection as the mode of recruitment which would be done only by PSC or promotion committee duly constituted and by no other body.

Therefore, ad hoc employee should be replaced as expeditiously as possible by direct recruits. A little leeway to make ad hoc appointment due to emergent exigencies, does not clothe the executive Government with power to relax the recruitment or to regularise such appointment nor to claim such appointments to be regular or in accordance with rules. Back door ad hoc appointments at the behest of power source or otherwise and recruitment according to rules are mutually antagonistic and strange bed partners. They cannot co-exist in the same sheath. The former is in negation of fair play. The later are the product of order and regularity. Every eligible person need not necessarily be fit to be appointed to a post or office under the State, selection according to rules by a properly constituted commission and fitment for appointment assures fairness in selection and inhibits arbitrariness in appointments. In view of the Explanation (b) to Rule 4, the ad hoc appointments to any post in any of the three wings of the 638 services under the Rules are therefore de hors the Rules.

Appointments of Respondents I to 6 cannot be held to be in accordance with the Rules.

8.It is true that under Article 320 of the Constitution (Section 133 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution) by operation of the proviso, it shall not be necessary for the President or the Governor, as the case may be, to consult the PSC in respect of any service or post in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State, as the case may be, either in general or in particular class or classes or any particular circumstances, but clause (1) of Article 320 postulates that it shall be the duty of the PSC to conduct examinations for appointment of service of the Union and the service of the State, respectively, and to assist the State for recruitment to any service for which the candidates fulfilling the qualifications are required. Though it is settled law that consultation is not mandatory but as held by this Court in Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab3 that the establishment of an independent body like PSC, is to ensure selection of best available persons for appointment to a post to avoid arbitrariness and nepotism in the matter of appointment. Commission is constituted by persons of high ability, varied experience and of undisputed integrity and further assisted by experts on the subject. Whenever the Government is required to make an appointment to a high public office, it is required to consult the PSC. The selection has to be made by the PSC and the Government has to fill up posts by appointing those selected and recommended by the Commission, adhering to the order of merit in the list of candidates sent by the PSC. The selection by the Commission, however, is only a recommendation of the Commission and the final authority for appointment is the Government. Government cannot appoint a person whose name does not appear in the list. But it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments will be made. The process for selection and selection for the purpose of recruitment against existing or anticipated vacancies, does not create a right to be appointed to the post which can be enforced by a mandamus. In M.C. Bindal v.

R.C. Singh4 this Court held that a candidate in order to be considered for appointment for a post must have the requisite qualifications. Under Article 320(3)(a) and (b), it is the duty of the PSC to consider and to get itself satisfied as to which of the candidates have fulfilled the requisites specified in the advertisement. It is the constitutional duty of the Commission under Article 320 to recommend the candidates fulfilling all the requisite qualifications for the posts to the Government for being considered for appointment to the post concerned. In Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India5 one of the contentions raised was that Rule 27 of the U.P. Forest Service Rules, 1952, empowers the Government to relax any conditions of service to remove undue hardship and the appointments of the ad hoc promotion is in 3 (1985) 1 SCC 122: 1985 SCC (L&S) 174: (1985) 1 SCR 899 4 (1989) 1 SCC 136: 1989 SCC (L&S) 86: (1988) 8 ATC 944:

AIR 1989 SC 134 5 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272: 1993 SCC (L&S) 694: (1993) 24 ATC 545 639 accordance with Rule 27. Considering the contention, this Court held that: (SCC p. 288, para 33) “There is a distinction between ‘rules of recruitment’ and ‘conditions of service’. To become a member of the service in a substantive capacity, appointment by the Governor shall be preceded by selection of a direct recruit by the Public Service Commission; undergoing training in Forestry for two years in the college and passing Diploma are conditions precedent. If the contention of the promotees that rules of recruitment are conditions of service is accepted, it would be open to the Governor to say that ‘I like the face of “A” and I am satisfied that he is fit to be appointed; I dispense with the rules of recruitment and probation and appoint “A” straightaway to the service in a substantive capacity as Assistant Conservator of Forest.”‘ Therefore, it was held that rule of relaxation cannot be exercised in matters of recruitment. It would be only to remove undue hardship that the power to relax the conditions of service should be exercised and rules relating to recruitment of the service should not be relaxed. In Syed Khalid Rizvi v. Union of India6 (C.A. No. 823 of 1989 etc.

dated November 20, 1992), it was reiterated that appointment to a post in accordance with the Rules is a precondition and the conditions of the rules of recruitment cannot be relaxed. Rule 3 of the Residuary Rules, though empowers the Government to relax the rules, it cannot be availed nor have power to relax conditions of recruitment. In A.K. Bhatnagar v. Union of India7 this Court held that from among temporary appointees, those selected by UPSC became seniors according to the merit determined by the PSC and the non-selectees would become juniors to them though the non-selectees were seniors as temporary appointees.

9.Moreover the proviso to Article 320 (proviso to Section 133 of J & K Constitution), though gives power to the State Government to specify case or class of cases in respect of which consultation with the PSC may be dispensed with still the recruitment shall be in compliance with either of the Article 320(1) and Section 133(1) of the J & K Constitution or by duly constituted body or authority. The rules or instructions should be in compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The procedure prescribed shall be just, fair and reasonable. Opportunity shall be given to eligible persons by inviting applications through the public notification and recruitment should be according to the valid procedure and appointment should be of the qualified persons found fit for appointment to a post or an office under the State. Therefore, it must be held that power of relaxation exercised by the Government is ultra vires the Rules and the High Court is right in holding that Government cannot relax the rules of recruitment to be made by the PSC. Government have no power to make regular appointment under the Rules without selection by the Public Service 6 1993 Supp (3) SCC 575: 1994 SCC (L&S) 84 7 (1991) ISCC 544: 1991 SCC(L&S) 601: (1991) 6ATC 501 640 Commission under Section 133(1) read with Rule 5 and Schedule-III of the Rules.

10.The next question is whether the direction given by the High Court to regularise the services of the respondents is valid in law. It is true that the ad hoc appointees have been continuing from 1986 onwards but their appointments are de hors the Rules. Rules prescribe only two modes of recruitment, namely, direct recruitment or promotion by selection. As regards the lecturers are concerned, it is only by direct recruitment. The mode of recruitment suggested by the High Court, namely, regularisation by placing the service record of the respondents before the PSC and consideration thereof and PSC’s recommendation in that behalf is only a hybrid procedure not contemplated by the Rules. Moreover, when the Rules prescribe direct recruitment, every eligible candidate is entitled to be considered and recruitment by open advertisement which is one of the well accepted modes of recruitment. Inviting applications for recruitment to fill in notified vacancies is consistent with the right to apply for, by qualified and eligible persons and consideration of their claim to an office or post under the State is a guaranteed right given under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The direction, therefore, issued by the Division Bench is in negation of Articles 14 and 16 and in violation to the statutory rules. The PSC cannot be directed to devise a third mode of selection, as directed by the High Court, nor be mandated to disobey the Constitution and the law.

11.This Court in Dr A.K. Jain v. Union of India’ gave directions under Article 142 to regularise the services of the ad hoc doctors appointed on or before October 1, 1984.

It is a direction under Article 142 on the peculiar facts and circumstances therein. Therefore, the High Court is not right in placing reliance on the judgment as a ratio to give the direction to the PSC to consider the cases of the respondents. Article 142 – power is confided only to this Court. The ratio in Dr P. P.C. Rawani v. Union of India8 is also not an authority under Article 141. Therein the orders issued by this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution to regularise the ad hoc appointments had become final. When contempt petition was filed for non-implementation, the Union had come forward with an application expressing its difficulty to give effect to the orders of this Court. In that behalf, while appreciating the difficulties expressed by the Union in implementation, this Court gave further direction to implement the order issued under Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is more in the nature of an execution and not a ratio under Article 141. In Union of India v. Dr Gyan Prakash Singh9 this Court by a Bench of three Judges considered the effect of the order in A.K. Jain case’ and held that the doctors appointed on ad hoc basis and taken charge after October 1, 1984 have no automatic right for confirmation and they have to take their chance by appearing before the PSC for recruitment.

8 [1991] INSC 274; (1992) 1 SCC 331: 1992 SCC (L&S) 309: (1992) 19 ATC 503 9_ 1994 Supp (1) SCC 306: JT (I 993) 5 SC 681 641 In H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnataka10 this Court while holding that the appointment to the posts of clerk etc. in the subordinate courts in Karnataka State without consultation of the PSC are not valid appointments, exercising the power under Article 142, directed that their appointments as a regular, on humanitarian grounds, since they have put in more than 10 years’ service. It is to be noted that the recruitment was only for clerical grade (Class-III post) and it is not a ratio under Article 141. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh2 this Court noted that the normal rule is recruitment, through the prescribed agency but due to administrative exigencies, an ad hoc or temporary appointment may be made. In such a situation, this Court held that efforts should always be made to replace such ad hoc or temporary employees by regularly selected employees, as early as possible. The temporary employees also would get liberty to compete along with others for regular selection but if he is not selected, he must give way to the regularly selected candidates. Appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an ad hoc or temporary employee. Ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee. He must be replaced only by regularly selected employee. The ad hoc appointment should not be a device to circumvent the rule of reservation. If a temporary or ad hoc employee continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. It is to be remembered that in that case, the appointments are only to Class-III or Class-IV posts and the selection made was by subordinate selection committee. Therefore, this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down as a general rule that in every category of ad hoc appointment, if the ad hoc appointee continued for long period, the rules of recruitment should be relaxed and the appointment by regularisation be made.

Thus considered, we have no hesitation to hold that the direction of the Division Bench is clearly illegal and the learned Single Judge is right in directing the State Government to notify the vacancies to the PSC and the PSC should advertise and make recruitment of the candidates in accordance with the rules.

12.It is difficult to accept the contention of Shri Rao to adopt the chain system of recruitment by notifying each year’s vacancies and for recruitment of the candidates found eligible for the respective years. It would be fraught with grave consequences. It is settled law that the Government need not immediately notify vacancies as soon as they arose.

It is open, as early as possible, to inform the vacancies existing or anticipated to the PSC for recruitment and that every eligible person is entitled to apply for and to be considered of his claim for recruitment provided he satisfies the prescribed requisite qualifications. Pegging the recruitment in chain system would 10 1991 Supp (2) SCC 421 :1992 SCC (L&S) 53: (1992) 19 ATC 292: AIR 1991 SC 295 642 deprive all the eligible candidates as on date of inviting application for recruitment offending Articles 14 and 16.

13.Accordingly, we set aside the directions issued by the Division Bench of the High Court and confirm those of the Single Judge and direct the State Government of the J & K to notify the vacancies to the PSC which would process and complete the selection, as early as possible, within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of this order. The State Government should on receipt of the recommendation, make appointments in the order mentioned in the selection list within a period of two months thereafter.

Since the respondents have been continuing as ad hoc doctors, they shall continue till the regularly selected candidates are appointed. They are also entitled to apply for selection. In case any of the respondents are barred by age, the State Government is directed to consider the cases for necessary relaxation under Rule 9(3) of the age qualification. If any of the respondents are not selected, the ad hoc appointment shall stand terminated with the appointment of the selected candidate. The direction sought for by Dr Vinay Rampal cannot be given. His appeal is accordingly dismissed and the State appeal is also dismissed. The appeals of the PSC are accordingly allowed but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs.

The post J & K Public Service Commission Vs. Dr Narinder Mohan appeared first on B&B Associates LLP.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
UNNI KRISHNAN, J.P. AND ORS. ETC. ETC …PETITIONER
Vs.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. ETC. ETC. …RESPONDENT
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/1993
BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (CJ) BHARUCHA S.P. (J) PANDIAN, S.R. (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MOHAN, S. (J)
CITATION:
1993 AIR 2178 1993 SCR (1) 594
1993 SCC (1) 645 JT 1993 (1) 474
1993 SCALE (1)290

ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950:

HELD:By the Court, 1.The citizens of this country have a fundamental right to education. The said right flows from Article 21. This right is, however, not an absolute right. Its content and parameters have to be determined in the light of Articles 45 and 41. In other words, every child/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of 14 years. Thereafter his right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the State. [693B-C] 21.The obligations created by Articles 41, 45 and 46 of the Constitution can be discharged by the State either by establishing institutions of, Its own or by aiding, recognising and/or granting affiliation to private 602 educational institutions. Where and not granted to private educational institutions and merely recognition or affiliation is granted It may a” be insisted that the private education institution shall charge only that fee as is charged for similar courses in governmental Institutions.

The private educational institutions have to and are entitled to charge a higher fee not exceeding the ceiling fixed in that behalf. The admission of students and the charging of fee in these private educational institutions shall be governed by the evolved by this Court [693D-E] 3.A citizen of this country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, person or institution has a right much less a fundamental right to or recognition, or to grant-in-aid from the State. The recognition and affiliation shall be given by the State subject only to the conditions set out in, and In accordance with, the scheme laid down by this Court. No Government/University or authority shall be competent to grant recognition or affiliation with the said scheme. The said scheme shall constitute recognition or affiliation, as the case may be, in addition except In accordance a condition of such to such other conditions and terms which such Government, University or other authority may choose to impose. [693F-G]

4. Those institutions receiving aid shall howeverbe subject to all so terms and conditions, as the aid giving authority may impose In the interest of general public. [693H, 694A]

5. Section 3-A of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 Is violative of the equality clause enshrined in 14 and is, therefore, void. [694B] 6.None of the provisions of the enactments of other three States,viz., Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra says that the Management of a private educational institution can admit students, against “payment seats’, ‘irrespective of the ranking assigned to them In such test (En Test) or examination’. Much less do they say that to such admissions, the provision prohibition capitation fee shall not apply. No doubt they do not say expressly that such admissions shall be made on the basis of merit, but that is implicit If the notifications or orders issued thereunder provide otherwise, either expressly or by Implication, they would be equally bad. [690H, A-B] 603 Per Jeevan Reddy, J. (For himself and Pandian J.) Sharma, CJ and S.P.Bharucha, J. Concurring except on the question of rig to education being a fundamental right

11. Right to education is not statedexpressly as a Fundamental Right in Part III of the Constitution of India.

However, having regard to the fundamental significance of education to thelife of an individual and the nation, right to education is implicit In and flows from the right to life guarenteed by Article 21. That the right to education has been treated as one of transcendental importance in the life of an individual has been all over the world. Without education being provided to the citizen of this country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail. [644G, 652G-H, 653A-B), Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union, of India; [1983] INSC 206; [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67, to.

Miss Mohini jain v. State of Karnataka & Ors, [1992] INSC 184; [1992] 3 SCC 666, affirmed.

12. No doubt Article 21, which declares that no person shall be of his fife or personal, liberty except according to the procedure bed by law, is worded in negative terms, but It Is now well that Article 21 has both a negative and an affirmative dimension. It Is also well bed that the provisions of Parts III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and that Fundamental Rights are but a to the goal indicated in Part IV, and that the Fundamental Rights mad be construed in the not of the Directive Principles. [645C, 652E] Newspapers v. Union of India, [1959] S.C.L 12; Hussain Ara v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, [1979] INSC 67; [1979] 3 S.C.R. 532; A.R.

Antulay v.R.S. Nayak, [1992] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 225; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 51; Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors “[1964] 1 S.C.R 332; Vincent v. Union of India, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 468; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1988] 1 S.C.R.

279,; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 SC. 597; B.C.

Cooper v. Union of [1970] ‘SC. 564; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.

Union of India [1983] INSC 206; [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67; D.S. Nakara v. Union of of India [1983] SCR 130; The State of Madras v.Champakan Dorairajan, [1959] S.C.R. 995; Hanif v. State of 604 Bihar[1958] INSC 46; , [1959] S.C.R. 629; Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala 1973 Suppl. 521; U.P.S. C. Board v. Harishankar, [1978] INSC 146; A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 65 and Minerva Mills v. Union of India, [1980] INSC 141; A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, referred to.

Munn v. Illinois, 1877 (94) U.S. 113/142 and Boiling v.

Sharpe, 98 Lawyers Ed. 884, referred to.

13. The fact that right to education occurs in as many as three Articles in Part IV viz., Articles 41, 45 and 46 shows the importance attached to it by the founding fathers. Even some of the Articles in Part III viz, Articles 29 and 30 speak of education. [653F] Brown v. Board of Education, 98 Lawyers Ed. 873 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 32 Lawyers Ed. 2d. 15, referred to.

14. The mere fact that the State is not taking away the right at present does not mean that right to education is not included within the right to life. The content of the right is not determined by perception of threat The content of right to life is not to be determined on the basis of existence or absence of threat of deprivation. The effect of holding that right to education Is implicit in the right to life is that the state cannot deprive the citizen of his right to education except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that Mohini Jain was wrong in so far as it declared that the right to education flows directly from right to life.

[654E-G].

Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and Ors, [1992] INSC 184; [1992] 3 SCC 666, referred to.

15.However, the citizens of this country cannot demand that the State provide adequate number of medical colleges, engineering colleges and other educational institutions to satisfy all their educational needs. The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 must be construed in the light of the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution.

There are several articles in Part IV which expressly speak of right to education. [654H, 655A-B] Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and Ors., [1992] INSC 184; [1992] 3 SCC 666, overruled.

16A. Education means knowledge and knowledge itself Is power. The 605 preservation of means of Knowledge among the lowest ranks Is of more importanceto the public than all the property of all the rich men in the country. It Is this concern which underlies Article 46. [655D-E] John Adams: Desertation on Canon and Fuedal Law, 1765;

Rauschning. The Voice of Destruction: Hitler referred to.

1.7.A true democracy is one where education is universal, where people understand what is good for them and the nation and know how to govern themselves. Articles 45, 46 and 41 are designed to achieve the said goal among others. It is In the Hot of these articles that the content and parameters of the right to education have to be determined. [655F] 1.8.Thus, right to education, understood in the context of Articles 45 and 41, means: (a) every child/citizen of this country has a right to. free education until he completes the age of 14 years, and (b) after a child/citizen completes 14 years, his right to education is circumscribed by the limits of the economic capacity of the State and its development. Article 45 assures right to free education for all children until they complete the age of 14 Am. Among the several articles in Part IV, only Article 45 speaks of a time-limit; no other article does. This is very significant. The State should honour the command of Article

45. It must be made a reality. A childhood has a fundamental right to free education up to the age of 14 years. [655G, 656A, 658D] Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drain, referred to.

1.9.This does not, however, mean that this obligation can be performed only through the State schools. It can also be done by permitting, recognising and aiding voluntary nongovernmental organisations, who are prepared to impart free education to children. It does not also mean. that unaided private schools cannot continue. They can, indeed they too, have a role to play. They meet the demand of that segment of population who may not wish to have their children educated in State-run schools. They have necessarily to charge fees from the students. [658E] 1.10.The right to education further means that a citizen has a right to call upon the State to provide educational facilities to him within the limits of its economic capacity and development. This does not mean transferring Article 41 from Part IV to Part 111. No State would say that It need not provide education to its people even within the limits of Its economic 606 capacity, and development. It goes without saying that the limits-of economic capacity are, ordinarily speaking matters within the subjective satisfaction of the State.

Therefore, it is not correct to say that reading the right to education into Article 21, this Court would be enabling each and every citizen of this, country to approach the courts to compel the State to provide him such education as he chooses. The right to free education is available only to children until they complete the age of 14 years. There- after, the obligation of the State to provide education is subject to the limits of its economic capacity and development.

[660E-H, 661A] Francis C Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, [1981] INSC 12; [1981] 2 S.C.R. 516, referred to.

2.1.Private educational Institutions are a necessity in the present day context. It is not possible to do without them because the Governments are not in a position to meet the demand particularly in the sector of medical and technical education which call for substantial outlays. While education is one of the most Important functions of the Indian State, It has no monopoly therein. Private educational institutions Including minority educational institutions too have a role to play. Private educational institutions may be aided as well as unaided. Aid given by the Government may be cent per cent or partial. [674D-E] 2.2.So far as aided institutions are concerned, they have to abide by all the rules and regulations as may be framed by the Government and/or recognising(affiliating authorities in the matter of recruitment of teachers and staff, their conditions of service, syllabus, standard of teaching and so on. In particular, in the matter of admission of students, they have to follow the rule of merit and merit alone subject to any reservations made under Article 15. They shall not be entitled to charge any fees higher than what is charged in Governmental institutions for similar courses.

These are and shall be understood to be the conditions of grant of aid. The reason is simple: public funds, when given as grant and not as loan carry the public character wherever they go; public funds cannot be donated for private purposes. The element of public character necessarily means a fair conduct in all respects consistent with the constitutional mandate of Articles 14 and 15. All the Governments and other authorities in charge of granting aid to educational institutions shall expressly provide for such conditions (among others), If not already provided, and shall ensure com- 607 pliance with the same. Again aid may take several forms.

For example a medical college doesnecessarily require a hospital. The Government may permit it to avail of the services of a Government hospital for the purpose of the college free of charge. This would also be a form of aid and the conditions aforesaid have to be imposed may be with some relation in the of fees chargeable and observed.

The Governments (Central and State) and all other authorities granting aid shall impose such conditions forthwith, if not already imposed. These conditions shall apply, to exist as well as proposed private educational institutions. [674F-H, 675A-C] 23.So far as un-aided institutions are concerned they cannot be compelled to charge the same fee as Is dunged in Governmental institution, for the reason that they have to meet the cost of imparting education from their own resources and the main source, apart from dona- tions/charities, Many, can only be the fees collected from the students. It is here that the concepts of ‘self- financing educational institutions’ and cost based educational Institutions come in. However , commercialisation of education cannot and should not be permitted. The Parliament as well as State Lagislatures have expressed this intention in unmistakable terms. Both In the light of our tradition and km the stand-point of interest of public commercialisation is positively harmful;

it is opposed to public policy. [675D-E, 676B] 3.1. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution declares that all citizens of country shall have the right to any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. No opinion Is expressed on the question whether the right to established an education Institution can be said to be on any ‘occupation’ within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g). As- suming that It Is occupation such activity can In no event be a trade or business nor can it be a profession within the meaning of Article 19 (1) (g). Trade or business normally connotes an activity carried on with a profit motive. Education has never been commerce In this country. Making It one is opposed to the ethos, tradition and sensibilities of ibis nation. The argument to the contrary has an unholy ring to it. Imparting of education has never been treated as a trade or business in this country since times immemorial. It has been treated as a religious duty, and a charitable activity, but never as trade or business. Education in Its true aspect is more a mission and a vocation rather than a profession, trade or business, 608 however wide may be the denotation of the two latter words.

The Parliament too has manifested its Intention repeatedly (by enacting the U.G.C. Act, I.M.C. Act and A.I.C.T.E. Act) that commercialisation of education is not permissible and that no person shall be allowed to steal a march over a more meritorious candidate because of his economic power. The very same intention is expressed by the Legislatures of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu In the Preamble to their respective enactments prohibiting charging of capitation fee. [676D-H, 677A-D] 3.2.Imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or business. Education cannot be allowed to be converted into commence nor can the petitioners seek to obtain the said result by relying. upon the wider meaning of ‘occupation’.

The content of the expression ‘occupation’ has to be ascer- tained keeping in mind the fact that clause (g) employs all the four expressions viz, profession, occupation trade and business. Their fields may overlap, but each of them does certainly have a content of its own, distinct from the others. A law, existing or future, ensuring against the conversion of imparting of education into commerce would be a valid measure within the meaning of clause (6) of Article

19. [677F-G] State of Bombay v. R.M.D. C., [1957] INSC 33; [1957] SCR 874, relied on.

The sabar kherda Education Society) Sabar kherda v.’ State of Maharashtra AIR 1968 Bombay 91; Andhra Kesari Education Society v. Govemment of A.P., AIR 1984 AP. 251 and Bapuji Educational Association v. State, AIR 1986 Karnataka 119 disapproved.

3.3.The activity of establishing an educational institution, cannot be called a ‘profession’ within the meaning of Article 19(1) (g). It is significant to notice the words ‘to practice any profession’. Evidently, the reference is to such professions as may be practised by citizens i.e, individuals. [678G] N.U.C. Employees v. Industrial Tribunal A.I.R. 1962 S.C.

1080, referred to.

3A. Establishing educational institutions can by no stretch of inaginatiop be treated as ‘practising any profession’.

Teaching may be a profession but establishing an Institution, employing teaching and nonteaching staff, procuring the necessary infrastructure for running a school or college Is not ‘practising profession’. It may be anything but not practisIng a profession. It Is not necessary to go into the precise meaning and 609 content of the expressions profession, occupation, trade or business in the instant case. The main concern is only to establish that the activity of establishing and/or running an educational institution cannot be a matter of commerce.

[678H, 679A-B] 3.5.Assuming that a person or body of persons has a right to establish an educational institution, this right is not an absolute one. It is subject to such law as may be made by the State in the interest of general public. However, the right to establish an educational institution does not carry with it the right to recognition or the right to affiliation. [679C] 4.1.Recognition may be granted either by the Government or any other authority or body empowered to accord recognition.

Similarly, affiliation may be granted either by the University or any other academic or other body empowered to grant affiliation to other educational Institutions. In other words, it Is open to a person to establish an educational institution, admit students, impart education, conduct examination and award certificates to them. But be, or the educational institution, has no right to insist that the certificates or degrees (if they can be called as such) awarded by such institution should be recognised by the State muchless have they the right to say that the students trained by the institution should be admitted to examinations conducted by the University or by the Government or any other authority, as the case may be. The institution has to seek such recognition or affiliation from the appropriate agency. [679F-G] 4..2.No educational institution except an University can award degrees (Sections 22 and 23 of the U.G.C. Act).

The private educational institutions cannot award their own degrees. Even if they award any certiricates or other testimonials they have no practical value inasmuch as they are not good for obtaining any employment under the State or for admission into higher courses of study. No private educational institution can survive or subsist without recognition and/or affiliation. [680F-G] 4.3.The bodies which grant recognition and/or affiliation are the authoritiesof the State. In such a situation, it is obligatory in the interest of generalpublic upon the authority granting recognition or affiliation to insist upon such conditions as are appropriate to ensure not only education of requisite standard but also fairness and equal treatment in the matter of admission of students. Since the recognising/affiliating authority is the State, it is under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of Its duty 610 enjoined upon it by Article 14 of the Constitution. It cannot allow Itself or main activity attach to supplemental activity as well. Affiliation/recognition is not there for anybody to get it gratis or unconditionally. No Government, authority or University is justified or is entitled to grant recognition/affiliation without imposing such conditions.

Doing so, would amount to abdicating its obligations enjoined upon It by Part III, its activity Is bound to be as unconstitutional and illegal [680H, 681A-C]

4.4 The private educational institutions merely supplement the effort of the State in educating the people. It is not an independent activity. It is an activity supplemental to the principal activity carried on by the State. ore, what applies to the main activity aplies equally to supplemental activity. The State cannot claim immunity from the obligations arising from Articles 14 and 15, and so, It cannot confer such Immunity upon Its affiliates. [680G, 681D] 5.1.Keeping in view the positive features of the several Central and State enactments, this Court has evolved a scheme, which every authority granting recognition/affiliation shall Impose upon the Institutions seeking recognition/affiliation. The idea behind the scheme Is to eliminate discretion In the management altogether In the matter of admission. It is the discretion in the matter of admission that is at the root of the several ills complainedof and has mainly led to the commercialisation of education. [681E-F] 5.2.’Capitation Fee’ means charging or collecting amount beyond what is permitted by law-, all the Acts have defined this expression In this sense. A situation should be brought where there Is no room or occasion for the management or anyone on Its behalf to demand or collect any amount beyond what is permitted. However, charging the permitted fees by the private educational institutions which Is bound to be higher than the fees charged in similar governmental institutions by itself cannot be characterised as capitation fees. This is the policy underlying all the four States’ enactments prohibiting capitation fees. All of them recognise the necessity of charging higher fees by private educational Institutions. They seek to regulate the fees that can be charged by them which may be called permitted fees and to bar them from collecting anything other than the permitted fees, which is what’Capitation fees’ means.The attempt In evolving the scheme precisely is to give effect to the said legislative policy. It Its power and privilege to be used unfairly. The incidents attaching to the 611 would be highly desirable If this scheme is given a statutory shape by incorporating It in the Rules that may be framed under these enactments. [681F-H, 682A-B] 53.The scheme evolved is in the nature of guidelines which the appropriate Governments and recognising and affiliating authorities should impose and implement in addition to such other conditions and stipulations as they may think appropriate as conditions for grant of permission, grant of recognition or grant of affiliation, as the case may be.The scheme for the present is confined only to ‘professional colleges’ run by private educational institutions. [682C] 5.4.Only those institutions which seek permission to establish and/or recognition and/or affiliation from the appropriate authority shall alone be made bound by this scheme. This scheme is not applicable to colleges run by Government or to University colleges. Thus, the scheme should be made a condition of permission, recognition or affiliation, as the case may be. ‘These conditions should necessarily be imposed, in addition to such other conditions as the appropriate authority may think appropriate. No private educational institution shall be allowed to send its students to appear for an examination held by any Government or other body constituted by it or under any law or to any examination held by any University unless the concerned institution and the relevant course of study is recognised by the appropriate authority and/or is affiliated to the appropriate University, at the case may be. [693A-C] 5.5.It shall be open to the appropriate authority and the competent authority to issue such further instructions or directions, as they may think appropriate, not inconsistent with this scheme, by way of elaboration and elucidation.

This scheme shall apply to and govern the admissions to professional colleges commencing from the academic year 1993-94. [687G-H] 6.1.Until the commencement of the current academic year, the Andhra Pradesh was following a somewhat different pattern in the matter of filling the seats in private unaided engineering colleges. Though all the available seats were being filled by the allottees of the Convenor (State) and the managements were not allowed to admit any student on their own a uniform fee was collected from all the students. The concepts of ‘free seats’ and ‘payment seats’ were, therefore, not relevant in such a situation 612 all were payment seats only. Such a system cannot be said to be constitutionally provide more opportunities to meritorious students who may not be the to pay the enhanced free prescribed by the government for such colleges. The system devised would mean correspondingly mm financed burden on payment students whom in the system in vogue in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the burden is equally distributed among all the stu. dents. The theretical foundation for the method devised by the court is that a candidate/studeut who is stealing a march over his compatriot on account of his economic power should be made not only to pay for himself but also to pay for another meritorious student. This is the social justification behind the 50% rule prescribed in the scheme. In the interest of uniformity and in the light of the above social theory, the State of Andhra Pradesh should adhere to the system devised by the Court [688B-E] 6.2.In the circumstances, it is not necessary for this Court to go into or answer the question whether grant of permission to establish and the grant of affiliation Imposes an obligation upon an educational institution to act fairly in the matter of admission of the students and It requires debate in a greater depth and any expression of opinion thereon at this juncture is not really warranted. [631C, 688F] 7.1.Section 3-A of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 is, in the nature of an exception to the other provisions of the Act The Sec. don, read as a whole leads to the following consequences: (a) it is open to the private eductional institutions to charge as much amount as they can for admission. It will be a matter of bargain between the Institution and the student seeking admission;

(b) the admission can be made without reference to inter-se merit of paying candidates. The institution will be entitled to pick and choose the candidates among the applicants on such considerations as It may deem fit; (c) Section 5, which prohibits collection of capitation fee by an educational Institution, is expressly made inapplicable to such admissions. This is not without a purpose. The purpose Is to permit the institutions to charge as much as they can in addition to the collection of the prescribed tuition fee. [689E, G-H,69OA-B] 7.2.The educational activity of the private educational institutions is supplemental to the main effort by the State and what applies to the main activity applies equally to the supplemental activity as well. Since Article 14 tionally not permissible. But the Idea in devising the scheme has been to 613 of the Constitution applies to the State innstitutions and compels them to admit students on the basis of merit and merit alone (subject, of course, to any permissible reservations wherein too, merit inter-se has to be fol- lowed) the applicability of Article 14 cannot be excluded from the supplemental effort/activity. Ile State Legislature had, therefore, no power to say that a private educational institution will be entitled to admit students of its choice, irrespective of merit or that it is entitled to charge as much as it can, which means a free hand for exploitation and more particularly, commercialisation of education, which is impermissible in law. No such immunity from the constitutional obligation can be claimed or conferred by the State Legislature. On this ground alone, the Section is liable to fail. Mm section falls foul of Article 14 and must accordingly fail. The offending portions of Section 3-A cannot be severed from the main body of the section and, therefore, the whole section is liable to fall to the ground. [690C-G] Kranti Sangran Parishad v. NJ. Reddy, (1992) 3 A.L.T. “, affirmed..

7.3.Consequent on the striking down of Section 3-A, the question which arises is as to what should happen to the students who were admitted by the Private Engineering Colleges in this State, at their own discretion, to the extent of the 50% of the available seats. Though the High Court has invalidated these admissions they are continuing now by virtue of the orders of stay granted by this Court Until the previous year, the State Government has been permitting these private engineering colleges to collect a higher fees from all the students allotted to them. Of course, all the available seats were filled up by students allotted by the convenor of the common entrance exam; no one could be admitted by these colleges on their own. For the current year, these colleges admitted 50% of the students in their own discretion which necessarily means collection of capitation fees and/or arbitrary admissions for their own private masons. At the same time these colleges have been collecting the same fees as was charged last year both km the students allotted by the convenor as also-from those admitted by themselves. Thus, they have reaped a double advantage. Though the admissions were made In a hurry, but the fact remains that they have been continuing in the said course under the orders of this Court over the last about four months. The present situation has been brought about by a combination of circumstances namely the enactment of Section 3-A. the allotment of students to the extent of 50% only by the convenor and 614 the failure of the Government to immediately rectify the misunderstanding of the convenor. [691C-E, H, 692A] 7.4. In the circumstances, these students should not be sent out at this stage. May be, the result Is rather unfortunate but all the relevant circumstances have to be weighed. At the same time, the managements of these private engineering colleges should not be allowed to walk away with the double advantage referred to above. Since they have admitted students of their own choice to the extent of 50% and also because It is not possible to investigate or verify for what consideration those admissions were made, It is appropriate that these colleges should charge only that fee from the 50% free students as is charged for similar courses in the concerned university engineering colleges. For the remaining years of their course these colleges shall collect only the said fee, which for the sake of convenience may be called the ‘government feel. The balance of the amount which they have already collected during this year shall be remitted Into the Government account within six weeks.

Whichever college fails to comply with this direction it will stand disaffiliated on the expiry of six weeks of this order and the recognition granted to it, if any, by any appropriate authority shall also stand withdrawn. [692B-E] Per L.M. Sharma, CJ. (for himself and Bharucha J.) Concurring 1.1The question whether the right to primary education as mentioned in Article 45 of the Constitution of India, Is a Fundamental Right under Article 21 did not arises in Mohini Jain’s case and no finding or obserbation on that question was called for. h cannot be accepted that since a positive finding on that question was recorded in Mohini Jain’s case it becomes necessary to consider its correctness on merits.

this Court should follow the well established principle of not proceeding to decide any question A” Is not necessary to be decided In the case. Therefore. no opinion upon the question is expressed. However, the finding given In Mohini Jain’s case on this question was not necessary in that case and Is, therefore not binding law. If It becomes necessary to decide this question In any subsequent case then having regard to Its vast impact, inter alia, on the capacity financial capacity, the question may be referred to a larger Bench for decision. [622F-G, 623D-E] Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, [1992] INSC 184; [1992] 3 S.C.C. 666, referred to.

615 1.2. Suffice it to say that there is no Fundamental Right to Education for a professional degree that flows from Article

21. [623F] Per Mohan J (Concurring) 1.1.Article 21 acts as a shield against deprivation of life or personal liberty since personal liberty and life have come to be given expanded meaning It would not be incorrect to hold that life which means to live with dignity takes within it education as well. [697E, 705C] Addl. Dist. Magistrate v. S.S. Shukla, [1976] Supp.

S.C.R. 172, relied on.

1.2.The fundamental purpose of Education is the same at all times sad In all places. It is to transfigure the human personality into a pattern of perfectionthrough a synthetic process of the development of the body,the enrichment of the mind, the sublimation of the motions and the illumination of the spirit Education Is a preparation for a living and for life,when and hereafter.

In the context of a democratic form of government which depends for its sustenance upon the enlightenment of the populace education is at once at once a social and political necessity. Education is enlightenment If the one that leads dignity to a man. [695C, E, 706G] University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, [1963] INSC 81; [1964] 2 S.C.R. 703, relied on.

Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, US. Supreme Court Reports 98 Law. Ed. U.S. 347, referred to.

13. It is not correct to say that because Article 21 is couched in a negative languauge positive rights to life and liberty are not conferred.The as to why Article 21 did not positively confer a fundamental right to life or personal liberty like Article 19 is that great concepts like liberty and We were purposefully left to gather meaning from experience. They relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact. The drafters of the Constitution knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged. The right to life and liberty inhere In every man. There is no need to provide for the time in a positive manner.

Therefore, if really Article 21, which Is the heart of fundamental brights, has received added meaning from time to time,there is no justification as to why It cannot be interpreted in the light of Article 45, wherein the State of obligated to provide education up to 14 years of within the prescribed time limit [699D, 697E, G, 701G] 616 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India A.I.R. 1978 597; Kharak Singh v. State of UP., [1964] S.C.R. 332; Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1; Puthumma & Ors.

v. State of Kerala & Ors., [1978] INSC 7; [1978] 2 S.C.R. 537; American Constitution in Mussorie v. Holland [1920] USSC 87; 252 U.S. 416; State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhyaratiya & Ors., [1989] INSC 300; [1992] 2 Scale 791;

Satwant Singh v. A.P.O. New Deft [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525;

Govinda v. State of UP., [1975] INSC 75; [1975] 3 S.C.R. 946; Sunil Batra v.

Delhi Administration [1978] INSC 148; [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494; Charles Sobraj v.

Supt. Central Jail[1978] INSC 131; , [1979] 1 S.C.R. 111; Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, [1978] INSC 138; [1979] 1 S.C.R. 192; Hussaini Katoon v. State of Bihar, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 169; Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration [1980] INSC 98; [1980] 3 S.C.R. 855; v. State of Maharashtra [1983] 2 S.C.C. %; A.G. of India v. Lachmadevi, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 467; Paramananda Katra v. Union of India, [1989] INSC 254; [1989] 4 S.C.C. 286; Santistar Builder v. N.K.I Totame, [1990] 1 S.C.C. 520; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [1983] INSC 206; [1984] 3 S.C.C. 161; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] INSC 155; [1985] 3 S.C.C. 545; Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, [1992] INSC 184; [1992] 3 S.C.C. 666 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendranath, [1971] 1 S.C.C. 607, referred to.

1.4.If life is so interpreted as to bring within it right to education, it has to be interpreted in the light of directive principles. Harmonious interpretation of the fundamental rights vis-a-vis the directive principles must be adopted. [706H, 707A] State of Kerala & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Anr.[1976] 1 S.C.R.

906; Pathumma & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., [1978] INSC 7; [1978] 2 S.C.R. 537 and Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi & Ors., [1992] 4 S.C.C.

99, referred to.

Constituent Assembly Debates, 1948-49, Vol.VI, pp. 909 and 910, referred to.

2.1.A time limit was prescribed under Article 45. Such a time limit is found only here. If, therefore, endeavour has not been made till now to make this Article reverberate with life and articulate with meaning, the Court should step in.

The State can be obligated to ensure a right to free education of every child upto the age of 14 years. [713E] Norma Bernstein, Human Rights and Education, Vol.. 3 p.41;

John Ziman, World of Science and the Rule of Law, 1986 Edn.

p.49, referred to.

617 2.2.Higher Education calls heavily on national economic resources. The right to it must necessarily be limited in any given country by its economic and social circumstances.

The State’s obligation to provide it is, therefore, not absolute and immediate but relative and progressive. It has to take steps to the maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right of education by all appropriate means. But, with regard to the general obligation to provide education, the State is bound to provide the same, if it deliberately starved its educational system by resources that it manifestly had, unless it could show that it was allocating them to some even more pressing programme. Therefore, by holding education as a fundamental right up to the age of 14 years this Court is not determining the priorities. On the contrary, reminding it of the solemn endeavour, it has to take, under Article 45, within a prescribed time, which time limit has expired long ago. [716D-F] 2.3.Therefore, right to free education up to the age of 14 years is a fundamental right. Since fundamental rights and directive principles are complementary to each other, there is no reason why this fundamental right cannot be interpreted in this manner. Mohini Jain’s case had laid down the law somewhat broadly when it stated education at all levels. This must be confined to what is envisaged under Article 45. [719H, 717B, 716B] San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigues, [1973] 411 U.S., referred to.

Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, [1992] INSC 184; [1992] 3 S.C.C. 666, partly affirmed.

California Law Review, Vol. 57 19699 p. 380, referred to.

3.It cannot be said that establishment of an educational institution would be ‘business’. Nor again, could that be called trade since no trading activities are carried on.

Equally, it is not a profession. It is one thing to say that teaching is a profession but, it is a totally different thing to plead that establishment of an educational institution would a profession. It may perhaps fall under the category of occupation provided no recognition is sought from the State or affiliation from the University is asked on the basis that it is a fundamental right. [724G-H] P.V G. Raju v. Commissioner of Expenditure, I.T.R. Vol.

86 p.267; P.K Menon v. Income-tax Commissioner, [1959] Supp.

1 S.C.R. 133; Hindustan 618 Steel Limited v. State of Orissa, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 753 and Barendra Prasad Ray v. The Income-tax Officer, [1981] INSC 86; A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1047, referred to.

Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. R. Rajappa [1978] INSC 44; [1978] 3 S.C.R. 207 and Miss. Sundaranbai v. Government of Goa, [1988] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 604, distinguished.

P.Ramanatha Aiyar, Law Lexicon Reprint, Edn. 1987 p.897;

Black Law Dictionary, Fifth Edn. p.973 and Ramnath Iyer, Law Lexicon, Edn. 1987, referred to.

4.1.Educational Institutions can be classified under two categories (1) those requiring recognition by the State and, (2) those who do not require such a recognition. [725F] 4.2.There is absolutely no fundamental right to recognition in any citizen. The right to establishment and run the educational institution with State’s recognition arises only on the State permitting, pursuant to a policy decision or on the fulfilment of the conditions of the Statute. Therefore, where It is dependent on the permission under the Statute or the exercise of an executive power, it cannot qualify to be a fundamental right. Then again the State policy may dictate a different course. [725G-H, 726A] 4.3.The logical corollary of holding that a fundamental right to establish an educational Institution is available under Article 19(1)(g) would lead to the proposition, right to establish a university also. [726B] S.Azeez Basha & Anr. v. Union of India [1968] 1 S.C.R.

833, referred to.

4.4.If there is no fundamental right to establish a university a fortiori a fundamental right to establish an educational institution is not available. By implication also, a fundamental right of the nature and character conferred under Article 30 cannot be read into Article 19(1)(g). The conferment of such a right on the minorities in a positive way under Article 30 negatives the assumption of a fundamental right in this behalf in every citizen of the country. [727A-B] Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat, [1974] INSC 106; [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173, referred to.

619 4.5.Every activity or occupation by the mere fact of its not being obnoxious or harmful to society cannot by Itself be entitled to protection as fundamental right. Some rights, by the my very nature cannot be qualified to be protected as fundamental rights. [729B] 4.6.Accordingly, there is no fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to establish an educational institution, if recognition or affiliation is sought for such an educational institution. However, anyone desirous of starting an institution purely for the purposes of education the students could do so, but 22 and 23 of the University grants C ion Act Which prohibits the award of degrees except by a University most be kept in mind. [729C-D] 5.It is not possible to hold that a private educational institution either by recognition or affiliation to the university could ever be called an instrumentality of State.

Recognition is for the purposes of conforming to the standards laid down by the State. Affiliation is with regard to the syllabi and the course of study. Unless and until they are’in accordance with the prescription of the university, degrees would not be conferred The educational Institutions prepare the students for the examination conducted by the university. Therefore, they are obliged to follow the syllabi and the course of the study. [732B-C] Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [1980] INSC 219; [1981] 2 S.C.R. 79;

Tekraj Vasandi v. Union of India, [1989] 1 S.C.C. 236 and All India Sainik Schools Employees’ Assn. v. Sainik Schools Society, [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.C. 205, relied on.

6.1.These private institutions discharge a public duty. If a student desires toacquire a degree, for example, In medicine, he will have to route through a medical college.

These medical colleges are the Instruments to attain thequalification. Therefore, since what Is discharged by the educational institution is a public duty, that requires it to act fairly. In such a case, it will be subject to Article 14. [732D] 6.2.These educational institutions discharge public duties.

Irrespective of the educational institutions receiving aid, it is a public duty. If absence of aid does not detract from the nature of duty. [737C] Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti 620 Mahotsav Samarak Trust v. V.& Rudani [1989] INSC 134; [1989] 2 S.C.C. 691 and R.V. Panel on Take-Overs, 1987 1 All England Reports 564, relied on.

7.1.As on today, it would be unrealistic and unwise to discourage private initiative in providing educational facilities, particularly for higher education. The private sector should be involved and indeed encouraged to augment the much needed resources in the filed of education, thereby making as much progress as possible In achieving the constitutional goals in this respect Private colleges are the felt necessities of time. That does not mean one should tolerate the so-called colleges run In thatched huts with hardly any equipment, with no or Improvised laboratories, scam facility to learn in an unhealthy atmosphere, for from conducive to education. Such of them most be put down ruthlessly with an iron hand irrespective of who has started the institution or who desires to set up such an institution.They are poisonous weeds In the field of education. Those who venture are financial adventurers without morals or scruples. Their only aim is to make money, driving a hard bargain, exploiting eagerness to acquire a professional degree which would be a passport for employment In a country rampant with unemployment. They could be even called pirates In the high seas of education.

[742A-D) 7.2.However, not all the private Institutions belong to this category There are institutions which have attained great reputation by devotion and by nurturing high educational standards. They surpass the colleges run by the Government In many respects. They require encouragement From this point of view regulatory controls have to be continued and strengthened. The commercialisation of education, the racketeering must be prevented. The State should strive its utmost in this direction. [743C] 7.3.Regulatory measures must so ensure that private educational institutions maintain minimum standards and facilities. Admission within all groups and categories should be based only on merit There may be reservation of seats in favour of the weaker sections of the society and other groups which deserve special treatment. The norms for admission should be predetermined, objective and transparent [743D-E] 7A. Profiteering is an evil. If a public utility like electricity could be controlled, certainly, the professional colleges also require to be regulated. [744A] 621 Kerala State Electricity Board v. S.N. Govinda Prabhu, [1986] 3 S.C.R.; Suman Gupta and Ors. v. State of J & K and Ors., [1983] INSC 124; [1983] 3 S.C.R. 985; Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Anr. v. Association of Natural Gas Consuming Industries of Gujarat and Ors., [1990] Supp. S.C.C. 397 and Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. A.P.S.E.B., [1991] 3 S.C.C. 2″, referred to.

8.It is not correct to say that education must be available free and it must be run on a charitable basis.

The time is not yet ripe to hold that education must be made available on a charitable basis, though whenever trusts are made for advancement of education it was held to be a charitable purpose. [746C, 747H, 748A] St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, [1992] 1 S.C.C. 558; Special Commissioners of Income-tax v. Pemsel, 3 Tax Cases 53; The king v. The Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income-tax, 5 Tax Cases 408 and The Abbey Malvem Wells Ltd. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning 1951 (2) All England Law Reports 154, referred to.

P.R. Ganapathy Iyer. The Law relating to Hindu and Mahomedan Endowments, Chap. III p.46 & 49; B.K. Mukherje :

The Hindu Law of Religious and Chariatable Trust, p.58 para 2.7A, referred to.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No.607 of 1992.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

WITH
W.P.(C) Nos. 657, 602 & 678/92, SLP(C)No. 11852/92, W.P.(C) No.701, 770 & 729/92 SLP(C) No. 13263, 12830 & 13913/92 with I.A. Nos. 2-5, 13914 and 12845-58/92, W.P. (C) No. 785 & 836/92, SLP(C)No. 13940/92, W.P.(C) No. 779/92, 2337- 2338/83, C.A. No. 3573/92, W.P.(C) No.870/92, 855/92 & SLP(C) No.15039 of 1992.

Milon Kumar Banerjee, Attorney General, Dipankar Prasad Gupta, Solicitor General, V.R. Reddy, Additional Solicitor General, K.K. Venugopal, Santosh Hegde, K. Parasam, Shanti Bhushan, Kapil Sibal, R.K.Jain, Ms. Indira Jaising, C.S.

Vaidyanathan, D.D.Thakur, V.M.Tarkunde, Har Dev Singh, Sushil Kumar, Rana Jois, S.S. Javeli, S.K Dholakia Ashok Desai, C. Sitaramaiah Harish N. Salve, Madhunaik Nair, 622 Suchinto Chatterji, P.P. Tripathi, K.V. Mohan, Ejaz Maqbool, Vijai Kumar, V. Balachandran, S.R. Bhat, A.V. Rangam, A.

Ranganadhan, W.C. Chopra, Satish Parasaran, Jayant Bhushan, A. Subha Rao, Ms. Bharati Reddy, Ms. Pramila, T.V.S.

Narasimhachari Naresh Kaushik, Navin Batra, B.

Veerabhadrappa, Shankar Divate, Mrs. Lalitha Kaushik, S.C.

Patel Mohan V. Katarki Shambhu Prasad Singh, Rajeshwar Thakur, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, KV. Viswanathan, Madhu Naik, K.V. Venkataraman, K. Ram Kumar, Vivek Gambhir, S.K Gambhir, B.E. Avadh, M.D. Adkar, C.B. Babu, Smt. Ayajai C.V. Subba Rao, A.Mariarputham, Mrs. Aruna Mathur, Dr. Sumant Bhardwaj, Anuputham, Aruna & Co., Ms. Madhu Moolchandani S.A.

Sequeira, G.K Shevgoor, R.P. Wadhwani, Dr. J.P. Verghese, M.P. Raju, LJ. Vadakara, P.R. Ramasesh, Anip Sachthey, S.S.

Khanduja, Yashpal Dhingra, B.K. Satija, A.M. Majumdar, Sanjay Parikh, A.K. Panda, Karanja Wala, Ajay Malviya, Ranjan Mukherjee, R.K. Mehta, J.R. Das, D.K. Sinha, Mrs.

Bharati Sharma, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, Dr. Sumant Bhardwaj, R.S.

Hegde, K.R. Nagaraja, Sunil Dogra, Smiriti Misra, Ms.

Madhavan, P.H. Parekh, A.S. Bhasme, Vimal Dave and B.

Rajeshwar Rao for the appearing parties.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by SHARMA, CJ. We have had the benefit of going through the two judgments of our learned Brothers B.P Jeevan Reddy and S. Mohan, JJ. We are in agreement with the judgment of Brother B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. except to the extent indicated below.

2.The question which arose in the case of Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, [1992] INSC 184; [1992] 3 SCC 666, as also in the present cases before us, is whether a citizen has a Fundamental Right to education for a medical, engineering or other professional degree. The question whether the right to primary education, as mentioned in Article 45 of the Constitution of India, is a Fundamental Right under Article 21 did not arise in Mohini Jain’s case and no finding or observation on that question was called for. It was contended before us that since a positive finding on that question was recorded in Mohini Jain’s case it becomes necessary to consider its correctness on merits. We do not think so.

3.Learned arguments were addressed in support of and against the aforesaid view which have been noticed in the judgments of our learned Brothers. It was contended by learned counsel appearing for some of the 623 parties before us that Article 37 in Part IV of the Consititution expressly states that the provisions contained in Part IV shall not be enforceable by any court and that, therefore, assuming the right under Article 45 to be included within the ambit of Article 21, it would still not be enforceable. Emphasis was also laid upon the language used in Article 45 which requires the State to “endeavour to provide’ for the free and compulsory education of children.

A comparison of the language of Article 45 with that of Article 49 was made and it was suggested that whereas in Article 49 an ‘obligation’ was placed upon the State, what was required by Article 45 was “endeavour” by the State. We are of the view that these arguments as also the arguments of counsel on the other side and the observations in the decisions relied upon by them would need a thorough consideration, if necessary by a larger Bench, in a case where the question squarely arises.

4.Having given our anxious consideration to the arguments in favour of and against the question aforementioned, we are of the view that we should follow the well established principle of not proceeding to decide any question which is not necessary to be decided in the case. We, therefore, do not express any opinion upon this question except to hold that the finding given in Mohini Jain’s case on this question was not necessary in that case and is, therefore, not binding law. We are of the view that if it becomes necessary to decide, his question in any subsequent case then, for the reasons set out above and having regard to its vast impact, inter alia on the country’s financial capacity, the question may be referred to a larger Bench for decision.

5.For the purposes of these cases, it is enough to state that there is no Fundamental Right to education for a professional degree that flows from Article 21.

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. In these writ petitions, filed by private educational institutions engaged in or proposing to engage in imparting medical and engineering education the correctness of the decision rendered by a Division Bench comprising Kuldip Singh and R.M. Sahai JJ. in Miss Mohini Jain V. State of Karnataka and Ors., is called in question.

The petitioners,running medical/engineering colleges in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, say that if Mohini Jain is correct and is followed and implemented by the respective State Governments as indeed they are bound to they will have to close 624 down; no other option is left to them. It is, therefore, necessary in the first instance to ascertain what precisely does the said decision lay down.

2.The Karnataka Legislature enacted, in the Year 1984, the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation fee) Act. The preamble to the Act recites:

“An Act to prohibit the collection of capitation fee for admission to educations institutions in the State of Karnataka and matters relating thereto;

Whereas the practice of collecting capitation fee for admitting students into educational institutions is widespread in the State;

And whereas this undesirable practice beside contributing to large scale commercialisation of education has not been conducive to the maintenance of educational standards;

And whereas it is considered necessary to effectively curb this evil practice in public interest by providing for prohibition of collection or capitation fee and matters relating thereto;

Be it enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature in the Thirty-Fourth Year of the Republic of India as follows” Clause (b) of Section 2 defines the expression ‘Capitation fee in the following words:

“2(b)Capitation fee’ means any amount, by whatever name called, paid or collected directly or indirectly in excess of the fee prescribed under s”on 5, but does not include the deposit specified under the proviso to section 3.” Section 3 prohibits collection of. capitation fees by any educational institution or anyone connected with its management, notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force. The Section along with its proviso reads thus.

625 “3. Collection of capitation fee prohibited.

Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no capitation fee shall be collected by or on behalf of any educational institution or by any person who is incharge of or is responsible for the management of such institution:

Provided…………………..

Section 5, which is the other provision referred to in the aforesaid definition reads as follows:

5. Regulation of fees etc. (1) It shall be competent for the Government, by notification, to regulate the tuition fee or any other fee or deposit or other amount that may be received or collected by any educational institution or class of such institutions in respect of any of all class or classes of students.

(2)No educational institution shall collect any fees or amount or accept deposits in excess of the amounts notified under sub- section (1) or permitted under the proviso to section 3.

(3)Every educational institution shall issue an official receipt for the fee or capitation fee or deposits or other amount collected by it.

(4)All monies received by any educational institution by way of fee or capitation fee or deposits or other amount shall be deposited in the account of the institution, in any Scheduled Bank and shall be applied and expended for the improvement of the institution and the development of the educational facilities and for such other related purpose and to such extent and in such manner as may be specified by order by the Government.

(5)In order to carry out the purposes of sub-section (4), the Government may require any education institution to submit their programmes or plans of improvement and development of the institution for the approval of the 626 Government.” 3.Section 4 provides for regulation of admission in the educational institutions in the State. According to sub- section (1), the maximum number of students for admission that can be admitted to a course of study and the minimum qualifications shall be fixed by the Government. However, in the case of a course of study in an institution maintained by or affiliated to the University, the minimum qualifications shall be fixed by the University and not by the Government. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 4 pertain to ‘regulation of capitation fee during the period specified under the proviso to Section 3. In view of their importance, these sub-sections may be set out in full :

“(2) in order to regulate the capitation fee charged or collected during the period specified under the proviso to section 3, the Government may, from time to time, by general or special order, specify in respect of each private educational institution or class or classes of such institutions.

(a) the number of seats set apart as Government seats:

(b) the number of seats that may be filled up by the management of such institution.

(i) from among Karnataka students on the basis of merit, on payment of such cash deposits refundable after such number of years, with or without interest as may be specified therein, but without the payment of capitation fee; or (ii) at the discretion Provided that such number of seats as may be specified by the Government but not less than fifty per cent of the total number of seats referred to in the clauses (a) and (b) shall be filled from among Karnataka students.

Explanation. For the purpose of this section Karnataka students means persons who have studied in such educational institutions in the State of Karnataka run or recog- 627 nised by the Government and for such number of years as the Government may specify;

(3) an educational institution required to fill seats in accordance with item (1) of sub- clause (b) of clause (2) shall form a committee to select candidates for such seats.

A nominee each of the Government and the University to which such educational institution is affiliated shall be included as members of such committee.” These two sub-sections, in short, say: (i) it shall be open to the Government to specify the number of seats that may be set apart as “Government seats’ in any private educational institution or in a class or classes of such institutions;

(ii) The Government can also specify that out of the seats to be filled by the Management (Management quota), a particular number of seats may be filled from among Karnataka students, on the basis of merit on payment of such refundable deposit as may be prescribed; The government can also specify the number of seats that may be filled at the discretion of the management. (It is obvious that if the seats to be filled on the basis of merit/refundable deposit are not specified, all the seats other than “Government seats” can be filled at the discretion of the management;) (iii) the number of ‘Karnataka students’ (which expression is defined by the explanation) should not be less than 50% over-all; (iv) in case, the number of seats to be filled on merit-cum-refundable deposit are specified, a selection committee, as contemplated by sub-section (3) has to be formed for making the selection. The expression “Government seats” is defined in clause (e) of Section 2 in following words:

“(e) “Government Seats” means such number of seats in such educational institution or class or classes of such institutions in the state as the Government may, from time to time, specify for being filled up by it in such manner as may be specified by it by general or special order on the basis of merit and reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and such other categories, as may be specified, by the Government from time to time, without the requirement of payment of capitation fee or cash deposit.”

4. In exercise of the power conferred by section 5 of the Act, the 628 Government of Karnataka issued a notification on June 5, 1989. It provided that from the academic year 1989-90, the fees payable in private medical colleges shall be Rs.2,000 p.a. in case of students admitted against ‘Government Seats’ (the same as in the Government Medical Colleges), Rs.25,000 in the case of other Karnataka students and Rs.60,000 in the case of non-Karnataka students.

5.Miss Mohini Jain, a non-Karnataka student (she was from Meerut in Uttar Pradesh) applied for admission in M.B.B.S.

course in one of the private medical colleges in Karnataka.

She was informed by the college that if she pays Rs. 60,000 towards the first year’s tuition fee and furnishes a bank guarantee for the fees payable for the remaining years of the M.B.B.S. course, she will be admitted. Her parents were not in a position to pay the same and hence she could not be admitted. Her further case, which was denied by the Management of the college, was that she was asked to pay a capitation fee of Rs.4,50,000 as a condition of admission.

She approached this court under Article 32 challenging the aforesaid notification of the Karnataka Government and asking for a direction to be admitted on payment of the same fee as was payable by the Karnataka students admitted against the “Government Seats”.

6. The Bench which heard and disposed of the writ petition framed four questions as arising for its consideration viz., (i) Is there a ‘right to education’ guaranteed to the people of India under the Constitution ? If so, does the concept of ‘capitation fee’ infract the same ? (ii) Whether the charging of capitation fee in consideration of admission to educational institutions is arbitrary, unfair, unjust and as such violates the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution ? (iii) Whether the impugned notification permits the Private Medical Colleges to charge capitation fee in the guise of regulating fees under the Act ? and (iv) Whether the notification is violative of the provisions of the Act which in specific terms prohibits the charging of capitation fee by any educational institution in the State of Karnataka ?

7. On the first question, the Bench held, on a consideration of Articles 21, 38, 39(a) and (f), 41 and 45 of the Constitution:

(a) “the framers of the Constitution made it obligatory for the State to provide education for its citizens”;

629 (b)the objectives set forth in the preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved unless education is provided to the citizens of this country, (c)the preamble also assures dignity of the individual.

Without education, dignity of the individual cannot be assured;

(d)Parts III and IV of the Constitution are supplementary to each other. Unless the ‘right to education’ mentioned in Article 41 is made a reality, the fundamental rights in Part III will remain beyond the reach of the illiterate majority, (e)Article 21 has been interpreted by this Court to include the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it. “The ‘right to education’ flows directly from right to life.’ In other words, ‘right to education’ is concomitant to the fundamental right enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. The State is under a constitutional mandate to provide educational institutions at all levels for the benefit of citizens.” The benefit of education cannot be confined to either classes.

(f)Capitation fee is nothing but a consideration for admission. The concept of “teaching shops” is alien to our Constitutional scheme. Education in India has never been a commodity for sale.

(g)”We hold that every citizen has a ‘right to education’ under the Constitution. The State is under an obligation to establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the said right. The State may discharge its obligation through state-owned or state-recognised educational institutions. When the State Government grants recognition to the private educational institutions it creates an agency to fulfil its obligation under the Constitution. The students are given admission to the educational institutions whether state-owned or state- recognised in recognition of their ‘right to education’ under the Constitution. Charging capitation fee in consideration of admission to educational institutions, is a patent denial of a citizen’s right to education under the Constitution.” 8.On the second question, the Bench held that “the State action in permitting capitation fee to be charged by state- recognised educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India……….. The Capitation fee brings to the fore a clear class bias.” Admission of non-meritorious students by charging capitation 630 fees in any form whatsoever strikes at the very root of the constitutional scheme and our educational system. D.P.

Joshi does not come to the rescue of the private institutions.

9.On the third question, the Bench held that having regard to the scheme of the Act, charging of Rs. 60,000 for admission is ‘nothing but a capitation fee’. The private medical colleges have further been given a free hand in the matter of admission of non-Karnataka students irrespective of merit. It held further : “if the State Government fixes Rs. 2000 per annum as the tuition fee in government colleges and for “Government Seats’ in private medical colleges then it is the state-responsibility to see that any private college which has been set up with Government permission and is being run with Government recognition is prohibited from charging more than Rs. 2000 from any student who may be resident of any part of India. When the State Government permits a private medical college to be set-up and recognises its curriculum and degrees then the said college is performing a function which under the Constitution has been assigned to the State Government. We are therefore of the view that Rs. 60,000 per annum permitted to be charged from Indian students from outside Karnataka in Para 1 (d) of the notification is not tuition fee but in fact a capitation fee and as such cannot be sustained and is liable to be struck down.” 10.The notification impugned was accordingly held to be outside the scope of the Act and bad. (It was declared that the judgment shall not be applicable to foreign students and N.R.Is.). The Writ petition was allowed accordingly but Mohini fain was denied admission since “she was not admitted to the college 3n merit and secondly the course commenced in March-April, 1991.” (The decision was rendered on 30.7.1992). It was directed that the said decision shall have only prospective operation and shall not affect the admissions already made in accordance with the said notification.

It is the above propositions that have provoked this batch of writ petitions.

11. Mohini Jain was followed by a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kranti Sangram Parishad v. NJ. Reddy, (1992) 3 A.L.T. 99. the Respondents in those writ petitions including the State of Andhra Pradesh have filed a number of S.L.Ps. seeking leave to appeal against the said judgment.

In the said S.L.Ps., certain issues peculiar to those matters 631 arise, which we are not dealing with herein. This decision is concerned mainly with the correctness of Mohini jain and the following three questions, which were framed by us at the hearing. The three questions are:

(1)Whether the Constitution of India guarantees a fundamental right to education to its citizens ? (2)Whether a citizen of India has the fundamental right to establish and run an educational institution under Article 19(1)(g) or any other provision in the Constitution ? (3)Whether the grant of permission to establish and the grant of affiliation by a University imposes an obligation upon an educational institution to act fairly in the matter of admission of the students ? Before we deal with the above questions, it would be appropriate to notice the legal and relevant factual position obtaining in three others States, namely Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. All the matters before us arise from these four States only. Notice in these matters were however directed to all the States in the country. None has appeared excepting the above four States.

ANDHRA PRADESH 12.The Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 was enacted by the State Legislature with a view to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the educational system in the State of Andhra Pradesh, for reforming, organising and developing the said educational system and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental therewith. By virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 1, it applies to all educational institutions and tutorial institutions in the State except those governed by the University Acts or the A.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1971. Section 2 defines certain expressions occurring in the Act. Clause (11) defines the expression ‘college’ to include a medical college established or maintained and ad- ministered by or affiliated to or associated with or recognised by any University in the State. Clause (18) defines ‘educational institution’ to mean recognised schools and colleges including Medical Colleges. Chapter-VI (Sections 18 to 33) deals with establishment of educational institutions, their administration and control. Section 18 says that Government may, for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the Act, provide adequate 632 facilities for imparting education either by establishing and maintaining educational institutions by itself or by permitting any local authority or private body of persons to establish and maintain educational institutions. Section 19 classifies the educational institutions into (a) State institutions (b) local authority institutions and (c) private institutions. Section 20 deals with grant of permission for establishment of educational institutions.

It says that the competent authority (as defined in Clause (12) of Section 2) shall from time to time conduct a survey to identify the educational needs of the locality under its jurisdiction and notify in the prescribed manner through the local newspapers calling for applications from the educational agencies desirous of establishing educational institutions. In pursuance of such notification, applications may be filed either by existing institutions or new institutions as also by local authorities for establishment of new institutions or for expansion of the existing ones. Sub-section (3) prescribes the requirements which have to be satisfied by an applicant, the matters with respect to which the competent authority has to be satisfied before grant of permission and the steps that have to be taken by the person (to whom the permission is granted) within the specified period. According to the sub-section, an application has to be accompanied by (1) title deeds relating to the site for building, play-grounds and garden proposed to be provided. (2) Plans approved by the local authorities concerned which shall conform to the rules prescribed therefore and (3) documents evidencing availability of the financing needed for constructing the proposed buildings. The Authority must be satisfied before granting the permission that there is a need for providing educational facilities to the people in the locality, that there is adequate financial provision for continued and efficient maintenance of the institution as prescribed by the competent authority and evidence that the institution is proposed to be located in sanitary and healthy surroundings. The local authority or the body of persons to whom the permission is granted has to appoint the teaching staff qualified according to the rules made by the Government in this behalf and satisfy other requirements laid down by the Act, rules and the orders made thereunder, within the period specified by the authorities. In default of such compliance, it shall be competent to the Authority to cancel the permission. Sub-section (4) makes it punishable for anyone to establish an educational institution otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act Anyone running an institution after cancellation of the permission is also punishable.

633 13.Section 20-A declares that on and from the commencement of the A.P. Education (Amendment) Act, 1987, no individual shall establish a private institution. The institutions already established by individuals however are not affected by the said provision. Section 21 deals with grant and withdrawal of recognition of institution. It provides that the competent authority may by order in writing grant recognition to an educational institution permitted to be established under Section 20 subject to such conditions as may be prescribed in regard to the accommodation, equipment, appointment of teaching staff and so on. It further provides that if any local authority or other private educational institution fails to fulfil all or any of the conditions of recognition or commits any of the other irregularities mentioned in sub-section (2), its recognition may be withdrawn. It is not necessary to notice to other provisions in the Act.

14.In the year 1983, the Legislature of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983. The Act was made to provide for regulation of admission into educational institutions and to prohibit the collection of capitation fee in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

It would be appropriate to notice the preamble to the Act.

It reads:

“Whereas the undesirable practice of collecting capitation fee at the time of admitting students into educational institutions is on the increase in the State;

And whereas, the said practice has been contributing to large scale commercialisation of Education;

And whereas, it is considered necessary, to effectively curb this evil practice in order to avoid frustration among the meritorious and indigent students and to maintain excellence in the students of education;

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh in the Thirty-fourth year of the Republic of India as follows:’ 15.The Act was brought into force on and with effect from 30th January, 1983. Section 2 contains the interpretation Clause. Clause (b) defines the expression ‘capitation fee” to mean any amount collected in 634 excess of the fee prescribed under section 7. Section 3 provides that admission into educational institutions in the State shall be made on the basis of the marks obtained in the qualifying examination or on the basis of the ranking assigned in the entrance test conducted by such authority and in such manner as may be prescribed. So far as Medical and Engineering colleges are concerned, it is provided that admission thereto shall be made exclusively on the basis of the ranking assigned in the entrance test. The State has also reserved to itself the power to specify seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward classes.

Section 4 provides that even a minority educational institutions shall have to admit students on the basis of merit while admitting the students belonging to that minority or other students. Section 5 prohibits the capitation fee. It says ‘the collection of any capitation fee by any educational institution or by any person who is incharge of or is responsible for the management of the institution is hereby prohibited.’ Section 6 says that any donations made to educational institution shall be made only in the prescribed manner and not otherwise, and that the money so received shall be deposited and applied in the prescribed manner.

Section-7 regulates the fee that can be charged by an educational institution. It would be appropriate to read the section here in its entirety:

7. (1) ‘It shall be competent for the Government by notification, to regulate the tuition fee or any other fee that may be levied and collected by any educational institution in respect of each class of students.

(2)No educational institution shall collect any fees in excess of the fee notified under sub-section (1).

(3)Every educational ‘institution shall issue an official receipt for the fee collected by it.” Section 9 provides for penalties in case of contravention of the provisions of the Act. The punishment prescribed is not less than three years and not exceeding seven years, in addition to fine. Section 15 confers upon the Government the power to make rules to carry out the purposes of the enactment.

16. The 1983 Act was amended in the year 1992 by inserting Section 635 3-A, which section reads as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, but subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf and the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission) Order 1974, it shall be lawful for the management of any un-aided private Engineering College, Medical College, Dental College and such other class of un-aided educational institutions as may be notified by the Government in this behalf to admit students into such Colleges or educational institutions to the extent of one half of the total number of seats from among those who have qualified in the common entrance test or in the qualifying examination, as the case may be, referred to in sub-section (1) of Section-3 irrespective of the ranking assigned to them in such test or examination and nothing contained in Section 5 shall apply to such admission.” It is necessary to notice what precisely this Section provides for. It starts with a non-obstante clause ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, but subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf and the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission) Order 1974 (Presidential order issued under Article 371-D of the Constitution)”; it then says that it shall be lawful for the management of any un-aided private Engineering college, Medical College, Dental College and such other class of un-aided educational institutions as may be notified by the Government in this behalf to admit students into such Colleges or educational institutions to the extent of 50 per cent of the seats from among those qualified in the entrance test or the qualifying examination, as the class may be; the section says further rather curiously that the educational institution shall be entitled to admit them irrespective of the ranking assigned to them in the entrance test or qualifying examination and further that nothing contained in Section 5 shall apply to such admission. In short it means that it is open to a private medical/engineering college to admit students of its choice to the extent of 50 per cent so long as they have qualified in the common entrance test without regard to the ranking and/or merit. The dispensing with of the Section 5 for the above purpose is a clear indication that it is open to the institution to collect such capitation fee as it can from such students. Of course, the tuition fee’ shall be same as is prescribed by 636 the Government under Section 7.

Section 3-A came into force on 15.4.1992. No Rules have been made by the Government under the Section so far.

17.On 25.5.1992, the Government issued a notification inviting applications for permission to establish Medical, Dental and Engineering Colleges. The last date prescribed for receipt of applications was 8.6.1992. The applicants for Medical Colleges had to deposit within the said date a sum of rupees one crore in cash, furnish bank guarantee for another one crore and produce evidence of financial viability to the extent of four crores. A committee was appointed to inspect the land and other facilities offered by the applicants. The Committee formulated its guidelines on 28.6.1992 and submitted its report on 21.7.1992 recommending as many as 12 Medical Colleges and 8 Dental Colleges. The then Chief Minister approved the same on 27.7.1992 and a G.O. was issued on the same day granting permission. A number of Writ Petitions were immediately filed in the High Court challenging the said grant as well as Section 3-A.

18.There are a number of private engineering colleges in the State. Until the current academic year (1992-1993), all the seats in these colleges were filled in by the convenor of the common entrance examination. The management had no discretion or choice in the matter of admission of students.

They were, however, permitted to charge a particular fees which was relatively higher than the fees charged in the Government Engineering Colleges. Nothing more. But when Section 3-A was introduced in the 1983 Act on 15.4.1992, these private engineering colleges took the stand that they are entitled to admit students to the extent of 50 per cent of the seats according to their choice, irrespective of merit, so long as they have qualified in the entrance test.

It is obvious that such a stand meant collection of capitation fee as much as they could. There was an uproar among the student and teaching community against such admissions. Even the Government could not ignore the said protest and intimated the private engineering colleges on 26.7.1992 not to make any admissions till the Rules are made under Section 3-A. The engineering colleges, however, took the stand that they have already made the admissions according to their choice to the extent of 50 per cent.

Indeed all this was facilitated by the fact that convenor allotted students to these engineering colleges only to the extent of 50 per cent of their respective capacity instead of 100% as usual 637 thereby sending an explicit signal that the colleges were free to fill up the rest on their own. Be that as it may, these admissions led to the filing of a batch of Writ petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Following Mohini Jain and also on certain other grounds, a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowed the Writ Petitions.

It declared Section 3-A up-Constitutional. It also declared that the admissions made by the private Engineering Colleges to the extent of 50 per cent at their own choice was illegal. The Court further declared that the grant of permission to 12 Medical and 8 Dental Colleges was equally invalid. It is against the said decision that the State of Andhra Pradesh, certain educational institutions and the students admitted at the choice of the managements have come forward with a number of Special leave petitions.

19.Leave is granted in all the Special leave petitions preferred against the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 18th September, 1992 in Writ Petition No. 8248 of 1992 and batch. Besides the appeals, there are a few writ petition-, from this State questioning the correctness of the dicta in Mohini Jain.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 20.The Maharashtra Legislature enacted the Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitotion Fee) Act, 1987 (being Maharashtra Act No. VI of 1988) to prohibit collection of capitation fee for admission of students to, and the: promotion to a higher standard or class in, the educational institutions in the State of Maharashtra and to provide for matters connected therewith. The Preamble to the Act declaims:

“WHEREAS the practice of collecting capitation fee for admitting students into educational institutions and at the time of promoting students to a higher standard or class at various stages of education is on the increase in the State;

AND WHEREAS this undesirable practice has been contributing to large scale commercialisation of education which is not conducive to the maintenance. of educational standards;

AND WHEREAS the National Policy on Education 1986 638 envisages that the commercialisation of technical and professional education should be curbed and that steps should be taken to prevent the establishment of institutions set up to commercialise education;

AND WHEREAS with a view to effectively curb this evil practice, it is expedient in the public interest to prohibit collection of capitation fee for admission of students to, and their promotion to a higher standard or class in, the educational institutions in the State of Maharashtra and to provide for matters connected therewith; it is hereby enacted in the Thirty- eighth year of the Republic of India as follows:”

21. Section 2 defines certain expressions occurring in the Act. Clause (a) defines capitation fee to mean “any amount, by whatever name called, whether in cash or kind, paid or collected, directly or indirectly, in excess of the prescribed or, as the case may be, approved, rates of fees regulated under section-4”. Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 prohibits the collection of capitation fee either for admission of a student or for his promotion to higher class.

Sub-Section (2), however, permits the management of an educational institution to collect and accept donations from benevolent persons, organisations, trusts and other associations but says that no seats shall be reserved in consideration thereof. The moneys so received shall have to be deposited and dealt with in the prescribed manner. Sub- section (3) provides that if in any case it is found that any private educational institution has contravened any provisions of the Act or the. Rules made thereunder, it shall be directed to refund the same to the person from whom it was collected. Section 4 empowers the Government to regulate the tuition fee that may be received or collected by any educational institution for admission to any course of study in such institution. Separate fee shall have to be prescribed for aided institutions and un-aided institutions.

In the case of un-aided institutions, the tuition fee shall be prescribed “having regard to the usual expenditure excluding any expenditure on lands and building or on any such other item as the State Government may notify.” Different scales of tuition fee can be prescribed for different institutions or different areas or different courses of study, as the case may be. Section 7 provides for punishment which may extend to three years and fine in case of contravention of any provisions of Act or Rules.

639 22.It is stated that the government of Maharashtra had prescribed an uniform fee of Rs. 6,500/- per annum in the case of private un-aided engineering colleges, which was raised to Rs. 8,500/ in 1991. In 1992, the fees was raised only in the case of outside students (students outside the Maharashtra State) to Rs. 17,000/.

It is also stated that the government of Maharashtra has issued a notification directing that 90% of the seats in any private engineering college shall be filled by nominees of the Government and the remaining 10 per cent by the management at its discretion. In the case of medical colleges, the fee prescribed in the case of private un-aided medical colleges for the current academic year is Rs.

30,000/ for Maharashtra students and Rs. 60,000/ in the case of outside students. In the case of medical colleges, 20% of the seats are allowed to be filled by the management at their discretion. Remaining 80% seats are to be filled by the Government nominees.

23.Mahatma Gandhi Mission, Nanded, the appellant in C.A.

No. 3573 of 1992 was permitted by the State Government to start an un-aided medical college at Aurangabad. It is stated that the appellant is a Public Charitable Trust registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 as well as Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The medical college is affiliated to Marathwada University and is also recognised by the Maharashtra medical council. The total intake capacity is to seats each year. The permission to start medical college was accorded to the appellant on no-grant-in-aid basis. The appellant was allowed to fill 20% of the seats at their discretion from among those students who have obtained a minimum of 50% of the marks in the aggregate in specified subjects and have passed the qualifying examination in their first attempt. (There is no system of common entrance test in Maharashtra). Admissions were accordingly made for the current academic year. Soon after the decision of this court in Mohini Jain a large number of students filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) claiming refund of the fee collected from them in excess of the fee prescribed by the Government for students admitted in government medical colleges for such course. A Division Bench made an interim order on 27th August, 1992 directing the appellant institution to furnish a bank guarantee to the extent of 50% of the excess amount collected by them from the students, i.e., in a sum of Rs. 42 lakhs pending 640 disposal of the writ petition. It was further directed that pending disposal of the writ petition, the institution shall not collect any amount in excess of Rs. 3,000/ from any of the students. The said interlocutory order is challenged by the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3572 of 1992.

24.Writ Petition 855 of 1992 is filed by Jammu and Kashmir Parents Association of Students questioning the notification issued by the Government of Maharashtra obligating the outside-Maharashtra students to pay double the tuition fee payable by the Maharashtra students.

25.Writ Petition 678 of 1992 is preferred by Maharashtra Institute of Technology, Pune questioning the correctness of Mohini fain and praying for issuance of a declaration that the petitioner has a fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India to establish and run a self-financing engineering college subject to compliance with the regulatory requirements of the statute. The petitioner has also invoked Article 19(1) (c) as conferring upon him a right to establish/form any association to run an engineering college on self-financing basis.

TAMIL NADU 26.Soon after the decision in Mohini Jain, the Governor of Tamil Nadu promulgated an ordinance being ordinance No. 10 of 1992 called the Tamil Nadu Educational Institutions (Prohibition of collection of capitation fee) Ordinance, 1992. The ordinance has since been substituted by an Act Tamil Nadu Educational Institutions (Prohibition of collection of capitation fee) Act, 1992, being Act No. 57 of 1992. The Act is designed to prohibit the collection of capital fee for admission to educational institutions in the State of Tamil Nadu and provide for matters relating thereto. The preamble to the Act recites:

“WHEREAS the practice of collecting capital fee for admitting students into educational institutions is widespread in the State;

AND WHEREAS this undesirable practice, besides contributing a large scale commercialisation of education, has not been conducive to the maintenance of educational standards;

641 AND WHEREAS it is considered necessary to effectively curb this undesirable practice, in public interest, by prohibiting the collection of capitation fee and to provide for matters relating thereto;

BE it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Tamil Nadu in the Forty-third year of the Republic of India as follows:” 27.The Act has been given effect from 20th day of August, 1992, the date on which the ordinance was issued. The expression ‘capitation fee’ is defined in Clause (a) of Section 2 to mean “any amount, by whatever name called, paid or collected, directly or indirectly, in excess of the fee prescribed under Section 4.” Section 3 prohibits the collection of capitation fee by any educational institution or by any person on its behalf. Section 4 empowers the government to regulate the fee chargeable in educational institutions. Once such a notification is issued, no institution can charge or collect any fee over and above the fee prescribed. The Section reads thus:

“4. (1) Notwithstanding any contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Government may, by notification, regulate the tuition fee or any other fee or deposit that may be received or collected by any educational institution or class or classes of such educational institutions in respect of any or all class or classes of students:

Provided that before issuing a notification under this subsection, the draft of which shall be published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette stating that any objection or suggestion which may be received by the Government, within such period as may by specified therein, shall be considered by them.

(2)No educational institution shall receive or collect any fee or accept deposit in excess of the amount notified under sub-section (1).

(3)Every educational institution shall issue an official receipt for the fee or deposit received or collected by it.” Section 5 empowers the Government to regulate the maintenance of 642 accounts by the educational institutions in such manner as may be prescribed. Similarly, Section 6 empowers the Government to call upon the educational institutions to submit such returns or statements in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed or carrying out the purposes of the Act. Section 7 Provides for penalties in case of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. The minimum punishment is three years imprisonment which may extend up to seven years in addition to fine. Besides penalty, the educational institution is also made liable to refund the excess amount/capitation fee collected to the concerned students/persons. Section 12 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act over any other law for the time being in force. Section 14 confers upon the Government the power to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act.

It is not brought to our notice that rules have been made under the Act as yet. Sri P.R. Seetharaman, learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu, however, filed a statement ‘THE PRESENT ADMISSION FORMULA IN RESPECT OF SELF-FINANCING PRIVATE MEDICAL COLLEGES AND ENGINEERING COLLEGES IN TAMIL NADU’. It is necessary to set out the statement in full.

It reads:

“The Government of Tamil Nadu has also recently constituted a committee for examining proposals regarding regulation of fixation of fees in respect of self-financing colleges of medical and engineering and of Art and Science as well as unaided courses of private aided colleges. True copy of the order is annexed hereto. The self-financing Medical Colleges in Tamil Nadu are allowed to admit candidates of their choice up to 60% of the approved intake of the college adhering to the minimum mark rule prescribed for Government Medical Colleges. The remaining 40% of the seats are allowed by the Director of Medical Education every year and this is filled from among the approved list of candidates selected for admission to Government and Private Medical Colleges. The self-financing private Engineering Colleges are allowed to admit candidates of their choice up to 50% of approved intake of the college under Management quota. The remaining 50% of the seats are allowed by the Director of Technical Education every year from among the approved list of candidates selected for admission to Government 643 and aided colleges. True copies of the orders passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu are annexed hereto.

DATED AT DELHI THIS 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1992.

COUNSEL FOR TAMIL NADU.” 28.Sri Seetharaman further stated that the Government will insist that from the students admitted against 40% government seats, only the fee collected in government medical colleges will be allowed to be collected. He also brought to our notice that the government has constituted a committee to go into and frame rules regulating the fee structure in self-financing medical engineering and other colleges. (vide G.O.M.S. 1172 Education (JI) Deptt. dated 30.11.1992.).

29.Writ Petition 701 of 1992 is filed by the Annamalai University and its Pro-Chancellor, Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy questioning the provisions of the above Act and the correctness of the principles enunciated in Mohini Jain. A writ of mandamus is sought by this institution directed to the respondents (State of Tamil Nadu, Union of India and the University Grants Commission) ‘to forbear from in any manner interfering with the right of the petitioner to collect capitation fees by whatever nomenclature the said fee or payment may be described from the students seeking admission into various degree courses in the colleges under the control of the petitioner University to cover a reasonable return on the capital investment and meet the recurring expenditure every year for running the course in the colleges including for running Rajah Sir Muthiah Medical College and Hospital from the various students who seek admission and who have the requisite merit to be admitted and who are ready and @g to pay such amount.’ ‘Yet another mandamus is sought directing the respondents to ensure that the petitioners are not compelled to charge merely the rates of fees as charged by colleges run by the State Government from the students who have the requisite merit for admission irrespective of their capacity to contribute for the maintenance and running of the college as and by way of payment of fees by whatever nomenclature it may be called.

30.The petitioners have come forward with the following case: Annamalai University is an autonomous residential unitary university es- 644 tablished and incorporated under the Annamalai University Act, 1928 enacted by the then Madras Legislature. It has 45 faculties including Engineering and Technology and Medicine.

So far as the medical college is concerned, the annual intake is 125. Against this strength of 125, the petitioner admits 50 students belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward classes. Only a nominal fee is collected from them. From the remaining 75 students, a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs is collected by way of fees. This sum of Rs.

4 lakhs is hardly sufficient to meet the cost of medical education. Unless this minimum fee of Rs. 4 lakh is collected from at least 75 students, it is not possible for the petitioner to run the medical college which is attached to a hospital. While so, the Governor of Tamil Nadu has issued the aforesaid ordinance prohibiting the capitation fee. This ordinance has evidently been issued pursuant to the decision of this Court in Mohini Join. if the petitioner is compelled to collect only that fee which is charged by the Government in Government Medical Colleges, it would be impossible to run the medical college. It has to close down. The impugned ordinance (by the date of filing of writ petition the Act replacing the ordinance had not yet come into force) is violative of the fundamental right of the petitioners to establish and administer a medical college by collecting appropriate amounts from the students who are ready and willing to pay the same for their admission into the medical college, says the petitioner.

PART II Question No. 1.- “Whether the Constitution of Inda guarantees a fundamental right to education to its citizens?’ 31.Right to education is not stated expressly as a fundamental right in Part Ill. This Court has, however, not followed the rule that unless a right is expressly stated as a fundamental right, it cannot be treated as one. Freedom of Press is not expressly mentioned in Part III, yet it has been read into and inferred from the freedom of speech and expression. Express Newspapers v. Union of India,, [1959] S.C.R. 12. More particularly, from Article 21 has sprung up a whole lot of human rights jurisprudence viz., right to legal aid and speedy trial Hussain Ara Khatoon [1979] INSC 67; [1979] 3 S.C.R. 532 to A.R. Antulay, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 225, the right to means of livelihood Olga Tellis, [1985] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

51, right to dignity and privacy, Karak. Singh [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332, right to health Vincent, v. Union of India [1987] 645 2 S.C.R. 468), right to pollution-free environment M.C.

Mehta v. Union of India 119881 1 S.C.R. 279 and so on. Let us elaborate.

32.In Express Newspapers V. Union of India, [1959] S.C.R.

12 it has been held.

“The freedom of speech comprehends the freedom of press and the freedom of speech and press are fundamental and personal rights of the citizens.’ 33.Article 21 declares that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. It is true that the Article is worded in negative terms but it is now well-settled that Article 21 has both a negative and an affirmative dimension.

As far back as 1962, a Constitution Bench (comprising of six learned Judges) in Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., [1964] 1 S.CR. 332 decided on 18th December, 1962 considered the content of the expression “personal, liberty” occurring in Article 21. Rajgopala Ayyangar, J. speaking for the majority, observed:

“We shall now proceed with the examination of the width, scope and content of the expression “Personal liberty” in Article 21. We feel unable to hold that the term was intended to bear only this narrow interpretation but on the other hand consider that “personal liberty’ is used in the Article as a compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the ‘personal liberties” of man other than those deal with in the several clauses of Art.

19(1). In other words, while Art. 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes of that freedom, “personal liberty’ in Art. 21 takes in and comprises the residue.” The leaned Judge quoted the dissenting opinion of Field, J.

(one of those dissenting opinions which have out-lived the majority pronouncements) in Munn v. Illinois, (1877 (94) U.S. 113/142 attributing a broader meaning to the word “fife’ in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S.

Constitution, which correspond inter alia to Article 21 of our Constitution. The learned Judge held that the word ‘personal liberty’ would include the privacy sanctity of a man’s home as well as the dignity of the individual.

646 The minority Judges, however, placed a more expansive interpretation on Article 21. They said:

“No doubt the expression’ personal liberty’ is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty.

It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression ‘personal liberty’ in Art. 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental right of life and personal liberty has many attributes and some of them are found in Art.

19. If a person’s fundamental right under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19(1) are concerned.”

34. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] S.C. 597 Bhagwati, J. held that the judgment in, R. C. Cooper v.

Union of India, 1970 S.C. 564 has the effect of overruling the majority opinion and of approving the minority opinion in Kharak Singh.

35.In Bolling v. Sharpe, 98 Lawyers Ed. 884 Warren, CJ.

speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court observed “although the court has not assumed to define “liberty’ with any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective.” Having said so, the learned Judge proceeded to observe “segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective,, arid thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.’ 36.The word “life” occurring in Article 21 too has received a broad and expansive interpretation., While it is not necessary to refer to all of them, reference must be made to the decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay 647 Municipal Corporation [1985] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 51.

Chandrachud, CJ. speaking for a Constitution Bench of this court observed:

“The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood.

If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprevation would not only denude the fife of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to fife.

That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life viable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life………

Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy, provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Article 41, which is another Directive Principle provides, inter alia, that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work in cases of unemployment and of undeserved want. Article 37 provides that the Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any court, are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country. The Principles contained in Articles 39(a) and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamen- 648 tal in the understanding and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights.

If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life.” 37.In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [1983] INSC 206; [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67 Bhagwati J. while affirming the proposition that Article 21 must be construed in the light of the Directive Principles of the State Policy observed thus:

“This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities of children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity In D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, [1983] S.C.R. 130, a Constitution Bench explained the significance of the addition of the expression “Socialist” in the preamble of our Constitution in the following words:

“During the formative years…. socialism aims at providing all opportunities for pursuing the educational activity There will be equitable distribution of national cake….

In Vincent v. Union of India, [1987] INSC 68; [1987] 2 S.C.R. 468, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that:

“In a welfare State, therefore, it is the obligation of the State to ensure the creation and the sustaining of conditions congenial to good health In a series of pronouncements, during the recent years, this court has culled out 649 from the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution, the several obligations of the State and called upon it to effectuate them in order that the resultant pictured by the Constitution fathers may become a reality.’ In A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Naik, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 225, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that Article 21 creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily and that the said right encompasses an the stages of a criminal case.

It was held that the violation of this right of the accused may entail the very quashing of the charges.

Interplay of parts III and IV/- 38.This Court has also been consistently adopting the approach that the fundamental rights and directive principles are supplementary and complementary to each other and that the provisions in Part III should be interpreted having regard to the Preamble and the directive principles of the State policy. The initial hesitation to recognise the profound significance of Part IV has been given up long ago. We may explain.

While moving for consideration the interim report on fundamental rights, Sardar Vallabhai Patel described both the rights mentioned in Pam III and IV as ‘fundamental rights’ one justificiable and other non-justiciable. In his supplemental report, he stated:

“There were two parts of the report; one contains fundamental rights which were justiciable and the other part of the report refers to fundamental rights which were not justiciable but were directives.” This statement indicates the significance attached to directive principles by the founding fathers. It is true that in The state of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan 119591 S.C.R. 995, fundamental rights were held preeminent vis-a- vis Directive Principles but since then there has been a perceptible shift in this Court’s approach to the inter-play of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

39.As far back as in 1958, in the Kerala Education Bill a Special Bench of this Court speaking through S.R. Das, CJ., while affirming the primacy of Fundamental Rights, qualified the same with the following 650 observations:

Nevertheless’ in determining the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights relied upon by or on behalf of any person or body, the court may not entirely ignore these directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV of the constitution but should adopt the principle of harmonious construction and should attempt to give effect to both as much as possible ” This is also the view taken in Hanif v. State of Bihar, [1958] INSC 46; [1959] S.C.R. 629 at 655.

In Keshavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 1973 Suppl. 521 more than one learned Judge adverted to this aspect. In the words of Hegde and Mukherjee. JJ.:

“The Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles con Part IV is to ignore the sustenance provided for in the Constitution, the hopes held out to the nation and the very ideals on which our Constitution is built There is no anti-thesis between the Fundamental Rules and the Directive Principles …. One Supplements the other.” Shelat and Grover, JJ. in their judgment observed:

“Both Parts HI and IV …. have to be balanced and harmonised then alone the dignity of the individual can be achieved They (Fundamental, Rights and Directive Principles)were meant to supplement each other.” Mathew, J. while adopting the same approach remarked:

“The object of the people in establishing the Constitution was to promote justice, social and economic liberty and equality. The modus operandi to achieve these objectives, is set out in Parts III and IV of the Constitution.

Both Parts III and IV enumerate certain moral rights. Each of these Parts represents in the main the statements in one sense of certain aspirations whose fulfilment was regarded as essens- 651 tial to the kind of society which the Constitution-makers wanted to build. Many of the articles, whether in Part III or Part IV, represent moral rights which they have recog- nised as inherent in every human being in his country. The task of protecting and realising these rights is imposed upon all the organs of the State, namely, legislative, executive and judicial. What then is the importance to be attached to the fact that the provisions of Part III are enforceable in a Court and the provisions in Part IV are not? Is it that the rights reflected in the provisions of Part III are somehow superior to the moral claims and aspirations reflected in the provisions of Part IV? I think not. Free and compulsory education under Article 45 is certainly as important as freedom of religion under Article

25. Freedom from starvation is as important as right to life. Nor are the provisions in Part III absolute in the sense that the rights represented by them can always be given full implementation.” Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) put the same idea in the following words:

“As I look at the provisions of Parts III and IV, I feel no doubt, that the basic object of conferring freedoms on individuals is the ultimate achievement of the ideals set out in Part IV….. May I say that the directive principles of State policy should not be permitted to become ‘a mere rope of sand’. If the State fails to create conditions in which the fundamental freedoms can be enjoyed by all, the freedom of the few will be at the mercy of the many and then all freedoms will vanish.”

40. In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, Krishna Iyer, J. stated:

“Our thesis is that the dialectics of social justice should not. be missed if the systhesis of Part III and Part IV is to influence State action and Court pronouncements.” In U.P.S.C Board v. Harishankar, [1978] INSC 146; A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 65 it was observed: Addressed to courts, what the injunction (Article 37) means is that while 652 courts are not free to direct the making of legislation, courts are bound to evolve, affirm and adopt principle of interpretation which will further and not hinder the goals set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy. This command of the constitution must be everpresent in the minds of the Judges while interpreting statutes which concern themselves directly or indirectly with matters set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy.” This is on the view that the ‘State’ in Article 36 read with Article 12 includes the judiciary as well.

In Minerva Mills v. Union of India [1980] INSC 141; A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, Chandrachud, CJ. quoted with approval the similie of Granvlle Austin that Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot and observed that “to give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution.’ The learned Chief Justice obserned further:

“Those rights (Fundamental Rights) are not an end in themselves but are the means to an end.

The end is specified in Part IV.’ 41.It is thus well established by the decisions of this Court that the provisions of Parts III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and that Fundamental Rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in Part IV. It is also held that the Fundamental Rights must be construed in the light of the Directive Principles. It is from the above stand point that Ouestion No.1 has to be approached.

ARTICLE 21 AND RIGHT TO EDUC4TION.

42.In Bandhua Mukti March this court held that the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 does take in ‘educational facilities”. (The relevant portion has been quoted hereinbefore). Having regard to the fundamental significance of education to the life of an individual and the nation, and adopting the reasoning and logic adopted in the earlier decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore, we hold, agreeing with the statement in Bandhua Mukti Morcha, that right to education is implicit in and flows from the right to life guaranteed by Article 21.

That the right to education has been treated as one of transcendental importance in the life of an individual has recognised not only in this country since thousands of years, but all over the world. In Mohini Jain the importance of education has 653 been duly and rightly stressed. The relevant observations have already been set out in para 7 hereinbefore. In particular, we agree with the observation that without education being provided to the citizens of this country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail. We do not think that the importance of education could have been better emphasised than in the above words. The importance of education was emphasised in the ‘Neethishatakam’ by Bhartruhari (First Century B.C.) in the following words:

“Translation:

Education is the special manifestation of man;

Education is the treasure which can be preserved without the fear of loss;

Education secures material pleasure, happiness and fame; Education is the teacher of the teacher;

Education is God incarnate;

Education secures honour at the hands of the State, not money- A man without education is equal to animal.” The fact that right to education occurs in as many as three Articles in Part IV viz., Articles 41, 45 and 46 shows the importance attached to it by the founding fathers. Even some of the Articles in Part III viz., Articles 29 and 30 speak of education.

43.In Brown v. Board of Education, 98 Lawyers Ed. 873, Earl Warren, CJ., speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court emphasised the right to education in the following words:

“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and eats…….. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in awaken- 654 ing the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.” In Wisconsin v. Yoder, [1972] USSC 102; 32 L.Ed. 2d, 15 the Court recognised that:

“Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.” The said fact has also been affirmed by eminent educationists of modern India like Dr. Radhakrishnan, J.P.

Naik, Dr. Kothari and others.

44.It is argued by some of the counsel for the petitioners that Article 21 is negative an character and that it merely declares that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Since the State is not depriving the respondents-students of their right to education, Article 21 is not attracted, it is submitted. If and when the State makes a law taking away the right to education, would Article 21 be attracted, according to them. This argument, in our opinion, is really born of confusion; at any rate, it is designed to confuse the issue. The first question is whether the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 does take in the right to education or not. It is then that the second question arises whether the State is taking away that right. The mere, fact that the State is not taking away the right as at present does not mean that right to education is not included within the right to life. The content of the right is not determined by perception of threat. The content of right to life is not to be determined on the basis of existence or absence of threat of deprivation. The effect of holding that right to education is implicit in the right to fife is that the State cannot deprive the citizen of his right to education except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

45.In the above state of law, it would not be correct to contend that Mohini Jain was wrong in so far as it declared that “the right to education flows directly from right to life.’ But the question is what is the content of this right? How much and what level of education is necessary to make the life meaningful? Does it mean that every citizen of this country can call upon the State to provide him education of his choice? In other words, whether the citizens of this country can demand that the State provide 655 adequate number of medical colleges, engineering colleges and other educational institutions to satisfy all their educational needs? Mohini Jain seems to say, yes. With respect, we cannot agree with such a broad proposition. The right to education which is implicit in the right to fife and personal liberty guarenteed by Article 21 must be construed in the fight of the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution So far as the right to education is concerned, there are several articles in Part IV which expressly speak of it. Article 41 says that the “State shall within the limits of its economic capacity and development make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of underserved want.’ Article 45 says that “the State shau endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.’ Article 46 commands that ‘the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.” Education means knowledge and Knowledge itself is power.’ As rightly observed by Johan Adams, ‘the preservation of means of knowledge among the lowest ranks is of more importance to the public than all the property of all the rich men in the country” (Dissertation on canon and fuedal law, 1765). It is this concern which seems to underlie Article 46. It is the tyrants and bad rulers who are afraid of spread of education and knowledge among the deprived classes. Witness Hitler railing against universal education. He said:

‘Universal education is the most corroding and disintegrating poison that liberalism has ever invented for its own destruction.’ (Rauschning, The voice of destruction:

Hider speaks). A true democracy is one where education is universal where people understand what Is good for them and nation and know how to govern themselves. The three articles 45, 46 and 41 are designed to achieve the said goal among others. It is in the light of these articles that the content and parameters of the right to education have to be determined. Right to education understood in the context of Articles 45 and 41, means. (a) every child/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years and (b) after a child/citizen completes 14years, his right to education is circumscribed by the 656 limits of the economic capacity of the State and its development We may deal with both these limbs separately.

Right to free education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years (45-A). It is noteworthy that among the several articles in part IV, only Article 45 speaks of a time-limit; no other article does. Has it no significance? Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44 years of the Constitution? Can the State flout the said direction even after 44 years on the ground that the article merely calls upon it to “endeavour to provide” the same and on the further ground that the said article is not enforceable by virtue of the declaration in Article 37. Does not the passage of 44 years more than four times the period stipulated in Article 45 convert the obligation created by the article into an enforceable right? In this context, we feel constrained to say that allocation of available funds to different sectors of education in India discloses an inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution. The Constitution contemplated a crash programme being undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in Article 45. It is relevant to notice that Article 45 does not speak of the limits of its economic capacity and development’ as does Article 41, which inter alia speaks of right to education.

What has actually happened is more money is spent and more attention is directed to higher education that to and at the cost of primary education. (By primary education, we mean the education, which a normal child receives by the time he completes 14 years of age). Neglected more so are the rural sectors, and the weaker sections of the society referred to in Article 46. We clarify, we are not seeking to lay down the priorities for the government we are only amphasising the constitutional policy as disclosed by Articles 45, 46 and 41. Surely the wisdom of these constitutional provisions is beyond question. This inversion of priorities has been commended upon adversely by both the educationists and economists.

Gunnar Myrdal the noted economist and sociologist, a recognised authority on South Asia, in his book “Asian Drama” (abridged Edition published in 1972) makes these perceptive observations at page 335:

“But there is another and more valid criticism to make. Although the declared purpose was to give priority to the increase of elementary schooling in order to raise the rate of literacy in the population, what has actually happened is that secondary schooling has been rising much faster and 657 tertiary schooling has increased still more rapidly. There is a fairly general tendency for planned targets of increased primary schooling not to be reached, whereas targets are over-reached, sometimes substantially, as regards increases in secondary and, particularly, tertiary schooling. This has all happened in spite of the fact that secondary schooling seems to be three to five times more expensive than primary schooling, and schooling at the tertiary level five to seven times more expensive than at the secondary level.

What we see functioning here is the distortion of development from planned targets under the influence of the pressure from parents and pupils in the upper strata who everywhere are politically powerful. Even more remarkable is the fact that this tendency to distortion from the point of view of the planning objectives is more accentuated in the poorest countries, Pakistan, India, Burma and Indonesia, which started out with far fewer children in primary schools and which should therefore have the strongest reasons to carry out the programme of giving primary schooling the highest priority. It is generally the poorest countries that are spending least, even relatively, on primary education, and that are permitting the largest distortions from the planned targets in favour of secondary and tertiary education.’ In his other book ‘Challenge of World Poverty’ (published in 1970) he discusses elaborately in chapter 6 ‘Education’ the reasons for and the consequences of neglect of basic education in this country. He quotes J.P. Naik, (the renowned educationist whose Report of the Education Commission, 1966 is still considered to be the most authoritative study of education scene in India) as saying ‘Educational development……… is benefiting the ‘haves’ more than the “have not’. This is a negation of social justice and ‘planning’ proper’ and our constitution speaks repeatedly of social justice (Preamble and Article 38(1)).

As late as 1985, the Ministry of Education has this to say in para 3.74 of its publication “Challenge of Education a policy perspective”. It is stated there:

658 “3.74. Considering the constitutional imperative regarding the universalisation of elementary education it was to be expected that the share of this sector would be protected from attribution. Facts, however, point in the opposite direction. From a share of 56 per cent in the First Plan, it declined to 35 per cent in the Second Plan, to 34 per cent in the Third Plan, to 30 per cent in the Fourth Plan. it started going up again only in the Fifth Plan, when it was at the level of 32 per cent, increasing in Sixth Plan to 36 per cent, stiff 20 per cent below the First Plan level. On the other hand, between the First and the Sixth Five Year Plans, the share of university education went up from 9 per cent to 16 per cent.” Be that as it may, we must say that at least now the State should honour the command of Article 45. It must be made a reality atleast now. Indeed, the ‘National Education Policy 1986’ says that the promise of, Article 45 will be redeemed before the end of this century. Be that as it may, we hold that a child (citizen, has a fundamental right to free education up to the age of 14 years.

46.This does not however mean that this obligation can be performed only through the State schools. It can also be done by permitting, recognising and aiding voluntary non- governmental organisations, who are prepared to impart free education to children. This does not also mean that unaided private schools cannot continue. They can, indeed, they too have a role to play. They meet the demand of that segment of population who may not wish to have their children educated in State-run schools. They have necessarily to charge fees from the students. In this judgment, however, we do not wish to say anything about such schools or for that matter other private educational institutions except ‘professional colleges, This discussion is really necessitated on account of the principles enunciated in Mohini jain and the challenge mounted against those principles in these writ petitions.

47.At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to the additional affidavit filed by the Union of India. In this affidavit. the present state of primary and upper primary education is set out. (Primary stage means Classes I to V. Upper primary stage means classes VI to VIII). After 659 setting out the particulars of number of schools and enrollment therein, it is stated in para 3 that ‘this increase provided Indian Education System with one of the largest systems in the world, providing accessibility within 1 Km. distance of Primary schools to 8.26 habitations con- taining about 94% of the country’s population. Growth in enrolment in the decade of 80s showed an acceleration that has now brought enrolment rates close of 100% at primary stage.’ Again in para 4, under the sub-heading “Free education”, the following statement occurs:

“4. In the endeavour to increase enrolment and achieve the target of UEE, all State Governments have abolished tuition fees in Government Schools run by local bodies and private aided institutions is mostly free in these States; however, in private unaided schools which constitute 3.7.% of the total elementary schools in the country, some fee is Charged. Thus, overall it may be said that education up to elementary level in practically all schools is free. Other costs of education, such as text books, uniforms, schools bags, transport etc. are not borne by States except in a very few cases by way of incentives to children of indigent families or those belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes categories. The reason why the State Government are unable to bear this additional expenditure is that 96% of expenditure on elementary education goes in meeting the salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff.” Para 5 of the affidavit deals with “Compulsory education”. It reads as follows:

“5. 14 States and 4 Union Territories have enacted legislation to make educational compulsory but the socioeconomic compulsions that keep the children away from schools have restrained them from prescribing the rules and regulations whereby those provisions can be endorsed.” The affidavit also mentions the steps taken by Central and State Governments in pursuance of Naitonal Education Policy including “Operation Blackboard” and its contribution to the increase in primary education. It was indeed gratifying to note these facts, though much more remains to 660 be done to raise the quality of instruction.

Before proceeding further we think it right to say this: We are aware that “Education is the second highest sector of budgeted expenditure after the defence. A little more than three per cent of the Gross National Product is spent in education”, as pointed out in para 231 of ‘Challenge of Education. But this very publication says that “in comparison to many countries, India spends much less on education in terms of the proportion of Gross National Product’ and further ‘in spite of the fact that educa- tional expenditure continues to be the highest item of expenditure next only to Defence the resource gap for educational needs is one of the major problems. Most of the current expenditure is only in the form of salary payment.

It hardly needs to be stated that additional capital expenditure would greatly augment teacher productivity because in the absence of expenditure on other heads even the utilisation of staff remains low.’ We do realise that ultimately it is a question of resources and resources-wise this country is not in a happy position. AR we are saying is that while allocating the available resources, due regard should be had to the wise words of Founding Fathers in Articles 45 and 46. Not that we are not aware of the importance and significance of higher education. What may perhaps be required is a proper balancing of the various sectors of education.

Right to education after the child/citizen completes the age of 14 years.

48.The right to education further means that a citizen has a right to call upon the State to provide educational facilities to him within the limits of its economic capacity and development. By saying so, we are not transferring Article 41 from part IV to Part III we are merely relying upon Article 41 to illustrate the content of the right to education flowing from Article 21. We cannot believe that any State would say that it need not provide education to its people even within the limits of its economic capacity and development. It goes without saying that the limits of economic capacity are, ordinarily speaking, matters within the subjective satisfaction of the State.

49.In the fight of the above enunciation, the apprehension expressed by the counsel for the petitioners that by reading the right to education into Article 21, this Court would be enabling each and every citizen of this country to approach the courts to compel the State to provide him such education as he chooses must be held to be unfounded. The right to free 661 education is available only to children until they complete the age of 14 years. Thereafter, the obligation of the State to provide education is subject to the limits of its economic capacity and development. Indeed, we are not stating anything new. This aspect has already been emphasised by this Court in Francis C Mullin v.

Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, [1981] 2 S.C.R.

516. While elaborating the scope of the right guaranteed under Article 21, this court stated:

“But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it viz., the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about the mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must in any view of the matter, include a right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the humanself” 50.We must hasten to add that just because we have relied upon some of the directive principles to locate the parameters of the right to education implicit in Article 21, it does not follow automatically that each and every obligation referred to in Part IV gets automatically included within the purview of Article 21. We have held the right to education to be implicit in the right to fife because of its inherent fundamental importance. As a matter of fact, we have referred to Articles 41, 45 and 46 merely to determine the parameters of the said right.

PART III Question Nos. 2 and 3.

51.It would be convenient to deal with question Nos.2 and 3 together. The contentions urged by the counsel for the petitioners can be broadly summarised in the following words:

662 (a)The State has no monopoly in the matter of imparting education. Every citizen has the fundamental right to establish an educational institution as a part of the right guaranteed to him by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

This right extends even to the establishment of an educational institution with a profit motive i.e., as a business adventure. The said right, no doubt, is subject to such reasonable restrictions as may be placed upon it by a law within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19. But for the said restrictions, the right is absolute.

(b)The vice lies not in the establishment of educational institutions by individuals and private bodies but in unnecessary State control. The law of demand and supply….. what may be called the ‘market forces…….

must be allowed a free play. Because there are more number of persons seeking admission that the existing institutions can provide that the several ins complained of have developed.

(c)The establishment of an education institution is no different from any other venture e.g., starting a business or industry. It is immaterial whether the institution is established with or without profit motive. Indeed, only when there is profit motive that persons with means would come forward to open more and more schools and colleges.

There are not many persons available today who are prepared to donate large funds for establishing such institutions by way of charity or philantrophy.

(d)Even if it is held, for any reason, that a person has not right to establish an education institution as a business venture, he has atleast the right to establish a self-financing educational institution. Such a institution may also be described as an institution providing cost-based education. This means that it is open to a person to collect amounts from willing parties and establish an institution to educate such persons or their children, as the case may be. Even in an established institution, the fees that may collected from the students must be such as not only to defray the expenditure of running the institution but also for improvement. expansion, diversification and growth. In such institutions, the quantum of the fees to be charged should. be left to the concerned institutions. The Government should have to say in the matter. So far as the court is concerned, it is not possible for it, in the very nature of things, to go into this issue. The needs of each educational institution may be different. The standard of education imparted and the facilities provided may be different 663 from institution to institution. May be, the Government or the Court may insist that as a condition for running such institution, a reasonable number of seats should be allotted to students purely on merit, who shall be asked to pay only such fees as is charged in similar Governmental institutions. If this is done to which the petitioners have no objection it will not only meet the needs of education of those who have the capacity to pay but it will also meet the needs of other meritorious students who are not able to obtain admission in the Governmental institutions and are also not in a position to pay the fees normally charged such private institutions. Several facts and figures are furnished to us to show how in each State these private educational institutions are providing a large number of “free seats’ to the nominees of the Government.

It is pointed out that all these students would not have had an opportunity. of studying the course of their choice but for the existence of these private educational institutions.

(e)Mohini Jain’s case was not right in saying, in the above situation, that charging of any amount, by whatever name it is called, over and above’ the fee charged by the Government in its own colleges, must be described as capitation fee. Saying so amounts to imposing an impossible condition. It is simply not possibly for the private educational institutions to survive if they are compelled to charge only that fee as is charged in Governmental institutions. The cost of educating an engineering or a medical graduate is’ very high. All that cost is borne by the State in Governmental colleges but the State does not subsidise the private educational institutions. The private educational institutions have to find their own finances and that can come only from the students.

(f)Even if the right to establish an educational institution is not trade or business within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g), it is certainly an 4occupation’ within the meaning of the said clause. Indeed, the use of the four expressions profession, occupation, trade or business in Article 19(1)(g) was meant to cover the entire field of human activity. In such a situation, it is not necessary for the petitioners to pinpoint to which particular expression does their activity relate. It is enough to say that the petitioners do have the right to establish private educational institutions at any rate, self-financing/cost- based private educational institutions. This right can be restricted only by a law as contemplated by clause (6) of, Article 19.

664 (g)The right to establish and administer an educational institution (by a member of the majority community, religion or linguistic) arises by necessary implication from Article

30. The Constitution could not have intended to confine the said right only to minorities and deprive the majority communities therefrom.

(h)The Government or the University cannot insist of stipulate as a condition of recognition/affiliation that the private educational institutions should admit students exclusively on merit. It has been well recognised by this court that one who pays for the education is also entitled to stipulate the manner in which he well admit students’.

There is no reason why such a right should not be recognised in the case of the private educational institutions.

Moreover, there may be several kinds of private educational institutions; they may be established for achieving certain specified purposes. For example, medical or engineering college may be established to cater to the needs of a particular region or a district. Similarly, another educational institution may have been established by members of a particular community to educate their own children.

The Gulburga Medical College in the State of Karnataka, it is pointed out, is established to meet the educational needs in the field of medicine to the students belong to Gulburga, Raichur and Bidar districts, formerly included within the Nizam’s dominions and which were included in the State of Karnataka on the reorganisations of States. Similarly, the Kempe Gowda Medical College in Karnataka, it is submitted, has been established by members of Vokkaliga community.

Their wishes and objectives have to be respected. There may be yet another institution which may have been established with the and of a large donation made by a charitable-minded person e.g., Annamalai University in Tamil Nadu. If such University stipulates that members of the founder’s family or their nominees will be admitted every year to the extent of a certain percentage, no fault can be found therewith.

(i)By virtue of mere recognition and/or affiliation these private educational institutions do not become instrumentalities of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The concept of ‘State action’ cannot be extended to these colleges so as to subject them to the discipline of Part III. It may be a different matter if the institution is in receipt of any aid, partially and wholly, from the State. In such a situation, the command of Article 29(2) comes into play but even that does not oblige the institution to admit the students exclusively on the basis of merit but only not to 665 deny admission to anyone any of the grounds mentioned therein.

52.On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents as also by the learned counsel for the India Medical Council and All India Council for Technical Education that: (a) imparting of education has always been recognised in this country from times immemorial as the religious duty. Both Hinduism and Islam treated it as such. It has also been recognised as a charitable object. But never has it been recognised as a trade or business. It is a mission, not a trade. Commercialization of education has always been looked upon with disfavor in this country. As far back as in 1956, the Parliament expressed its intention by enacting the University Grants Commission Act which specified the prevention of commercialization of education as one of the duties of the University Grants Commission. The same intention has been expressed by several enactments made by the Parliament and State Legislatures since then.

(b)Imparting of education is the most important function of the State. This duty may. be discharged by the State directly or through the instrumentality of private educational institutions. But when the State permits a private body or an individual to perform the said function it is its duty to ensure that no one gets an admission or an advantage on account of his economic power to the detriment of a more meritorious candidate.

(c)The very concept of collecting the cost of the education that is what the concept of cost-based or self- financing educational institutions means is morally abhorrent and is opposed to public policy. A cavitation fee does not cease to be a capitation fee just because it is called cost-based education or by calling the institution concerned as a self-financing institution. These expressions are but a cover a mere pretence for collecting capitation fee. It is nothing but exploitation.

It is an elitist concept basically opposed to the constitutional philosophy By allowing such education, two classes will come into being. The concept suffers from class bias.

(d)If, for any reason, it is held that a citizen or a person has a right to establish an educational institution, the said right does not carry with it the right to recognition or the right to affiliation, as the case may be.

It has been repeatedly held by this court that even a minority educational institution has no fundamental right to recognition or affiliation. If so, no such right can be envisaged in the case of majority community or in the case 666 individuals or persons. Once this is so, it is open to the State or the University according recognition or affiliation to impose such conditions as they think appropriate in the interest of fairness, merit, maintenance of standards of education and so on. In short, it is open to the Government or the University to make it a condition of recognition/affiliation that the admission of students, in whichever category it may be, shall be on the basis of merit and merit alone. The institutions obtaining recognition/affiliation will be bound by such condition and any departure therefrom renders the recognition/affiliation liable to be withdrawn.

(e)Even if the Government or the University does not expressly impose such a condition, such condition is implicit by virtue of the fact that in such a situation, the activity of the private educational institution is liable to be termed as ‘State action’. The fact that these institutions perform an important public function coupled with the fact that their activity is closely inter-twined with governmental activity, characterises their action as ‘State action’. At the minimum, the requirement would be to act fairly in the matter of admission of students and probably in the matter of recruitment’ and treatment of its employees as well. These institutions are further bound not to charge any fee or amount over and above what is charged in similar governmental institutions. If they need finances, they must find them through donations or with the help of religious or charitable organisations. They cannot also say that they will first collect capitation fees and with that money, they will establish an institution. At the worst, only the bare running charges can be charged from the students. The capital cost cannot be charged from them.

53.Before we express ourselves upon the rival contentions urged by the parties, it would be appropriate to notice the relevant statutory provisions-.

UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION ACT.

54.The University Grants Commission Act was enacted by the Parliament in 1956 to provided for the ordination and determination of standards in Universities and for that purpose to establish a University Grants Commission.

Chapter III deals with the powers and functions of the Commission. Section 12 empowers the Commission to take, in consultation with the Universities and other concerned bodies, all such steps as it may think fit for the promotion and ordination of University education 667 and for, the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in the Universities.

Section 12-A is relevant for our purposes. Clause (a) in Sub-section (1) defines the expression ‘affiliation’. It reads:

“Affiliation’ together with its grammatical variations, includes in relation to a college, recognition or such college, association of such college with, and admission of such college to the privileges of a University.” Clause (b) defines the expression ‘college’ in the following words:

” ‘College’ means any institution whether known as such or by any other name which provides for a course of study for obtaining any qualification from a University and which in accordance with the rules and regulations of such University is recognised as competent to provide for such course of study and present students undergoing such course of study for the examination for the award of such qualification.” Sub-secton (2) empowers the Commission inter alia to regulate the fee chargeable in constituent and affiliated colleges, if such a course is found to be necessary to ensure that “no candidate secures admission to such course of study by reason of economic power and thereby prevents a more meritorious candidate from securing admission to such course of study.” It would be appropriate to set out Sub- section (2) in its entirety. It reads:

“Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Section if, having regard to, (a) the nature of any course of study for obtaining any qualification from any University, (b) the types of activities in which persons obtaining such qualification are likely to be engaged on the basis of such qualification, (c) the minimum standards which a person possessing such qualification should be able to maintain in his 668 work relating to such activities and the consequent need for ensuring, so far as may be, that no candidate secures admission to such course of study by reason of economic power and thereby prevents a more meritorious candidate from securing admission to such course of study-, and (d) all other relevant factors, the Commission is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest, it may, after consultation with the University or Universities concerned, specify the regula- tions the matters in respect of which fees may be charged, and the scale of fees in accordance with which fees shall be charged in respect of those matters on and from such date as may be specified in the regulations in this behalf, by any college providing for such course of study from or in relation to any student in connection with his admission to and prosecution of such course of study- Provided that different matters and different scales of fees may be so specified in relation to different Universities or different classes of colleges or different areas.” Sub-Section (3) then says that where regulations of the nature referred to in sub-section (2) have been made, no college shall levy or charge fees in excess of what is specified. Sub-section (4) provides the consequence of violation by any college of such regulations. Sub-section (5) says that violation shall also mean disaffiliation.

Section 14 prescribes the consequences of failure of Universities to comply with the recommendations of the Commission. It includes withholding of funds. Sub-section (1) of Section 22 which occurs in Chapter IV declares that ‘the right of conferring or granting degree shall be exercised only by a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a provincial Act or a State Act or an institution deemed to be a University under Section 3 or ,in institution specially empowered by an Act of Parliament to confer or ,;rant degrees.” Sub-section (2) emphatically declares that “save as provided in Sub-section (1), no person or authority shall confer or grant or hold self or itself out as entitled to confer or grant any degree.’ Sub-section (3) defines the expression ‘degree’.

It means “any such degree as may, with 669 the previous, approval of the Central Government, by specified in this behalf by the on by notification in the official gazette.” Section 23 prohibits the use of the word ‘University’ in the name of any on other than a University established or incorporated under an enactment or a deemed University. Section 24 provides for penalties for violation of Sections 22 and 23. Section 25 confers the rule making power upon the central Government while Section 26 confers the regulation power upon the Commission.

INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL ACT:

55. The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 was enacted by the parliament to provide for the reconstitution of the Medical Council of India and the maintenance of a medical register for India and for matters connected therewith. The expression ‘recognised medical qualification’ is defined in clause (h) of Section 2 to mean “any-of the medical qualifications included in the schedules.” The expression ‘approved institution’ has been defined in clause (a) to mean ‘a hospital, health centre or every such institution recognised by a University as an institution in which a person may undergo training, if any, required by his course of study before the award of any medical qualification to him.” Section 11 declares that the medical qualifications granted by any University or medical institution in India which are included in the first schedule to the Act shall be recognised medical qualifications for the purposes of the Act. It also provides the procedure for any University or Medical institution applying to the Central Government for recognising new or other qualifications. Section 13 says that the medical qualifications granted by medical institutions in India not included in the First Schedule but included in Part I of the Third Schedule shall also be recognised medical qualifications for the purposes of the Act. Section 19 provides for withdrawal of recognition in cases where the Council finds lowering of standards of proficiency, knowledge or skill. Section 21 provides for the maintenance of an Indian Medical Register. Section 27 says that a person registered in the Indian Medical Council Register shall be entitled to practice as a medical practitioner in any part of India and to recover in due course of law in respect of such practice any expenses, charges or fees to which he is entitled. Section 32 confers the rule making power upon the Government while Section 33 confers the regulation making power upon the Council. The First Schedule mentions the names of the Universities and the recognised medical qualifications 670 awarded by them. Same is done by Part I of the Third Schedule.

ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION ACT, 1987.

56.This Act has been made by the Parliament for the establishment of the ‘All India Council for Technical Education’ with a view to the proper planning and coordinated development of the technical education system throughout the country, promotion of qualitative improvement of such education and other allied matters. Section 3 of the Act provides for the establishment of the Council while Section 10 specifies the functions of the Council. Apart from directing generally that the Council shall take all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring coordinated and integrated development of technical education and maintenance of standards, the Act specifically empowers the Council, inter alia, to “(j) fix norms and guidelines for charging tuition and other fees; (k) grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned, and (n) take an necessary steps to prevent commercialisation of technical education.” It is true, there is no express provision in the Act which says that no engineering college or any other college or institution imparting technical education shall be established except with the permission of the Council. But this may be for the reason that such a power was intended to be exercised by the Council itself if it thinks necessary to do so. We are of the opinion that the vast powers conferred upon the Council by Section 10, ‘including those specified above, do extend to and entitle it to issue an order to the above effect. It can also say that even in the existing institutions, no new course, faculty or class shall be opened except with its approval. It can also pass appropriate directions to the existing institutions as well for achieving the purposes of the Act. Such an order may indeed be necessary for a proper discharge of the wide-ranging functions conferred upon the Council.

57.It is brought to our notice by the learned counsel appearing for the Council that the Council has evolved a proforma of undertaking which should be executed by the person-in-charge of any institution proposed to be established stating inter alia that such institution will not only observe the several orders and instructions issued by the Council but it shall not charge any capitation fee from the students/guardians of the students in any form.

The proforma further stipulates that in the event of non-com- 671 pliance of any of the orders and directions issued by the Council or the terms of the undertaking, it shall be open to the Council to take appropriate action including withdrawal of its approval or recognition, which automatically entails stoppage of financial grant or assistance from the Central and State Government. It is also brought to our notice that the Council has issued guidelines for admission to Engineering Degree and Engineering Diploma programmes in G.S.R. 320 dated 15th June, 1992 in exercise of the power conferred upon it by Section 23(1) of the Act (Section 23 of the Act confers the regulation making power upon the Council).

STATE ENACTMENTS:

58.As mentioned in Part I of this judgment, the States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and recently the state of Tamil Nadu have all enacted legislation prohibiting the charging of capitation fee. We had also set out the Preamble to the Andhra Act which Preamble is to be found almost in every such enactment. We had referred to the A.P.

Education Act, 1982 as well which provides that no educational institution shall be established in the State except with the permission of the competent authority INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 1992:

59.The last of the statutory provisions to be noticed is of great relevance herein viz., the Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Ordinance, 1992 being Ordinance No. 13 of 1992 issued by the President of India on 27th August, 1992. By this Ordinance, Section 10-A to 10-C have been added besides amending Section 33. Section 10-A provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Medical Council Act or any other law for the time being in force, no medical college shall be established nor any new or higher course of study or training opened in an existing institution nor shall it increase its admission capacity in any course of study or training, except with the previous permission of the Central Government obtained in accordance with the provisions of the said section. The section prescribes the procedure for submitting the application, the matters which the Central Government shall take into account while considering the said application, the obligatory consultation with the Council and the manner in which the application shall be disposed of. It also 672 provides the matters which the Council should take into consideration while making its recommendation to the Central Government. Suffice it to mention that the several matters which the Council and the Central Government are directed to take into consideration are designed to ensure that a properly equipped institution is in place before it is permitted to impart medical education. Section 10-B provides for non-recognition of medical qualifications awarded by institutions which have been established without the previous permission of the Central Government or by an institution which violates any of the conditions in Section 10-A. Section 10-C provides that if any person has established a medical college or has opened a new or higher course of study in an existing college, he shall, within one year from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance, seek permission of the Central Government in accordance with Section 10-A.

GROUND REALITY:

60.Notwithstanding the fact that education is the second highest sector of budgeted expenditure after the Defence, the outlay on education is woefully inadequate to the needs of the people. Whereas many other countries spend six to eight per cent of their Gross National Product on education, our expenditure on education is only three per cent of the Gross National Product. Seventy five to eight per cent of the expenditure goes in paying the salaries of the teachers and other connected staff. These are the statements made in the Government of India publication ‘Challenge of Education a policy pe rspective” referred to hereinbelow. Even so, on account of lack of proper supervision, lack of self- discipline and commitment, the quality and standard of instruction in most of the Government schools and colleges except the professional colleges is woeful. This has provided an occasion and an opportunity to private educational institutions to fill the void, both in terms of meeting the need and more particularly in the matter of quality of instruction. Because, the State is in no position to devote more resources and also because the need is constantly growing, it is not possible to do without private educational institutions. In this context, it is appropriate nay, necessary, to notice the stand of the Government of India in this behalf. It is thus: the Central Government does not have the resources to undertake any additional financial responsibility for medical or technical education; it is unable to aid any private educational institution financially at a level higher than at present;

therefore the policy 673 of the Central Government is to involve private and voluntary efforts in the education sector in conformity with accepted norms and goals; however, the private educational institutions cannot be compelled to charge only that fee as is charged in Governmental institutions; in 1986, the Central Government has evolved the ‘New Education Policy’ according to it, ‘in the interests of maintaining the standards and for several other valid reasons, the commercialisation of technical and professional education will be curbed. An alternative system will be devised to involve private and voluntary effort in this section of education, in conformity with accepted norms and goals.’ (vide parts 6-20); the amendments proposed to I.M.C. Act, 1956 in 1987 have not materialised so far; so far as engineering colleges are concerned, permission is being granted by the A.I.C.T.E. subject to the condition that they do not collect any capitation fee; according to the guidelines issued by the A.I.C.T.E., the technical colleges will be permitted to recover ‘only a graded percentage of the average cost of student education, depending on whether the institution is Government-funded, Government-aided or unaided.’ (According to the these guidelines, it is stated, the students will be asked to pay 20% of the cost in Government funded institutions, 30-35% in Government-aided and 70% in unaided institutions). It is finally submitted that:

“(a) Conferring unconditional and unqualified right to education at all levels to every citizen involving a constitutional obligation on the State to establish educational institutions either directly or through State agencies is not warranted by the Constitution besides being unrealistic and impractical.

(b)When the Government grants recognition to private educational institutions it does not create an agency to fulfill its obligations under the Constitution and there is no scope to import the concept of agency in such a situation.

(c)The principles laid down in Mohini Jain’s case do require reconsideration.

(d)It would be unrealistic and unwise to discourage private initiative in providing educational facilities particularly for higher education. The private sector should be involved and indeed encouraged to augment the much needed resources in the field of education, thereby making as much progress as possible in achieving the Constitutional goals in this respect.

674 (e)At the same time, regulatory controls have to be continued and strengthened in order to prevent private educational institutions from commercializing education.

(f)Regulatory measures should be maintained and strengthened so as to ensure that private educational institutions maintain minimum standards and facilities.

(g)Admissions within all groups and categories should be based on merit. There may be reservation of seats in favour of the weaker sections of the society and other groups which deserve special treatment. The norms for admission should be pre-determined and transparent.” The stand of the State Governments of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu is no different.

61.The hard reality that emerges is that private educational institutions are a necessity in the present day context. It is not possible to do without them because the Governments are in no position to meet the demand particularly in the sector of medical and technical education which call for substantial outlays. While education is one of the most important functions of the Indian State it has no monopoly therein. Private educaitonal institutions including minority educational institutions too have a role to play.

62.Private educational institutions may be aided as well as un-aided. Aid given by the, Government may be cent per cent or partial. So far as aided institutions are concerned, it is evident, they have to abide by all the rules and regulations as may be framed by the Government and/or recognising/affiliating authorities in the matter of recruitment of teachers and staff, their conditions of service, syllabus, standard of teaching and so on. In particular, in the matter of admission of students, they have to follow the rule of merit and merit alone subject to any reservations made under Article 15. They shall not be entitled to charge any fees higher than what is charged in Governmental institutions for similar courses. These are and shall be understood to be the conditions of grant of aid. The reason is simple: public funds, when given as grant and not as loan carry the public character wherever they go; public funds cannot be donated for private purposes. The element of public character necessarily mean a fair conduct in all respects consistent with the constitutional mandate of Article 14 and 675 15.All the Governments and other authorities in charge of granting aid to educational institutions shall expressly provide for such conditions (among others), if not already provided, and shall ensure compliance with the same. Again aid may take several forms, For example, a medical college does necessarily require a hospital. We are told that for a 100 seat medical college, there must be a fully equipped 700-bed hospital. Then alone, the medical college can be allowed to function. A private medical college may not have or may not establish a hospital of its own. It may request the Government and the Government may permit it to avail of the services of a Government hospital for the purpose of the college free of charge. This would also be a form of aid and the conditions aforesaid have to be imposed may be with some relaxation in the matter of fees chargeable and observed. The Government (Central and State) and all other authorities granting aid shall impose such conditions forthwith, if not already imposed. These conditions shall apply to existing as well as proposed private educational institutions.

63.So far as un-aided institutions are concerned, it is obvious that they cannot be compelled to charge the same fee as is charged in Governmental institutions. if they do so voluntarily, it is perfectly welcome but they cannot be compelled to do so, for the simple reason that they have to meet the cost of imparting education from their own resources and the main source, apart from donations/charities, if any, can only be the fees collected from the students. It is here that the concepts of ‘self- financing educational institutions’ and ‘cost-based educational institutions’ come in. This situation presents several difficult problems. How does one determine the ‘cost of education’ and how and by whom can it be regulated? The cost of education may very, even within the same faculty, from institution to institution. The facilities provided, equipment, infrastructure, standard and quality of education obtaining may vary from institution to institution. The court cannot certainly do this. It must be done by Government or University or such other authority as may be designated in that behalf. Even so, some questions do arise whether cost-based education only means running charges or can it take in capital outlay? Who pays or who can be made to pay for establishment, expansion and improvement/diversification of a private educational institutions? Can an individual or body of persons first collect amounts (by whatever name called) from the intending students and with those monies establish an institution an activity similar to builders of apartments in the cities? How much should 676 the students. coming in later years pay? Who should work out the economics of each institution? Any solution evolved has to take into account all these variable factors. But one thing is clear: commercialisation of education cannot and should not be permitted The Parliament as well as State Legislatures have expressed this intention in unmistakable terms. Both in the light of our tradition and from the stand-point of interest of general public, commercialisation is positively harmful; it is opposed to public policy. As we shall presently point out, this is one of the reasons for holding that imparting education cannot be trade, business or profession. The question is how to encourage private educational institutions without allowing them to commercialise the education? This is the troublesome question facing the society, the government and the courts today. But before we proceed to evolve a scheme to meet this problem, it is necessary to answer a few other questions raised before us.

RIGHT TO ESTABLISH AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 64.Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution declares that all citizens of this country shall have the right “to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade on business”. Clause (6) of Article 19, however, says:

“Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said clause and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to or prevents the State from making any law relating to:

(i)the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii)carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State or any trade, business, industry or service whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.’ While we do not with to express any opinion on the question whether 677 the right to establish an educational institution can be said to be carrying on any “occupation’ within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g), perhaps, it is we are certainly of the opinion that such activity can neither be a trade or business nor can it be a profession within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g). Trade or business normally connotes an activity carried on with a profit motive. Education has never been commerce in this country. Making it one is opposed to the ethos, tradition and sensibilities of this nation. The argument to the contrary has an unholy ring to it. Imparting of education has never been treated as a trade or business in this country since times immemorial.

It has been treated as a religious duty. It has been treated as a charitable activity. But never as trade or business. We agree with Gajendragadkar, J. That “education in its true aspect is more a mission and a vocation rather than a profession or trade or business, however wide may be the denotation of the two latter words…….. (See University of Delhi [1961] 1 SCR 703). The Parliament too has manifested its intention repeatedly (by enacting the U.G.C. Act, I.M.C. Act and A.I.C.T.E. Act) that commercialisation of education is not permissible and that no person shall be allowed to steal a march over a more meritorious candidate because of his economic power. The very game intention is expressed by the Legislatures of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu in the Preamble to their respective enactments prohibiting charging of capitation fee.

65.We are, therefore, of the opinion, adopting the line of reasoning in State of Bombay v. R.M.D.C, [1957] INSC 33; 1957 S.C.R. 874, that imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or business. Education cannot be allowed to be converted into commerce nor can the petitioners seek to obtain the said result by relying upon the wider meaning of ‘occupation’.

The content of the expression “occupation” has to be ascertained keeping in mind the fact that clause (g) employs all the four expressions viz., profession, occupation, trade and business. Their fields may overlap, but each of them does certainly have a content of its own, distinct from the others. Be that as it may, one thing is clear imparting of education is not and cannot be allowed to become commerce. A law, existing or future, ensuring against it would be a valid measure within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19. We cannot, therefore, agree with the contrary proposition enunciated in 1968 Bombay 91, 1984 A.P. 251 and 1986 Karnataka 119.

678 66.The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon certain decisions in support of their contention that right to establish an educational institution flows from Article 19(1)(g). The first is in Bharat Sevashram Sangh v. State of Gujarat [1986] INSC 172; [1986] 3 S.C.R. 602, a decision of a Bench consisting of E.S. Venkataramiah and Ranganath Misra, JJ.

At page 609, while dealing with Section 33 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act empowering the Government to take over an educational institution in certain situations for a period not exceeding five years, the teamed Judges observed that “the said provision is introduced in the interest of the general public and does not in any way affect prejudically the fundamental right of the management guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.” Actually, the issue now before us was not raised or considered in the said decision. Moreover, the decision does not say whether it is a profession, occupation, trade or business.

Reliance is then placed upon the Seven Judge Bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Rajappa, [1978] INSC 44; [1978] 3 S.C.R. 207. Krishna Iyer, J. dealing with the meaning of the expression “industry” in I.D. Act observed that even educational institutions would fall within the purview of “Industry”. We do not think the said observation in a different context has any application here.

So far as the other decision in State of Maharashtra v. Lok Shikshan Sanstha, [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 879 is concerned, all that the court held there was that is view of the operation of emergency, Article 19 is not available to the petitioners seeking to establish an educational institution.

Article 358 was held to be a bar. But the decision does not say that such a right does inhere in the petitioners.

67.We are also of the opinion that the said activity cannot be called a ‘profession’ within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g). It is significant to notice the words “to practice any profession. Evidently, the reference is to such professions as may be practised by citizens i.e., individuals. (See N.U.C Employees v. Industrial Tribunal, [1962] INSC 51; A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1080 at 1085). Establishing educational institutions can by no stretch of imagination be treated as ‘practising any profession’. Teaching may be a profession but establishing an institution employing teaching and non- teaching staff, procuring the necessary infrastructure for running a school or college is 679 not ‘practising profession’. It may be anything but not practising a profession. We must make it clear that we have not gone into the precise meaning an content of the expressions profession, occupation, trade or business for the reason that it is not necessary for us to do so-in view of the approach we are adopting hereinafter, which would be evident from the succeeding paragraphs. Our main concern in the entire preceding discussion is only to establish that the activity of establishing and/or running an educational institution cannot be a matter of commerce.

68.For the purpose of these cases, we shall proceed on the assumption that a person or body of persons has a right to establish an educationtal institution in this country. But this right, we must make it clear, is not an absolute one.

It is subject to such law as may be made by the State in the interest of general public.

69.We must, however, make it clear, and which is of crucial importance herein, that the right to establish an educationcal institution does not carry with it the right to recognition or the right to affiliation. In St. Xaviers College v. Gujarat, [1974] INSC 106; [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173 it has been held uniformly by all the nine learned Judges that there is no fundamental right to affiliation. Ray, C.J., stated that this has been “the consistent view of this court.” They also recognised that recognition or affiliation is essential for a meaningful exercise of the right to establish and administer educational institutions. Recognition may be granted either by the Government or any other authority or body empowered to accord recognition. Similarly, affiliation may be granted either by the University or any other academic or other body empowered to grant affiliation to other educational institutions. In other words, it is opento a person to establish an educational institution, admit students, imparteducation, conduct examination and award certificates to them. But he,or the educational institution has no right to insist that the certificates ordegree (if they can be called as such) awarded by such institution should be recognised by the State much less have they the right to say that the students trained by the institution should be admitted to examinations conducted by the University or by the Government or any other authority, as the case may be. The institution has to seek such recognition or affiliation from the appropriate agency.

Grant of recognition and/or affiliation is not a matter of course nor is it a formality. Admission to the privileges of a University is a power to be exercised with 680 great care, keeping in view the interest of the general public and the nation. it is a matter of substantial significance the very life-blood of a private educational institution. Ordinarily speaking, no educational institution can run or survive unless it is recognised by the Government or the appropriate authority and/or is affiliated to one or the other Universities in the country.

Unless it is recognised and/or affiliated as stated above, it’s certificates will be of no use. No one would join such educational institution. As a matter of fact, by virtue of the provisions of the U.G.C. Act, noticed hereinabove, no educational institution in this country except a University is entitled to award degrees. It is for this reason that all the private educational institutions seek recognition and/or affiliation with a view to enable them to send the students trained by them to appear at the examinations conducted by the Government/University. The idea is that if such students pass the said examination, the Government/University will award its degree/diploma/cer- tificate to them. These educational institutions follow the syllabus prescribed by the Government/University, have the same courses of study, follow the same method of teaching and training. They do not award their own degrees/qualifications. They prepare their students for University/Government examinations, request the University/Government to permit them to appear at the examinations conducted by them and to award the appropriate degrees to them’. Clearly and indubitably, the recongnised/affiliated private educational institutions, supplement the function performed by the institutions of the State. Theirs is not an independent activity but one closely allied to and supplemental to the activity of the State. In the above circumstances, it is idle to contend that imparting of education is a business like any other business or that it is an activity akin to any other activity like building of roads, bridges etc. In short the position is this. No educational institution except an University can award degrees (Sections 22 and 23 of the U.G.C. Act). The private educational institutions cannot award their own degrees. Even if they award any certificates or other testimonials they have no practical value inasmuch as they are not good for obtaining any employment under the State or for admission into higher courses of study. The private educational institutions merely supplement the effort of the State in educating the people, as explained above. It is not an independent activity. It is an activity supplemental to the principal activity carried on by the State. No private education institution can survive or subsist without recognition and/or 681 affiliation. The bodies which grant recognition and/or affiliation are the authorities of the State. In such a situation, it is obligatory in the interest of general public upon the authority granting recognition or affiliation to insist upon such conditions as are appropriate to ensure not only education of requisite standard but also fairness and equal treatment in the matter of admission of students. Since the recognising/affiliating authority is the ‘State’ it is under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of its duty enjoined upon it by Article 14 of the Constitution. It cannot allow itself or its power and privilege to be used unfairly. The incidents attaching to the main activity attach to supplemental activity as well. Affiliation/recognition is not there for anybody to get it gratis or unconditionally. In our opinion, no Government, authority or University is justified or is entitled to grant recognition/affiliation without imposing such conditions. Doing so would amount to abdicating its obligations enjoined upon it by Part III; its activity is bound to be characterised as unconstitutional and illegal. To reiterate,, what applies to the man activity applies equally to supplemental activity. The State cannot claim immunity from the obligations arising from Articles 14 and 15. If so, it cannot confer such immunity upon its affiliates. Accordingly, we have evolved with the help of the counsel appearing before us and keeping in view the positive features of the several Central and State enactments refeffred to hereinbefore the following scheme which every authority granting recognition/affiliation shall impose upon the institutions seeking such recognition/affiliation.

The idea behind the scheme is to eliminate discretion in the management altogether in the matter of admission. It is the discretion in the matter of admission that is at the root of the several ills complained of It is the discretion that has mainly led to the commercialisation of education.

‘Capitation fee’ means charging or collecting amount beyond what is permitted by law; all the Acts have defined this expression in this sense. We must strive to bring about a situation where there is no room or occasion for the management or anyone on its behalf to demand or collect any amount beyond what is permitted. We must clarify that charging the permitted fees by the private educational institutions which is bound to be higher than the fees charged in similar governmental institutions by itself cannot be characterised as capitation fees. This is the policy underlying all the four States enactments prohibition capitation fees. All of them recognise the necessity of charging higher fees by private educational institutions.

682 They seek to regulate the fees that can be charged by them which may be called permitted fees and to bar them from collecting anything other than the permitted fees, which is what ‘Capitation fees’ means. Our attempt in evolving the following scheme precisely is to given effect to the said legislative policy. It would be highly desirable if this Scheme is given a statutory shape by incorporating it in the Rules that may be framed under these enactments.

SCHEME 70.The scheme evolved herewith is in the nature of guidelines which the appropriate Governments and recognising and affiliating authorities shall impose and implement in addition to such other conditions and stipulations as they may think appropriate as conditions for grant of permission, grant of recognition or grant of affiliation, as the case may be. We are confining the scheme for the present only to ‘professional colleges.’ The expression Professional colleges’ in this scheme includes:

(i) medical colleges, dental colleges and other institutions and colleges imparting Nursing, Pharmacy and other courses allied to Medicine, established and/or run by private education institutions, (ii)colleges of engineering and colleges and institutions imparting technical education including electronics, computer sciences, established and/or run by private educational institutions, and (iii)such other colleges to which this scheme is made applicable by the Government, recognising and/or affiliating authority.” The expression “appropriate authority” means the Government, University or other authority as is competent to grant permission to establish or to grant recognition to a professional college.

The expression ‘competent authority’ in this scheme means the Government/University or other authority, as may be designated by the Government/University or by law, as is competent to allot students for admission to various professional colleges in the given State.

683 It is made clear that only those institutions which seek permission to establish and/or recognition and/or affiliation from the appropriate authority shall alone be made bound by this scheme. This scheme is not applicable to colleges run by Government or to University colleges. In short, the scheme hereinafter mentioned shall be made a condition of permission, recognition or affiliation, as the case may be. For each of them viz., grant of permission, grant of recognition, grant of affiliation, these conditions shall necessarily be imposed, in addition to such other conditions as the appropriate authority may think appropriate. No Private educational institutaion shall be allowed to send its students to appear for an examination held by any Government or other body constituted by it or under any law or to any examination held by any University unless the concerned institution and the relevant course of study is recognised by the appropriate authority and/or is affiliated to the appropriate University, as the case may be.

(1)A professional college shall be permitted to be established and/or administered only by a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (or the corresponding Act, if any, in force in a given State), or by a Public Trust, religious or charitable, registered under the Trusts Act, Wakfs Act (or the corresponding legislation, if any, e.g., Tamil Nadu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act and A.P. Religious and Charitable Endowments Act). No individual, firm, company or other body of individuals, by whatever appellation called except those mentioned above will be permitted to establish and/or administer a professional college. All the existing professional colleges which do not conform to the above norm shall be directed to take appropriate steps to comply with the same within a period of six months from today. In default whereof, recognition/affiliation accorded shall stand withdrawn. (In this connection reference may be had to Rule 86(2) of Maharashtra Grant-in-aid code (referred to in State of Maharashtra v. Lok Shikshan Sanstha, [1971] Suppl.

S.C.R. 879 which provided that schools which are not registered under the Societies Registration Act, shall not be eligible for grant. Grant of recognition and affiliation is no less significance).

(2)Atleast, 50% of the seats in every professional college shall be filled by the nominees of the Government or University, as the case may be, hereinafter referred to as “free seats”. These students shall be selected on the basis of merit determined on the basis of a common entrance 684 examination where it is held or in the absence of an entrance examination, by such criteria as may be determined by the competent authority or the appropriate to authority, as the case may be. It is, however, desirable and appropriate have a common entrance exam for regulating admissions to these colleges/institutions, as is done in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The remaining 50% seats (payment seats) shaft be filled by those candidates who are prepared to pay the fee prescribed therefor and who have complied with the instructions regarding deposit and furnishing of cash security/Bank guarantee for the balance of the amount.

The allotment of students against payment seats shall also be done on the basis of inter se merit determined on the same basis as in the case of free seats. There shall be no quota reserved for the management or for any family, caste or community which may have established such college. The criteria of eligibility and all other conditions shall be the same in respect of both free seats and payment seats.

The only distinction shall be the requirement of higher fee by the ‘payment students’. The Management of a professional college shall not be entitled to impose or prescribe any other and further eligibility criteria or condition for admission either to free seats or to payment seats. It shall, however, be open to a professional college to provide for reservation of seats for constitutionally permissible classes with the approval of the affiliating University.

Such reservations, if any, shall be made and notified to the competent authority and the appropriate authority atleast one month prior to the issuance of notification @ for applications for admission to such category of colleges. In such a case, the competent authority shall allot students keeping in view the reservations provided by a college. The rule of merit shall be followed even in such reserved categories.

(3)The number of seats available in the professional colleges (to which this scheme is made applicable) shall be fixed by the appropriate authority. No professional college shall be permitted to increase its strength except under the permission or authority granted by the appropriate authority.

(4)No professional college shall call for applications for admission separately or individually. AD the applications for admission to all the seats available in such,colleges shall be called for by the competent authority alone, along with applications for admission to Government/University colleges of nature. For example, there shall be only one notification 685 by the competent authority calling for applications for all the medical colleges in the State and one notification for all the engineering colleges in the State and so on. The application forms for admission shall be issued by the competent authority (from such offices, centres and places as he may direct). The application form shall contain a column or a separate part wherein an applicant can indicate whether he wishes to be admitted against a payment seat and the order of preference, up to three professional colleges.

(5)Each professional college shall intimate the competent authority, the State Government and the concerned University in advance the fees chargeable for the entire course commencing that academic year. The total fees shall be divided into the number of years/semesters of study in that course. In the first instance, fees only for the first year/semester shall be collected. The payment students will be, however, required to furnish either cash security or bank grantee for the fees payable for the remaining years/semesters. The fees chargeable, in each professional college shall be subject to the ceiling prescribed by the appropriate authority or by a competent Court. The competent authority shall issue ‘a brochure, on payment of appropriate charges, along with the application form for ad- mission, giving full particulars of the courses and the number of seats available, the names of the colleges their location and also the fees chargeable by each professional college. The brochure win also specify the minimum eligibility conditions, the method of admission (whether by entrace test or otherwise) and other relevant particulars.

(6)(a) Every State Government shall forthwith constitute a Committee to fix the ceiling on the fees chargeable by a professional college or class of professional colleges, as the case may be. The Committee shall consist of a Vice- Chancellor, Secretary for Education (or such Joint Secretary, as he may nominate) and Director, Medical Education/Director Technical Education. The committee shall make such enquiry as it thinks appropriate. It shalt however, give opportunity to the professional colleges (or their association(s), if any) to place such material, as they think fit. It shall, however, not be bound to give any personal hearing to anyone or follow any technical rules of law. The Committee shall fix the fee once every three years or at such longer intervals, as it may think appropriate.

(b) It would be appropriate if the U.G.C. frames regulations under 686 Section 12A (3) of the U.G.C. Act, regulating the fees which the affiliated colleges, operating on no-grant-in-aid basis, are entitled to charge. The Council for Technical Education may also consider the advisability of issuing directions under Section 10 of the A.I.C.T.E. Act regulating the fees that may be charged in private unaided educational institutions imparting technical education. The Indian Medical Council and Central government may also consider the advisability of such regulation as a condition for grant of permission to new medical colleges under Section 10-A and to impose such a condition on existing colleges under Section 10-C.

(c)The several authorities mentioned in sub-paras (a) and ((1) shall decide whether a private educational institution is entitled to charge only that fee as is required to run the college or whether the capital cost involved in establishing a college can also be passed on to the students and if so, in what manner. Keeping in view the need, the interest of general public and of the nation, a policy decision may be taken. It would be more appropriate if the Central Government and these several authorities (U.G.C., I.M.C. and A.I.C.T.E.) cordinate their efforts and evolve a broadly uniform criteria in this behalf. Until the Central Government, U.G.C., I.M.C. and A.I.C.T.E. issue order/regulations in this behalf, the committee referred to in the sub-para (a) of this para shall be operative. In other words, the working and orders of the committee shall be subject to the orders/regulations, issued by Central Government, U.G.C., I.M.C. or A.I.C.T.E., as the case may be.

(d)We must hasten to add that what we have said in this clause is merely a reiteration of the duty nay, obligation placed up on the Governments of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu by their respective legislatures to wit, Section 7 of Andhra Pradesh Act 5 of 1983, Section 4 of Maharashtra Act 6 of 1988, Section 5 of Karnataka Act of 1984 and Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1992. Other States too may have to have similar provisions, carrying statutory force.

(7)Any candidate who fulfils the eligibility conditions would be entitled to apply for admission. After the free seats in professional colleges are filled up, atleast 10 days’ time will be given to the candidates (students) to opt to be admitted against payment seats. The candidates shall be entitled to indicate their choice for any three colleges (if available). In such a case, he shall comply with the deposit and cash security/Bank guarantee 687 – taking the institution charging the highest fees as the basis within the said period of ten days. If he is admitted in an institution, charging less fee, the difference amount shall be refunded to him. (The cash security or Bank guarantee shall be in favour of the competent authority, who shall transfer the same in favour of the appropriate college if that student is admitted).

(8)The results of the entrance examination, if any, held should be published atleast in two leading newspapers, one in English and the other in vernacular. The payment candidates shall be allotted to different professional colleges on the basis of merit-cum-choice. The allotment shall be made by the competent authority. A professional college shall be bound to admit the students so allotted.

The casual vacancies or unfilled vacancies, if any, shall also be filled in the same manner. The management of a professional college shall not be permitted to admit any student other than the one allotted by the competent authority whether against free seat or payment seat, as the case may be. It is made clear that even in the matter of reserved categories, if any, the principle of inter se merit shall be followed. All allotments made shall be published in two leading newspapers as aforesaid and on the notice boards of the respective colleges and at such other places as the comptent authority may direct, along with the marks obtained by each candidates in the relevant entrance test or qualifying examination, as the case may be. No professional college shall be entitled to ask for any other or further payment or amount, under whatever name it may be called, from any student allotted to it whether against the free seat or payment seat.

(9)After making the allotments, the competent authority shall also prepare and publish a waiting list of the candidates along with the marks obtained by them in the relevant test/examination. The said list shall be followed for filling up any casual vacancies or ‘drop-out’-vacancies arising after the admissions are finalised. These vacancies shall be filled until such date as may be prescribed by the competent authority. Any vacancies still remaining after such date can be filled by the Management.

It is made clear that it shall be open to the appropriate authority and the competent authority to issue such further instructions or directions, as they may think appropriate not inconsistent with this scheme, by way of elaboration and elucidation.

The scheme shall apply to and govern the admissions to professional 688 colleges commencing from the academic year 1993-94.

We are aware that until the commencement of the current academic year, the Andhra Pradesh was following a somewhat different pattern in the matter of filling the seats in private unaided engineering colleges. Though all the available seats were being filled by the allottees of the Convenor (State) and the managements were not allowed to admit any student on their own a uniform fee was collected from all the students. The concepts of ‘free seats’ and ‘payment seats’ were therefore not relevant in such a situation all were payment seats only. We cannot say that such a system is constitutionally not permissible. But our idea in devising this scheme has been to provide more opportunities to meritorious students, who may not be able to pay the enhanced fee prescribed by the government for such colleges. The system devised by us would mean correspondingly more financial burden on payment students whereas in the aforesaid system (in vogue in Andhra Pradesh) the financial burden is equally distributed among, all the students. The theoretical foundation for our method is, that a candidate/student who is stealing a march over his compatriot on account of his economic power should be made not only to pay for himself but also to pay for another meritorious student. This is the social justification behind the fifty per cent rule prescribed in clause (2) of this scheme. In the interest of uniformity and in the fight of the above social theory, we direct the State of Andhra Pradesh to adhere to the system derived by us.

71.In view of the above, we do not think it necessary to go into or answer Question No. 3. In our opinion, the said question requires debate in a greater depth and any expression of opinion thereon at this juncture is not really warranted.

PART IV VALIDITY OF SECTION 3-A OF THE ANDHRA PRADESH EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (REGULATION OF ADMISSION

AND PROHIBTION OF CAPITATION FEE) ACT 1983.

72.Section 3-A of the aforesaid Act, as introduced by the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 12 of 1992, read as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, but subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf and the 689 Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of admission) Order, 1974, it shall be lawful for the management of any unaided private engineering college, medical college, dental college and such other class of unaided educational institutions as may be notified by the Government in this behalf to admit students into such colleges or educational institutions to the extent of one half of the total number of seats from among those who have qualified in the common entrance test or in the qualifying examina- tion, as the case may be, referred to in sub- section (1) of Section 3 irrespective of the ranking assigned to them in such test or examination and nothing contained in Section 5 shall apply to such admissions.” A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has struck it down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and also on the ground of repugnancy with Section 12-A of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 Kranti Sangram Parishad v. Sri N.J. Reddy, (1992) 3 A.L.T. 99. The correctness of the said decision is assailed before us.

73.This Section is in truth, in the nature of an exception to the other provisions of the Act. It says that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, but subject to the rules as may be framed by the Government in this behalf, the private educational institutions of the nature mentioned therein, shall be entitled to admit students to the extend of half the number of seats from among those who have qualified in the common entrace test or the qualifying examination, as the case may be. This statement is accompanied by two significant features viz., (1) admission of such students could be irrespective of the ranking assigned to them to the common entrance test or other qualifying examination, as the case may be; and (2) it is made clear that nothing contained in Section 5 shall apply to such admissions. The Section is, thus, an exception to Section 3, 5. Section 3, it may be remembered, provides that admissions have to be made, to all categories, strictly in accordance with merit. The section, read as a whole, leads to the following consequences:

(a)It is open to the private educational institutions to charge as much amount as they can for admission. It will be a matter of bargain between the institution and the student seeking admission.

690 (b)The admission can be made without reference to inter-se merit of paying candidates. The institution will be entitled to pick and choose the candidates among the applicants on such considerations as it may deem fit.

(c)Section 5, which prohibtis collection of capitation fee by an education institutions, is expressly made inapplicable to such admissions. This is not without a purpose. The purpose is to permit the institutions to charge as much as they can in addition to the collection of the prescribed tuition fee.

74.We have held hereinbefore that the educational activity of the private educational institutions is supplemental to the main effort by the State and that what applies to the main activity applies equally to the supplemental activity as well. If Article 14 of the Constitution applies as it does, without a doubt to the State institutions and compels them to admit students on the basis of merit and merit alone (subject, of course, to any permissible reservations wherein too, merit inter-se has to be followed) the applicability of Article 14 cannot be excluded from the supplemental effort/activity. The State Legislature had, therefore, no power to say that a private educational institution will be entitled to admit students of its choice, irrespective of merit or that it is entitled to charge as much as it can, which means a free hand for exploitation and more particularly, commercialisation of education, which is impermissible in law. No such immunity from the constitutional obligation can be claimed or conferred by the State Legislature. On this ground alone, the Section is liable to fail.

In the circumstances, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the section is bad on account of repugnancy with Section 12-A of the University Grants Commission Act. It is enough to say that the said section falls foul of Article 14 for the reasons given above the must accordingly fail. We agree that the offending portions of Section 3-A cannot be severed from the main body of the section and, therefore, the whole section is liable to fall to the ground.

It is not brought to our notice that the enactments of other three States viz., Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra contain similar offending provisions. Indeed, they do not.

None of their provisions says that, the Management of a private educational institution can admit students, against “payment seats”, “irrespective of the ranking assigned to them in 691 such test (entrance test) or examination.” Much less do they say that to such admissions, the provision prohibiting capitation fee shall not apply. True, they do not say expressly that such admissions shall be made on the basis of merit, but that, according to us, is implicit. If the notifications or order issued thereunder provide otherwise, either expressly or by implication, they would be equally bad for the reason given above.

75.Once Section 3-A is struck down, the question arises as to what should happen to the students who were admitted by the Private Engineering Colleges in this State, at their own discretion, to the extent of the 50% of the available seats.

The High Court has invalidated these admissions but they are continuing now by virtue of the orders of stay granted by this Court. A fact which must be kept in mind in this behalf is this: Until the previous year, the Government of Andhra Pradesh has been permitting these private engineering colleges to collect a higher fees from all the students allotted to them. (We are told that the fees permitted to be collected was Rs. 10,000 per annum for the previous year).

Of course, all the available seats were filled up by students allotted by the convenor of the common entrance exam; no one could be admitted by these colleges on their own. Now, for the current year, these colleges admitted 50% of the students in their own discretion which necessarily means collection of capitation andior arbitrary admissions for their own private reasons. At the same time, these colleges have been collecting the same fees (Rs. 10,000 per annum) both from the students allottee by the convenor as also from those admitted by themselves. Thus they have reaped a double advantage.

76.It is submitted by Shri Shanti Bhushan the learned counsel for these students that they were innocent parties and had obtained admission in a bona fide belief that their admissions were being made properly. They have been studying since them and in a few months their academic year will come to a close. May be, the managements were guilty of irregularity, he says, but so far as the students are concerned they have done nothing contrary to law to deserve the punishment awarded by the Full Bench of the High Court.

77.It is true. as pointed out by the High Court that these admissions were made in a hurry but the fact remains that they have been continuing in the said course under the orders of this Court over the last about four months. As stated hereinbefore, the present situation has been brought 692 about by a combination of circumstances, namely the enactment of Section 3-A, the allotment of students to the extent of 50% only by the convenor and the failure of the Government to immediately rectify the misunderstanding of the convenor. In the circumstances we are not satisfied that these students should be sent out at this stage. May be, the result is rather unfortunate but we have to weigh all the relevnt circumstances. At the same time we are of the opinion that the managements of these private engineering colleges should not be allowed to walk away with the double advantage referred to above. Since they have admitted students of their own choice to the extent of 50% and also because it is not possible to investigate or verify for what consideration those admissions were made, we think it appropriate to direct that these colleges should charge only that fee from the 50% ‘free students’ as is charged for similar courses in the concerned university engineering colleges. For the remaining years of their course these colleges shall collect only the said fee, which for the sake of convenience may be called the ‘government fee’. The balance of the amount which they have already collected during this year shall be remitted into the Government account within six weeks from today, in default whereof the recognition and affiliation given to these colleges shall stand withdrawn. In other words whichever college fails to comply with the above direction it will stand disaffiliated on the expiry of six weeks from today and the recognition granted to it, if any, by any appropriate authority shall also stand withdrawn.

78.So far as Writ Petition 855 of 1992 is concerned, it complains of charging of double the tuition fee is case of students coming from outside the Maharashtra. The matter stand concluded against the petitoners by a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] INSC 3; [1955] 1 SCR 1215. This Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed.

79.Coming to Civil Appeal No. 3573 of 1992 filed by Mahatma Gandhi Mission, we are inclined, in all the facts and circumstances of the case to stay the operation of the impugned order which is only an interlocutory order effective till the disposal of the main Writ Petition. Writ Petition may be disposed of according to law and in the light to this Judgment.

693 PART V

80. For the above reasons the Writ Petitions and Civil Appeals except (W.P. (C) 855/92, C.A. 3573/92 and the Civil Appeals arising from S.L.Ps. 13913 and 13940/92) are disposed of in the following terms:

1. The citizens of this country have a fundamental right to education. The said right flows from Article 21. This right is, however, not an absolute right. Its content and para meters have to be determined in the light of Articles 45 and 41. In other words every child/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years. Thereafter his right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the State.

2. The obligations created by Articles, 41, 45 and 46 of the Constitution can be discharged by the State either by establishing institutions of its own or by aiding, recognising and/or granting affiliation to private educa- tional institutions. Where aid is not granted to private educational institutions and merely recognition or affiliation is granted it may not be insisted that the private education institution shall charge only that fee as is charged for similar courses in governmental institutions.

The private educational institutions have to and are entitled to charge a higher fee, not exceeding the ceiling fixed in that behalf. The admission of students and the charging of fee in these private educational institutions shall be governed by the scheme evolved herein set out in Part III of this Judgment.

3. A citizen of this country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, perosn or institution has a right much less a fundamental right, to affiliation or recognition, or to grant-in-aid from the State. The recognition and/or affiliation shall be given by the State subject only to the conditions set out in, and only accordance with the scheme contained in Part III of this Judgment. No Government/University or authority shall be competent to grant recognition or affiliation except in accordance with the said scheme. The said scheme shall constitute a condition of such recognition or affiliation, as the case may be, in addition to such other conditions and terms which such Government, University or other authority may choose to impose.

Those receiving aid shall however, be subject to all such terms and 694 conditions, as the aid giving authority may impose in the interest of general public.

4. Section 3-A of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission And Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 is violative of the equality Clause enshrined in Article 14 and is accordingly declared void. The declaration of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in this behalf is affirmed.

5. Writ Petition No. 855 of 1992 is dismissed.

Civil Appeal No. 3573 of 1992 is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The main Writ Petition wherein the said interim order has been passed may now be disposed of according to law.

6. Civil Appeals arising from S.L.Ps. 13913 and 13940/92 (preferred by students who were admitted by private unaided engineering colleges in Andhra Pradesh, without an allotment from the convenor of the common entrance examination) are allowed. The students so admitted for the academic year 1992-93 be allowed to continue in the said course but the management shall comply with the directions given in para 77 hereinabove.

MOHAN, J. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brother Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy. Though, I am in agreement with his conclusion, I would like to give my own reasonings. Since my learned brother has set out the facts, I will confine myself to answering the three questions, namely:

1. Whether the Constitution of India guarantees a fundamental right to education to its citizens?

2. Whether there is a fundamental right to establish an educational institution under Article 19(1)(g)?

3. Does recognition or affiliation make the educational institution an instrumentality? All the these matters raise a burning issue;

as to how to put an end to the evil of capitation fee or at least to regulate it.

As a prelude, the importance of education may be set out.

695 The immortal Poet Valluvar whose Tirukkural will surpass all ages and transcend all religions said of education:

“Learning is excellence of wealth that none destroy; To man nought else affords reality of joy.” Therefore, the importance of education does not require any emphasis.

The fundamental purpose of Education is the same at all times and in all places. It is to transfigure the human personality into a pattern of perfection through a synthetic ‘process of the development of the body, the enrichment of the mind, the sublimation of the emotions and the illumina- tion of the spirit. Education is a preparation for a living and for life, here and hereafter.

An old Sanskrit adage states: “That is Education which leads to liberation” liberation from ignorance which shrouds the mind; liberation from superstition which paralyses effort, liberation from prejudices which bring the Vision of the Truth.

In the context of a democratic form of government which depends once a social and political necessity. Even several decades ago, our leaders harped upon universal primary education as a desideratum for national progress. It is rather sad that in this great land of ours where knowledge first lit its torch and where the human mind soared to the highest pinnacle of wisdom, the percentage of illiteracy should be appalling. Today, the frontiers of knowledge are enlarging with incredible swiftenss. The foremost need to be satisfied by our education is, therefore, the eradication of illiteracy which persists in a depressing measure, Any effort taken in this direction of be deemed to be too much.

Victories are gained, peace is preserved, progress is achieved, civilization is build up and history is made not on the battle-fields where ghastly murders are committed in the name of patriotism, not in the Council Chambers where insipid speeches are spun out in the name of debate, not even in factories where are manufactured novel instruments to strangle life, but in educational institutions which are the seed-beds of culture, where children in whose hands quiver the destinies of the future, 696 are trained From their ranks will come out when they grow up, statesmen and soldiers, patriots and philosophers, who will determine the progress of the land.

The importance of education has come to be recognised in various judicial decisions.

In Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, U.S.

Supreme Court Reports 98 Law. Ed. U.S. 347 at page 880 it was observed:

“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him t o adjust normally to his environment.” Various fundamental rights enumerated under Part III of our Constitution can be divided into two classes.

1. Injuction restraining the State from denying certain fundamental rights like Articles 14 and 21.

2. A positive conferment of such fundamental rights under Articles 19, 25 and 26 etc.

In this connection, the following passage from Addl. Dist.

Magistrate v. S.S. Shuukla, [1976] Supp. SCR 172 @ 229-230 may be quoted:

“Part III of our Constitution confers fundamental rights in positive as well as in negative language. Article 15(1), 16(1) 9 22(2), 22(5), 25(1), 26, 29(1), 30 and 32(1) can be described to be Articles in positive language. Articles 14, 15(2), 16(2), 20, 21, 22(1), 22(4), 27, 28(1), 29(2), 31(1) and (2) are in negative language. It is apparent that most categories of fundamental rights are in positive as well as 697 in negative language. A fundamental right couched in negative language accentuates by reason thereof the importance of that right.

The negative language is worded to emphasise the immunity from State action as a fundamental right. (See The State of Bihar v.

Maharajadhuraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Ors.) These fundamental rights conferred by our Constitution have taken different forms. Some of these fundamental rights are said to have the texture of Basic Human Rights (See A.K Gopalan’s case (supra) at pp. 96-97, 248-293 and Bank nationalisation case (Supra) at pp. 568-71, 576-78).” Article 21 reads as follows:

“Perfection of life and personal liberty:- No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” It would be clear that it acts as a shield against deprivation of fife or personal liberty.

A question may be asked as to why it did not positively confer a fundamental right to life or personal liberty like Article 19. The reason is, great concepts like liberty and life were purposefully left to gather meaning from experience. They relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact. The drafters of. this Constitution knew too well that only a stagnant society remains uncharged.

Unlike such rights as required to be enumerated it has long been recognised that the individual shall have full protection in person. It is a principle as old as law.

However, it has been found necessary from time to time to define a new the exact nature and the extent of such protection. Political social and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights and the law in its eternal youth grows to meet the demands of society. The right to life and liberty inhere in every man. There is no need to provide for the same in a positive manner.

While dealing with the scope of Article 21 it was observed in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 597 @ 620-21 that:

“It is obvious that Art. 21, though couched in negative 698 language, confers the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. So far as the right personal liberty is concerned, it is ensured by providing that no one shall be deprived of personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by law. The first question that arises for consideration on the language of Art. 21 is: what is the meaning and content of the words ‘personal liberty’ as used in this Article? This question incidentally came up for discussion in some of the judgments in A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] INSC 14; [1950] SCR 88 : [1950] INSC 14; (AIR 1950 SC 27) and the observations made by Patanjali Sastri, J., Mukherjee, J. and S.R. Das, J. seemed to place a narrow interpretation on the words ‘personal liberty’ so as to confine the protection of Art. 21 to freedom of the person against unlawful detention. But there was no definite pronouncement made on this point since the question before the Court was no so much the interpretation of the words ‘personal liberty, as the inter-relation between Arts. 19 and 21.

It was in Kharak Singh v. State of UP., [1964] 1 SCR 332; (AIR 1963 SC 1295) that the question as to the proper scope and meaning of the expression ‘personal liberty’ came up pointedly for consideration for the first time before this Court. The majority of the Judges took the view ‘that ‘personal liberty’ is used in the article as a compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the ‘personal liberties’ of man other than those dealt with in the several clauses of Art. 19(1). In other words, while Art. 19(1) deals with particular species of attributes of that freedom, ‘personal libertyin Art. 21 takes in and comprises the residue”. The minority Judges, however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority and explained their position in the following words:

“No doubt the expression ‘personal liberty’ is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty.

It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and therefore the expression ‘personal liberty’ in Art. 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both 699 are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental right of fife and personal liberty has many attributes and some of them are found in Art. 19. If a person’s fundamental right under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19(1) are concerned.” There can be no doubt that in view of the decision of this Court in R. C. Cooper v.

Union of India[1970] INSC 18; , [1970] 3 SCR 530: (AIR 1970 SC 564) the minority view must be regarded as correct and the majority view must be held to have been overruled.”(Emphasis supplied) Therefore, it is not correct to state that because the article is couched in a negative language, positive rights to life and liberty are not conferred as argued by Mr.

Tarkunde, learned counsel.

This Court in Choarak Singh v. State of U.P., 119641 1 SCR 332, (345, 347 and 349) interpreted the word “liberty” on the lines of the meaning accorded to liberty in the 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution by in Munshi v.

Illuonis[1876] USSC 149; , [1877] 94 U.S. 113. Accordingly it was held:

” ‘Personal Liberty’ in Art. 21 takes in all the rights of man.” The 4th Amendment of U.S. Constitution guaranteed “the right to be secure on their persons, houses…….” This right was read into Article 21 and it was held that “there cannot be an unauthorised intrusion into a person’s home”.

In Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, [1973] Supp. SCR page 1 Mathew, J. stated therein that the fundamental rights themselves have no fixed content, most of them are empty vessels into which each generation must pour its content in the light of its experience. It is relevant in this context to remember that in building up a just social order it is sometimes imperative that the fundamental rights should be subordinated to directive principles.

700 In Puthumma’s case[1978] INSC 7; , [1978] 2 SCR 537, it has been stated:

“The attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than accentuate their meaning and content by process of judicial construction…

Personal liberty in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude’;, In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall what was said of the American Constitution in Mussorie v. Holland 252 U.S.

416 at 433:

“When we are dealing with words that also are constituent act, like the constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into fife a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.” In State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhyaratiya and others[1989] INSC 300; , (1992) 2 Scale 791 it is stated:

Because clause (d) of Article 39 spoke of “equal pay for equal work” for both men and women it did not cease to be part of article

14. To say that the rule having been stated as a directive principle of State Policy, and no enforceable in court of law is to indulge in sophistry. Parts IV & III of Constitution are not supposed to be exclusion any of each other. They are complementary to each other.The rule is as much a part of Article 14 as it is of clause (1) of Article 16.” This Court has held that several unenumerated rights fall within Article 21 since personal liberty is of widest amplitude.

The following rights are held to be covered under Article 21:

1. The right to go abroad Satwant Singh v. A.P. O. New Delhi [1967] 3 SCR page 525.

2. The right to privacy Govinda v. State of U.P., [1975] INSC 75; [1975] 3 SCR 946 701 In this case reliance was placed on the American decision in Griswols v. Connecticut, [1965] USSC 128; 381 US 479 at 510

3. The Right against solitary confinement Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1978] INSC 148; [1978] 4 SCC 494 at 545

4. The Right against Bar fetters Charles Sobraj v. Sup(. Central fail, [1979] 1 SCR Ill

5. The Right to legal aid Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, [1978] INSC 138; [1979] 1 SCR 192

6. The Right to speedy trial Hussainuia Katoon v. State of Bihar, [1979] 3 SCR 169

7. The Right against Handcuffing Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration [1080] 3 SCR 855

8. The Right against delayed execution TV. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1983 SC 361

9. The Right against custodial violence Sheela Bhasre v. State of Maharashtra, [1983] INSC 11; [1983] 2 SCC 96

10. The Right against public hanging A.G. of India v. Lachmadevi AIR 1986 SC 467

11. Doctor’s Assistance Parantananda Katra v. UOI, [1989] INSC 254; [1989] 4 SCC 286

12. Shelter Santistar Builder v. N.KI. Totame, [1990] 1 SCC 520 If really Article 21, which is the heart of fudamental rights has received expanded meaning from time to time there is no justification as to why it cannot be interpreted in the light of Article 45 wherein the State is obligated to provide education up to 14 years of age, within the prescribed time limit.

So much for personal liberty.

Now coming to life: this Court interpreted in Bandhua Mukti Morcha 702 v. Union of India[1983] INSC 206; , [1984] 3 SCC 161 @ 183- 84:

“It is the fundamental right of everyone in this country, assured under the interpretaiton given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullin’s case, to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. This right to live with human dignity, free from exploitation.

This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the directive Principles of State Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Article 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers, men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief.

These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to five with human dignity and no State neither the Central Government nor any State Government has the right to take any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials. Since the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Articles 41 and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the judicial process to make provision by statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring these basic essentials which go to make up a life of human dignity but where legislation is already enacted by the State providing these basic requirements to the workmen and thus investing their right to live with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content, the State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation for inaction on the part of the State in securing implementation of such legislation would amount to denial of the right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21, more so in the context of Article 256 which provides that the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in 703 that State.” This, was elaborated in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 119851 3 SCC 545 @ 571- 573:

“As we hive stated while summing up the petitioners case, the main plank of their argument is that the right to fife which is guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood .

Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to fife includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of livingn that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impos- sible to live. And yet such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to live. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him 704 of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force which peoples their desertion of their hearts and homes in the village is the struggle for survival that is, the struggle for fife. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between fife and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: Only a handful can efford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas, J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. ‘Life’, as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois, means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of fife extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed.

This observation was quoted with approval by this Court in Singh v. State of UP.

Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy, provides that the State shall in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Article 41, which is another Directive Principle, provides, inter alia, that the State shalt within the limits of its economic capacity and development make effective provision for securing the right to work in cases of unemployment and of undeserved want. Article 37 provides that the Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any court, are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the, country. The principles contained in Articles 39(a) and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights. If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may 705 not by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21.”(Emphasis supplied) If thus, personal liberty and life have come to be given expanded meaning, the question to be addressed is, whether life which means to live with dignity, will take within it education as well? To put it more emphatically, whether right to education flows from right to life? Before we go to Mohini Jain’s case [1992] INSC 184; [1992] 3 SCC 666 it may be necessary to refer to State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendranath, [1971] 1 SCC 607. At page 614 it is stated:

“Lastly it was urged that such test affected the personal liberty of the candidates secured under Article 21 of the Constitution. We fail to see how refusal of an application to enter a medical college can be said to affect one’s personal liberty guaranteed under that article. Everybody, subject to the eligibility prescribed by the University, was at liberty to apply for admission to the medical college. The number of seats being limited compared to the number of applicants every candidate could not expect to be admitted. Once it is held that the test is not invalid the deprivation of personal liberty, if any, in the matter of admission to a medical college was according to procedure established by law. Our attention was drawn t o the case of Spottwood v. Sharpe, in which it was held that due process clause of the Fifty Amendment of the American Constitution prohibited racial segregation in the District of Columbia. Incidentally the Court made a remark (at p. 887):

“Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty”. with any great precision, that term in not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper 706 governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.

The problem before is altogether different.

In this case everybody subject to the minimum qualification prescribed was at liberty to apply for admission. The Government objective in selecting a number of them was certainly not, improper in the circumstances of the case,.” It requires to be carefully noted that deprivate of personal liberty if done by a valid procedure established by law, the fundamental right under Article 21 was not, in any manner, affected. That is the crux of this ruling.

Now, coming to Mohini Jain’s case (supra) it was observed at pages 679-80:

“Right to life” is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic to the dignified enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue. The right to education flows directly from right to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The State Government is under an obligation to make endeavor to provide educational facilities at all levels to its citizens.” Education is enlightenment. It is the one that lends dignity to a man as was rightly observed by Gajendragarkear, J. (as he then was) in University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, [1963] INSC 81; [1964] 2 SCR 703 at 710:

“Education seeks to build up the personality of the pupil by assisting his physical, intellectual, moral and emotional development.” If life is so interpreted as to bring within it right to education, it has 707 to be interpreated in the light of directive principles.

This Court has uniformly taken the view that harmonious interpretation of the fundamental rights vis-a-vis the directive principles must be adopted. We will now refer to some of the important cases.

In State of Kerala & Anr. v. N.M. 7homas & Anr.[1975] INSC 224; , [1976] 1 SCR 906, at 914 it was held:

“There is complete unanimity of judicial opinion of this Court that the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights should be construed in harmony with each other and every attempt should be made by the Court to resolve apparent inconsistency.

The Directive Principles contained in Part IV constitute the stairs to climb the High edifice of a socialistic State and the Fundamental Rights are the means through which one can reach the top of the edifice.

The Directive Principles form the fundamental feature and the social conscience of the Constitution which enjoins upon the State to implement these Directive Principles. The Directives, thus provide the policy, the guidelines and the end of socioeconomic freedom and Arts. 14 and 16 are the means to implement the policy to achieve the ends sought to be promoted by the Directive Principles. So far as the Courts are concerned where there is no apparent inconsistency between the Directive Principles contained in Part IV and the Fundamental Rights mentioned in Part III, there is no difficulty in putting a harmonious construction which advances the object of the Constitution.’ In Pathumma and others v. State of Kerala and others[1978] INSC 7; , [1978] 2 SCR 537 at 545-46 it was observed:

“In fact in the case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala all the Judges constituting the Bench have with one voice given the Directive Priciples contained in the Constitution a place 708 of honour. Hegde and Mukhejea, JJ. as they they were have said that the fundamental rights and the Directive Principles constitute the “conscience’ of our Constitution. The purpose, of the Directive Principles is to fix certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non- violent social revolution. Chandrachud, J.

observed that our Constitution aims at bringing about a synthesis between ‘Fundamental Rights’ and the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ by giving to the former a place of pride and to the latter a place of permanence.

In a latter case State of Kerala & Anr. v.

N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1975] INSC 224; [1976] 2 SCC 310 one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) after analysing the Judgment delibered by all the Judges in the Kesvananda Bharati’s case (supra) on the importance of the Directive Principles observed as follows:

“In view of the principles adumbrated by this Court it is clear that the Directive Principles form the fundamental feature and the social conscience of the Constitution and the Constitution enjoins upon the State to implement these directive principles. The directives thus provide the policy, the guidelines and the end of socioeconomic freedom of Articles 14 and 16 are the means to implement the policy to achieve the ends sought to be promoted by the directive principles. So far as the courts are con- cerned where there is no apparent inconsistency between the directive principles contained in Part 111, which in fact supplement each other, there is no difficulty in putting a harmonious construction, which advances the object of the Constitution. Once this basic fact is kept in mind, the interpretation of Articles 14 and 16 and their scope and ambit become as clear as day’.

In the case of The State of Bombay v. R.M.D.

Chamarbaugwala this Court while stressing the importance of directive principles contained in the Constituion observed as follows:

709 The avowed purpose of our constitution is to create a welfare State. The directive principles of State Policy set forth in Part IV of our Constitution enjoin upon the State the duty to strive to promote the welfare of the people by and protecting, as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice, social economic and political shall inform all the institutions of the national life.’ In the case of Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v.

State of Maharashtra etc. (supra) the Constitution Bench of this Court observed as follows:

“Incorporation of Directive Principles of State Policy casting the high duty upon the State to strive to promote, the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice social economic and political shall inform all the institutions of the national life, is not idle point but command to action. We can never forget, except at our peril that the Constitution obligates the State to ensure an adequate means of livelihood to its citizens and to see that the health and strength of workers, men and women, are not abused, that exploitation, moral and material, shall be extradited. In short, State action defending the weaker sections from social injustice and all forms of exploitation and raising the standard of living of the people, necessarily imply that economic activities, attired as trade or business or commerce, can be de-recognised as trade or business.” In Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others[1992] INSC 36; , [1992] 4 SCC 99 at 110 it was observed:

“There is no doubt that broadly interpreted and as a necessary logical corollary, right to life would include the right to livelihood and, therefore, right to work. It is for this reason that this Court in Olga Tellis v.

Bombay Municipal Corporation while considering the consequences of eviction of the pavement dwellers had pointed out that in that case the eviction not merely resulted in deprivation of shelter but also deprivation of livelihood 710 inasmuch as the pavement dwellers were employed in the vicinity of their dwellings.

The Court had, therefore, emphasised that the problem of eviction of the pavement dwellers bad to be viewed also in that context. This was, however, in the context of Article 21 which seeks to protect persons at the deprivation of their life except according to procedure established by law. This Country has so far not found it feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as a fundamental right in the Constitution. This is because the country has so far not attained the capacity to guarantee it, and no because it considers it any the less fundamental to life. Advisedly, Article 41 of which enjoins upon the State to make effective provision for securing the same “within the limits of its economic capacity and development”. Thus even while giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to work, the Constitution makers though it prudent not to do so without qualifying it.” Such a conclusion may not be open to criticism. So interpreted it advances social justice.

In Vol. VII at pages 909 and 910 of the Constitutent Debates (1948-49) it is stated:

“The Honourable Shri K. Santhanam : Sir, you will remeber that throughout Europe, after the First World’ War, all that the minorities wanted was the right to have their own schools, and to conserve their own cultures which the Fascist and the Nazis refused them.

In fact, they did not want even the State schools. They did not want State aid, or State assistance. They simply wanted that they should be allowed to pursue their own customs and to follow their own cultures and to establish and conduct their own schools.

Therefore I do not think it is right on the part of any minority to depreciate the rights given in article 23(1).

Sir, in clause (2) of article 23 they are protected against discrimination. It is just possible that there may be many provinces based on language and therefore the Govern- 711 ment, the ministry and the legislature will be composed dominantly by members of the majority language. This right of non-discrimination will then become fundamental and valuable.

And then in clause (3) of this article, it is provided that when the State gives aid to education, it shall not discriminate against any educational institution, on the ground that it is under the management of a minority.

Whether based on community or on language, and this will be particularly applicable to the linguistic minorities. In every province, there are islands of these linguistic minorities. For instance, in my own province of Tamil Nadu there are islands, in almost every district, of villages where a large number of Telugu-speaking people reside. In this connection we have to hold the balance even between two different trends. First of all, we have to give to large linguistic minorities their right to be educated especially in the primary stages in their own language. At the same time we should not interfere with the historical process of assimilation. We ought not to think that for hundred and thousands of years to come these linguistic minorities will perpetuate themselves as they are. The historical processes should be allowed free play. These minorities should be helped to become assimilated with the people of the locality.

They should gradually absorb the language of the locality and become merged with the people there. Otherwise they will be aliens, as it were, in those provinces. Therefore, we should not have rigid provisions by which every child is automatically protected in what may be ,called his mother-tongue. On the other hand, this process should not be sudden, it should not be forced. Wherever there are large numbers of children, they should be given education primary education in their mother-tongue. At the same time, they should be encouraged and assisted to go to the ordinary schools of the provinces and to imbibe the local tongue and get assimilated with the people. If feel this clause does provide for these contingencies in the most practicable fashion.

712 Sir, Mr. Lari wanted an amendment which seeks to provide that every child, rather that every section of the citizens, shall be entitled to have primary education imparted to its children through the medium of the language of that section. I suppose what he means is that wherever primary education is imparted at the expense of the State, such provisions should be made. But this, I think, would give the minority or section of people speaking a language the complete and absolute right to have primary education which the people of this country do not have today. In the directives we have provided that in fifteen years’ time there should be universal primary education. But no one knows whether the financial and other conditions in the country would permit of universal primary education to be established even then. Today no one in India can ask for primary education as a right as only ten per cent of the population get primary education. Therefore, it is not possible to accept Mr. Lari’s amendment, because that would lead to all kinds of difficulties. If it were passed, then anyone can go to the Supreme Court and say that his child must get education in a particular language. That is not practicable, and I do not think even his intention is at all that.

At the same time, I think, what he has pleaded for must be kept in mind as a general policy.

It should be direction of the Central and the Provincial Governments to see that wherever there are congregations of boys and girls having a distinct mother tongue, schools should be provided in that language. I hope, that will be the policy adopted all over the country, especially as, if there is going to be new linguistic revisions of the boundaries , all the border areas will be full of this problem. I hope the respondent of the Linguistic Provinces Commission will contain some wise provisions to be adopted in this behalf. There should be no difficulty or hardship whatsoever in provinces when they are rearranged on a linguistic basis. For instance, if a Telugu goes to one area or the other, he should not have any hardship. As I said, this is a most difficult and com- 713 plicated problem and it cannot be dealt with in detail in the fundamental rights. This article 23 provides as much security as can be done in the Constitution. Other securities will have to be provided for both by Parliamentary and provincial,legislation, and I hope it will be done in due course.’ It is true the framers of the Constitution took that view.

But the position as on today is very different. The reason is Article 45 States as under:

“Provision for free and compulsory education for children. The State shall endeavor to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.” 14 years, spoken to under the Article, had long ago come to an end. We are in the 43rd year of Independence. Yet, if Article 45 were to r a pious wish and a fond hope, what good of it having regard to the importance of primary education? A time limit was prescribed under this Article. Such a time limit is found only here, If, therefore, endeavor has not been made till now to make this Article reverberate with life and articulate with meaning, we should think the Court should step in. The State can be objected to ensure a right to free education of every child up to the-age of 14 years.

On this aspect a useful reference could be made to what have been observed in Human Right and Education Vol. 3 edited by Norma Bernstein Tarrow at page 41:

“The State is directed to strive for the right to education, make provision for free and compulsory, education (Article 45) and promote the. educational interests of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and other weaker sections (including women).

Education is primarily the responsibility of the State Governments, but the Union Government has certain responsibilities specified in the Constitution on matters such as promote higher education and promotion of education for weaker sections. Most states have enacted 714 legislation for compulsory education. At the end of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1985) primary education for ages 6-11 is free in all states, and for age group 11-14 it is free in all except Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

In these States, girls and members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes get free education, and incentives such as mid-day meals, free books and uniforms, are provided.

At the secondary stage several states have free education for all children and those which do not make free education available to all do so for girls, Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Thus free education in all states is provided at the primary and secondary stages for girls, Scheduled Castes and Tribes.” Again at page 43 it is stated:

‘Useful measures of achievement in terms of the right to education are literacy and enrollment levels. The contemporary picture, however, is not as good as one would expect after 39 years of independence. The literacy rate has risen from 16.6. per cent in 1951 to 36.6 per cent according to the 1981 census.

But regional variations indicate a range of above 60 per cent literacy in Kerala to below 20 per cent in some states. Nearly 120 million in the functional age group of 15-35 are still illiterate (Bhandari 1981).

Over the last three decades of planned development, rapid growth in facilities has attempted to provide access for minorities and girls. The number of educational institutions has more than doubled, while the number. of teachers and students has multiplied many tunes. But despite the fact that 93 per cent of the rural population have access to schnook nearly 30 per cent of 6-14 year old (60 million) do not go to school and T7 per cent drop out. A large percentage of the dropouts are grids and Scheduled Caste and Tribe members. The main problems are socioeconomic constraints which result in educational constraints. Poverty is a majory cause for keeping chidren 715 away from school.” Article 26(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

“Everyone has the right to education.

Technical and professional and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.” (Emphasis supplied) In the World of Science and the Rule of Law by John Ziman 1986 Edition at page 49 if is stated:

“The principal global treaty which covers this right is the ICESCR, whose Article 13 recognizes the general right to education enunciated by the UDHR, but then goes on to add the following more specific provisions:

(2) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right:

(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available fee to all;

(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education:

(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all on the progressive introduction of free education;

(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whose period of their primary education;

(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teach- 716 ing staff shall be continuously improved.

The status of this Article is a useful reminder of the problems inherent in any attempt to create a ‘social’ right of this kind for individuals against their states.” No doubt, the above extract from Mohini Jain’s case (supra) states “education at all levels”, but we ‘consider the law has been somewhat broadly stated and, therefore, must be confined to what is envisaged under Article 45.

The criticism by Mr. Ashok Desai, learned counsel that Article 37 has not been adverted to and the reliance on directive principles is untenable, in view of what we have stated above.

Higher education calls heavily on national economic resources. The right to it must necessarily be limited in any given country by its economic and social circumstances.

The State’s obligation to provide it is, therefore, not absolute and immediate but relative and progressive. It has to take steps to the maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right of education by all appropriate means’ But, with regard to the general obligation to provide education, the State is bound to provide the same, if it deliberately starved its educational system by resources that it meanifestly had available unless it could show that it was allocating them to some even more pressing programme. fore, by holding education as a fundamental right up to the age of 14 years this Court is not determining the priorities. On the contrary, reminding it of the solemn endeavour, it has to take, under Article 45, within a prescribed time, which time limit was expired long ago.

Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned counsel contends that in the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrgues, 1973 411 U.S. it was observed:

“It is not province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.

Thus the key to discovering whether education is ‘Fundamental” is not to be found (imcomparisons) of the relative societal significances of 717 education as opposed to subsistence or housing… Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicity guaranteed by the Constitution.

But if in reality, the, fundamental rights and the directive principles are complementary to each other we are unable to see why this fundamental right cannot be interpreted in this manner. The American Constitution does not have a directive principle like, Article 45. Therefore, the contraly view was struck in San Antonio Independent School District (supra).

While dealing with the American Law on this aspect in Vol.

57 1969 Califomia Law Review at page 380 it was stated:, “It is true that the quotation from the Brown opinion seems stunningly relevant. Taken literally it would be decisive in some sense upon the question of this Article. Education ;must be made available to @ on equal terms.” From the vantage point of 1968, however, it is no longer clear that Brown was specially concerned about the interest in education.

The decision had scarcely appeared before the “ftmdamental” character of education become the fundamental character of golf and swimming rights, and all the cases since Brown, even the cases involving education, have shown complete preoccupation with the racial factor.

Meanwhile the Court has done nothing further to suggest that education enjoy as a constitutional life of its own.’ As to the present position of primary education in India, the additional affidavit on behalf of Union of India filed by Mr. H.C. Baveja, Assistant Education Advisor in the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India, Department of Education, New Delhi, puts the position thus:

STATUS OF ELEMENTRY EDUCATION IN INDIA

1. Provision of free and compulsory education to all children until they complete the age of 14 years is a Directive Principle of the Constitution. Recognising the 718 need for literate population and provision of elementary education as a crucial input for nation building, the policy of the Government has been to provide all children the free and compulsory education at least up to elementary level (primary and upper primary level). The 6th Five Year Plan document made a serious reference to the desirability of a time bound plan to achieve universal enrolment. The 7th Plan conveyed a sense of urgency about the need to achieve this objective. This was reinforced mid-way by the National Policy on Education, 1986.

Progress over the years.

2. Concerted efforts to reach the target has led to manifold increase in institutions, teachers and students as shown in the table below.- Number of Institution (in lakhs) ————————————————— 1950-51 1990-91 —————————————————- Primary Schools 2.10 5.58 (Class I-V) ————————————————— Upper Primary Schools 0.13 1.46 (Class VI-VIII) —————————————————- Total 2.23 7.04 —————————————————- Number of Teachers (In lakhs) —————————————————- Primary Schools 5.38 16.36 —————————————————- Upper Primary Schools O.36 10.59 —————————————————– Total 6.24 26.95 —————————————————– Gross Enrolment —————————————————— Primary Enrolment (in 192 991 —————————————————— Gross Enrolment Ratio 43.1% 101.03% ——————————————————– Upper Primary State ——————————————————– Total Enrolment (in lakhs) 31 333 ——————————————————— Gross Enrolment Ratio 12.9% 60.11% ——————————————————— 719

3. This increase provided Indian Education System with one of the largest systems in the world, providing accessibility within 1 km.

walking distance of Primary schools to 8.26lakhs habitations containing about 94% of the country’s population. Growth in enrolment in the decade of 80s showed an acceleration that has now brought enrolment rates close of 100% at primary stage.

FREE EDUCATION.

4. In the endeavour to increase enrolment and achieve the target of UEE, all State Governments have abolised tuition fees in Government Schools run by local bodies and private aided institutions is mostly free in these States. However, in private unaided schools which constitute 3.7. of the total elementary schools in the country, some fee is charged. Thus, overall it may be said that education up to elementary level in practically all schools is free. Other costs of education such as text books, uniforms, school bags, transport etc. are not borne by States except in a very few cases by way of incentives to children of indigent families or these belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes categories. The reason why the State Government are unable to bear this additional expenditure is that 96% of expenditure on elementary education goes in meeting the salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff.

COMPULSORY EDUCATION 5.14 States and 4 Union Territories have enacted legislation to make education compulsory but the socioeconomic compulsions that keep the children away from schools have restrained them from prescribing the rules and regulations whereby those provisions can be endorsed.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the right to free education up to the age of 14 years is a fundamental right.

720 The next question is whether there is a fundamental right to establish an educational institution. That takes us to Article 19(1)(g). That reads as follows:

to practise any profession, or to cam on any occupation, trade or business.’ The question now is: what is the meaning to be attributed to the words ‘profession, “occupation”, “trade” or “business”.

In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon Reprint Edition 1987 at page 897 ‘Occupation means:

“The principal business of one’s life, vocation,trade, the business which a man follows to procure a living or obtain wealth:

that which occupies or engages one’s time or attention, vocation, employment, calling trade; the business in which a man is usually engaged, to the knowledge of his neighbour.” According to Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth Edition at page 973 ‘Occupation’ means:

“Possession; control; tenure; use. The act or process by which real property is possessed and enjoyed. Where a person exercises physical control over land’.

That which principally takes up one’s time, thought, and energies, especially, one’s regular business or employment; also, whatever one follows as the means of making a livelihood. Particular business, profession, trade, or calling which engages individual’s time and efforts; employment in which one regularly engages or vocation of his life.” In P. V. G. Raju v. Commissioner of Expenditure, ITR Vol. 86 page 267 it is observed thus:

“The activity termed as ‘Occupation’. if of wider import than vocation or profession. It is also distinct from a hobby which can be resorted to only in leisure hours for 721 the purpose of killing time. Occupation, therefore, is that with which a person occupies himself ‘either temporarily or permanently or for a considerable period with continuity of activity. It is analogous to a business, calling or pursuit. A person may have more than one occupation in a previous year. The Occupations may be seasonal or for the whole year.” “Firstly, there can be a business, profession, vocation or occupation without any profit motive or on ‘no profit no loss basic. To, illustrate, co-operative societies or mutual insurance companies may carry on business without earning any income or without any profit motive. The vocation or occupation to do social service of various kinds for the uplift of the people would also come under this category. The profit motive or earning of income is not an essential ingredient to constitute the activity, termed as business, profession, vocation or occupation.” “If any authority is needed, we find it in Commissioner of Expenditure Tax v. Mrs.

Manorama Sarabhai, (1966) 59 ITR 262 (Guj.) wherein it was held that the educational activities of the assessees amounted to an occupation within the meaning of Section 5(a) and that no profit motive is necessary to treat an activity as a vocation or occupation within the meaning of Section 5(a). For all these reasons, we must negative this submission of Mr. Ramarao relating to the interpretation of the words “business, profession, vocation or occupation’ in section 5(a) of the Act.” In P.K Menon v. Income-tax Commissioner, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 133 at p. 137 this Court observed as follows:

“We find no difficulty in thinking that teaching is a vocation if not a profession.

It is plainly so and it is not necessary to discuss the various meanings of the word “vocation’ for the purpose or to cite authorities to support this view. Nor do we find any reason why, if teaching is a vocation, teaching of Vedanta is not. It is just as much 722 teaching and therefore, a vocation, as any other teaching. It is said that in teaching Vedanta the appellant was only practising religion. We are unable to see why teaching of Vedanta as a matter of religion is not carrying on of a vocation.’ “It is-said that as the word ‘Vocation’ has been used along with the words ‘business” and “profession” and the object of business and a profession, is to make a profit, only such activities can be included in the word ‘Vocation” the object of which likewise is to make a profit. We think that these contentions lack substance. We do not appreciate the significance of saying that in order to become a vocation an activity must be organised. If by that a continuous, or as was said, a systematic activity, is meant,we have to point out that it is well known that a single act may amount to the carrying on of a business or profession”.

The meaning of “business” can be gathered from Law Lexicon Edition 1987 by Ramnath Iyer:

“Business is that which engages the time, talent and interest of a man” and is what a man proposes to himself.

There may be a “Business” without precuniary profit being at all contemplated.

“Business” and “Trade” : “Business” has a more extensive meaning that “Trade” (per Willes, J.

Hariis v. Amery 35 L.J. C.P.92) But “Ordinarily speaking, Business is synonymous with ‘Trade”, (per Chatterton V. C. Delany v.

Deleny, 15 L.R. Ir. 67). There may, however, be a “Business” without pecuniary profit being at all contemplated. In such connection, “Business’ is a very much larger word than ‘Trade’ and the word “Business” is employed in order to include occupations which would not strictly come within the meaning of the word “Trade (per Person, J. Rolls v. Miller, 53 LJ.

Ch. 101) per Scruitton. L.J. The words ‘Trade” and ‘Business” do not mean the same thing ….. ;on business, though usually business is carried on for profit. It is to be presumed that the Railways are run on a profit, though it may be that occasionally they are run 723 at a loss.” “Monetary consideration for service is, therefore, not an essential characteristic of industry in a modern State”.

In Hindustan Steel Limited v. State of Orissa, [1970] 1 SCR 753 it is observed:

“A person to be a dealer within the meaning of the Act must carry on the business of selling or supplying goods in Orissa. The expression, ‘business’ is not defined in the Act. But as observed by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Abdul Bakshi, [1964] INSC 114; [1964] 7 SCR 664:

“The expression ‘business’ though extensively used as a word of indefinite import, in taxing statutes it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and tabour of a person , normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business there must be a course of dealings either actually continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit motive, and no for sport of pleasure.” In Barendra Prasad Ray v. The Income-tax Officer, AIR’1981 SC 1047: [1981] INSC 86; [1981] 3 SCR 387 at 400 B and H and 401 A and B it is observed:

“The expression ‘business does not necessarily mean trade or manufacture only. It is being:

used as including within its scope profession, vocations and calling from a fairly long time.

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘Business” as stated occupation, profession or trade’ and a man of business is defined as meaning “an attorney’ also. In view of the above dictionary meaning of the, word ‘business’ it cannot be said that the definition of business given in Section 45 of the Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. C.

39) was an extended definition intended for the purpose of that Act only. Section 45 of that Act says:

The expression ‘Business” includes every Trade, occupation, or profession”.

724 “Section 2(b) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 also defines ‘Business’ thus:- “Business’ includes every trade, occupation and profession.” “The observation of Rowlatt, J. in, Christopher Barker & Sons v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, (1919) 2 KB 222 at p.228. ‘All professions are businesses, but all businesses are not professions, …” also supports the view that professions are generally regarded as business. The same learned Judge in an other case Commissioner of Inland Revenue v.

Marine Steam Turbine Co. Ltd., (1920) 1.KB.

193 held:

“The word ‘Business’ however is also used in another and a very different sense, as meaning an active occupation or profession continuously carried on and it is in this sense the word is used in the Act with which we are here concerned”.

“The word “Business” is one of wide import and it means an activity carried on continuously and systematically by a person by the application of his labour skiff with a view to earning an income. We are of the view that in the context in which the expression “business” is used in Section 9(1) of the Act, there is n o warrant for giving a restricted meaning to it excluding professional connections from its scope.” In each of these cases, depending upon the statute, either “occupation” or ‘business’ has come to be defined.

Certainly, it cannot be contended that establishment of an educational institution would be “business”. Nor again, could that be called trade since no trading activities carried on. Equally, it is not a profession. It is one thing to say that teaching is a profession but, it is a totally different thing to urge that establishment of an educational institution would a profession. It may perhaps fall under the category of occupation provided no recognition is sought from the State or affiliation from the University is asked on the basis the it is a fundamental right. This position is explained, below:

725 However, some of the learned counsel relied on Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. R Rajappa, [1978] INSC 44; [1978] 3 SCR 207 to urge that the activity of running an educational institution was an industry. In that case, Krishna Iyer, J.

observed:

“To Christian education as a mission, even if true, is not to negate it being an Industry, we have to look at education activity from the angle of the Act and so viewed the ingredients of education are fufiled. Education is, therefore, an industry nothing can stand in the way of that conclusion.” This ruling was relied on in Miss Sundarambai v. Government of Goa, [1988] Suppl. 1 SCR 604 at page 608B. It was held:

“Thus it is seen that even though an educational institution has to be treated as an industry in view of the decision in the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v.

R. Rajappa (supra) the question whether teachers in an educational institution can be considered as workmen still remains to be decided.’ It requires to be carefully noted that while considering as to what would constitute an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act, these observations came to be made.

Certainly, that is very different from claiming a fundamental tat right under Article 19(1) (g).

Even on general principles, the matter could be approached this way. Educational institutions can be classified under two categories:

1. Those requiring recognition by the State and 2. Those who do not require such a recognition..

It is not mere an establishment of educational institution, that is urged by the petitioners, but, to run the educational institution dependent on recognition by the State. There is absolutely no fundamental right to recognition in any citizen. The right to establishment and run the educational institution with State’s recognition arises only on the State permitting pursuant to a policy decision or on the fulfilment of the conditions of the Statute. Therefore, where it is dependent on the permission under the 726 statute or the exercise of an executive power, it cannot qualify to be a fundamental right. Then again, the State policy may dictate a different course.

The logical corollary of holding that a fundamental right to establish in educational institution is available under Article 19(1) (g) would lead of the proposition, right to establish a university also. In fact, this Court had occasion to point out in S. Azeez Basha and Anr v. Union of India, 19681 1 SCR 833 at page 848 thus:

“Before we do so we should like to say that the words educational institutions” are of very wide import and would include a university also. This was not disputed on behalf of the Union of India and therefore it may be accepted that a religious minority had the right to establish a university under Art.

30(1). The position with respect to the establishment of Universities before the Constitution came into force in 1950 was this.

There was no law in India which prohibited any private individual or body from establishing a university and it was therefore open to a private individual or body to establish a university. There is a good deal in common between educational institutions which are not universities and those which are universities.

Both teach students and both have teachers for the purpose. But what distinguishes a university from any other educational institution is that a university grants degrees of its own while other educational institutions cannot. It is this granting of degrees by a university which distinguishes it from the ordinary run of educational institutions. (See St. David’s College, Lampeter v. Ministry of Educations 1951 1 All E.R. 559). Thus in law in India there was no prohibition against establishment of universities by private individuals or bodies and if any university was so established it must of necessity be granting degrees before it could be called a university. But though such a university might be granting degrees it did not follow that the Government of the country was bound to recognise those degrees.” 727 It there is no fundamental right to establish a university a fortiori a fundamental right to establish an educational institution is not available.

By implication also a fundamental right of the nature and character conferred under Article 30 cannot be read into Article 19(1) (g). The conferment of such a right on the minorities in a positive way under Article 30 negatise the assumption of a fundamental right in this behalf in every citizen of the country.

In Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat, [1974] INSC 106; [1975] 1 SCR 173 at page 191 it is observed:

“The tight to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice has been conferred on religious and linguistic minorities so that the majority who can always have their tights by having proper legislation do not pass a legislation prohibiting minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. If the scope of Article 30(1) is made an extension of the right under Article 29(1) as the right to establish and administer educational institutions for giving religious instruction or for imparting education in their religious teachings ‘or tenets the fundamental right of minorities to establish and administer educational institution of their choice will be taken away.

(Emphasis Supplied) At page 192 it is observed:

“Article 30 is a special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. This Court said that the two Articles create two separate rights though it is possible that the rights might meet in a given case.

The real reason embodied in Article 30 (1) of the Constitution is the conscience of the nation that the minorities, religious as well as linguistic, are not prohibited from establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice for the purpose of giving their children the best general education to make them com- 728 plete men and women of the country. The minorities are given this protection under Article 30 in order to preserve and strengthen the integrity and unity of the country. The sphere of general secular education is intended to develop the commonness of boys and girls of our country. This is in the true spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity through the medium of education. If religious or linguistic minorities are not given protection under Article 30 to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, they will feel isolated and separate.

General secular education will open doors of perception and act as the natural fight of mind for our countrymen to live in the whole.” Then again, at page 224 it is observed:

“The idea of giving some special rights to the minorities is not to have a kind of privileged or pampered section of the population but to give to the minorities a sense of security and a feeling of confidence. The great leaders of India since time immemorial had preached the doctrine of tolerance and cathnolicity of outlook. Those noble ideas were enshrined in the Constitution. Special rights for minorities were designed not to create inequality. Their real effect was to bring about equality by ensuring the preservation of the minority institutions and by guaranteeing to the minorities autonomy in the matter of the administration of these institutions. The differential treatment for the minorities by giving them special rights is intended to bring about an equilibrium, so that the ideal of -quality may not be reduced to a mere abstract idea but should become a living reality and result in true, genuine equality, an equality not merely in theory but also in fact. The majority in a system of adult franchise hardly needs any protection. It can look after itself and protect its interests.

Any measure wanted by the majority can without much difficulty be brought on the statute book because the majority can get that done by giving such a mandate to the elected representatives. It is only the 729 minorities who need protection, and article 30, besides some other articles, is intended to afford and guarantee that protection.

(Emphasis supplied) The argument that every activity or occupation by the mere fact of its not being abnoxious or harmful to society-, cannot by itself be entitled to protection as fundamental right. As pointed out above, some rights, by the very nature, cannot be qualified to be protected as fundamental rights.

Accordingly, it is held that there is no fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) to establish an educational institution, if recognition or affiliation is sought for such an educational institution. It may be made clear that any one desirous of starting an institution purely for the purposes of educating the students he could do so but Sections 22 and 23 of the University Grants Commission Act which prohibits the award of degrees except by a University must be kept in mind.

The next question which calls for determination is; does recognition or affiliation make the educational institution an instrumentality ? We propose to examine this question with reference to the following cases.

In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, [1980] INSC 219; [1981] 2 SCR 79 at pages 96 and 97 it was observed:

“The tests for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government may now be called out from the judgment in the Intemational Airport Authority’s case. These tests are not conclusive or clinching, but they are merely indicative indicate which have to be used with care and caution, because while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the expression “other authorities’, it must be realised that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. We may summarise the relevant tests gathered from the decision in the Intemational Airport 730 Authority’s case as follows:

(1)”One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or,agency of Government.” (2)”Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character.” (3)”It may also be a relevant factor…

whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected.” (4)”Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality.’ (5)”If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related t o governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an insmmentality or agency of Government.” (6)”Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.” If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government, it would, as pointed out in the Inter alia Airport Authority’s case, be an ‘authority’ and, therefore, ‘State’ within the meaning of the expression in Article 12.

We find that the same view has been taken by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in a subsequent decision of this Court in the UP. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narain [1980] INSC 5; [1980] 3 SCC 459 and the observations made by the learned Judge in that case strongly reinforced the view,we are 731 taking particularly in the matrix of our constitutional system.” Ranganath Mishra, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court, after a succinct analysis of the entire case law on the subject concludes in Tekraj Vasandi v. Union of India [1987] INSC 372; [1988] 1 SCC 236 at page 257 as under:

“We have several cases of societies registered under Societies Registration Act which have been treated as ‘State’ but in each of those cases it would appear on analysis that either governmental business had been undertaken by the Society or what was expected to be the public obligation of the ‘State’ had been undertaken to be performed as a part of the Society’s function. In a Welfare State, as has been pointed out on more than one occasion by this Court, governmental control is very pervasive and in fact touches all aspects of social existence. In the absence of a fair application of the tests to be made, there is possibility of turning every non-governmental society into an agency or instrumentality of the State. That obviously would not serve the purpose and may be far from reality. A broad picture of the matter has to be taken and a discerning mind has to be applied keeping the realities and human experiences in view so as to reach a reasonable’ conclusion. Having given our anxious consideration to the facts of this case, we are not in a position to hold that ICPS is either an agency or instrumentality of the State so as to com e within the purview of ‘other authorities’ in Article 12 of the Constitution. We must say that ICPS is a case of its type typical in many ways and the normal tests may perhaps not properly apply to test its character.’ The same learned Judge, after referring to the tests adumberated in Ajay Hasia (supra), holds in All India Sainik Schools Employees Assn. v. Sainik Schools Society, [1989] Supp 1 SCC 205 at 212:

“…… that the Sainik School Society is also ‘State’. The entire funding is by the State Governments and the Central Government. The overall control vests in the governmental authority. The main object of the Society is 732 to run schools and prepare students for the purpose of feeding the National Defence Academy. Defence of the country is one of the regal functions of the State.” Applying these tests, we find it impossible to hold that a private educational institution either by recognition or affiliation to the university could ever be called an ‘instrumentality of State. Recognition is for the purposes of conforming to the standards laid down by the State.

Affiliation is with regard to the syllabi and the course of study. Unless and until they are in accordance with the prescription of the University, degrees would not be conferred. The educational institutions prepare the students for the examination conducted by the university.

Therefore, they are obliged to follow the syllabi and the course of the study.

As a sequel to this, an important question arises: what is the nature of functions discharged by these institutions ? they discharge a public duty. If a student desires to acquire a degree, for example, in medicine, he will have to route through a medical college. These medical colleges are the instruments to attain the qualification. If, therefore, what is discharged by the educational institution, is a public duty that requires, duty and act fairly.

In such a case, it will be subject to Article 14.

Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvama Jayanti Mahotsav Samarak Trust v. VR. Rudani, [1989] INSC 134; [1989] 2 SCC 691 is an interesting case where a writ of mandamus was issued to a private college. In paragraph 12 at page 697 it was held:

“The essense of the attack on the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 may now be examined. It is argued that the management of the college being a trust registered under the Bomaby Public Trust Act is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The contention in other words, is that the trust is a private institution against which no writ of mandamus can be issued. In support of the contention, the counsel relied upon two decisions of this Court: (a) Executive Committee of Vanish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain, [1975] INSC 317; [1976] 2 SCC 58 and (b) Deepak Kumar Biswas v.

Director of Public Instructions[1987] INSC 73; , [1987] 2 SCC 252. In the first of the 733 two cases, the respondent institution was a Degree College managed by a registered co- operative society. A suit was filed against the college by the dismissed principal for reinstatement. It was contended that the Executive Committee of the college which was registered under the Co-operative Societies Act and affiliated to the Agra University (and subsequently to Meerut University) was a statutory body. The importance of this contention lies in the fact that in such as case, reinstatement could be ordered if the dismissal is in violation of statutory obliga- tion. But this Court refused to accept the contention. It was observed that the management of the college was not a statutory body since not created by or under a statute.

It was emphasised that an institution which adopts certain statutory provisions will not become a statutory body and the dismissed employee cannot enforce a contract of personal service against a non-statutory body.” At paragraphs 15 to 20 it was held:

“If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie.These are two exceptions to mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equa lly convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be, denied. It has to be appreciated that the appellants-trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money is paid as government aid. Public money paid as government aid plays a major role in the control maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University.

Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. (See The Evolving Indian I Administrative Law by M.P. Jain (1983) p. 226) So are the service conditions of the academic staff. When the 734 University takes a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on the management. The service conditions of the academic staff are, therefore, not purely of a private character. It has super-added protection by University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship between the staff and the management. When there is existence of this relationship, mandamus cannot be refused to the aggrieved party.

The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. It may be recalled that the remedy by prerogative writs in England started with very limited scope and suffered from many procedural disadvantages. To overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner (the Lord Chancellor) in pursuance of Section 3(1) (e) of the Law Commission Act, 1965, requested the Law Commission ‘to review the existing remedies for the judicial control of administrative acts and omissions with a view to evolving a simpler and more effective procedure’. The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law Commission Report No. 73). It was implemented by Rules of Court (Order 53) in 1977 and given statutory force in 1981 by Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981. It combined all the former remedies into one proceeding called Judicial Review. Lord Denning explains the scope of this “judicial review:

“At one storke the courts could grant whatever relief was appropriate. Not only certiorari and mandamus, but also declaration and injunction. Even damages. The procedure was much more simple and expeditious. Just a summons instead of a writ. No formal pleadings. The evidence was given by affidavit. As a rule no cross-examination, no discovery, and so forth. But there were important safeguards. In particular, in order to qualify, the applicant had to get the leave of a judge.

The statute, is phrased in flexible terms. it gives scope for development. It uses the words ‘having regard to 735 Those words are indefinite. The result is that the courts are not bound hand and foot by the previous law. They are to ‘have regard to’ it. So the previous law as to who are and who are not public authorities, is not absolutely binding.. Nor is the previous law as to the matters in respect of which relief may be granted. This means that the judges can develop the public law as they think best.

That they have done and are doing. (See The Closing Chapter by Rt. Hon. Lord Denning p.

122)” There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The ‘public authority’ for them mean every body which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all ‘public authorities’. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ in the nature of mandamus. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law.

Under Article 226, writs can be issued to “any person or authority”. It can be issued ‘for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose”.

226.Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases, any government within those territories directions orders and writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

The scope of this article has been explained by Subba 736 Rao, J., In Dwarkanath v. ITO, [1965] INSC 86; [1965] 3 SCR 536:

This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex-facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression “nature”, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other then the prerogative writs. It enables the High Court to would the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with, that of the English courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in ,a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of government into a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself.

The term “authority” used in Article 226, the context must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Artcle 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32.

Article confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “any person or authority’ used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body.The duty must be judge in the light 737 of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.

The emphasis in this case is as to the nature of duty imposed on the body. It requires to be observed that the meaning of authority under Article 226 came to be laid down distinguishing the same term from Article 12. In spite of it, if the emphasis is on the nature of duty on the same principle it has to be held that these educational institutions discharge public duties. Irrespective of the educational institutions receiving aid it should be held that it is a public duty. The absence of aid does not detract from the nature of duty.

In R. v. Panel on Take-Overs, 1987 (1). All England Reports 564 at page 568 it is observed:

“The principal issue in this appeal, and the only issue which may matter in the longer term, is whether this remarkable body is above law. Its respectability is beyond question.

So is its bona fides. I do not doubt for one moment that it is intended to and does operate in the public interest and that the enormously wide discretion which it arrogates to ‘itself is necessary if it is to function efficiently and effectively. While not wishing to become ‘involved in the political controversy on the relative merits of self-regulation and governmental or statutory regulation, I am content to assume for the purposes of this appeal that seff-regulation is preferable in the public interest. But that said, what is to happen if the panel goes off the rails ? Suppose, perish the thought, that it were to use its powers ‘in a way in which was manifestly unfair. What then ? Counsel for the panel submits that the panel would lose the support of public opinion in the financial markets and would be unable to continue to operate. Further or alternatively, Parliament could and would intervene. Maybe but how long would that take and who in the meantime could or would come. to the assistance of those who were being oppressed by such conduct”? 738 At page 574 it is held:

“The picture which emerges is clear. As an act of government it was decided that, in relation to takeovers, there should be a central self-regulatory body which would be supported and sustained by a periphery of statutory powers and penalties wherever non- statutory powers and penalties were insufficient or non-existent or where EEC requirements called for statutory provisions.” At page 577 it is held:

“In fact, given its novelty, the panel fits surprisingly well into the format which this court had in mind in R.v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. It is without doubt performing a public duty and an important one.

This is clear from the expressed willingness of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to limit legislation in the field of takeovers and mergers and to use the panel as the centerpiece of his regulation of that market. The rights of citizens are indirectly affected by its decisions, some, but by no means all of whom, may in a technical sense be said to have assented to this situation, e.g.

the members of the Stock Exchange. At least in its determination of whether there has been a breach of the code, it has a duty to act judicially and it asseas that its raison deter is to do equity between one shareholder and another. Its source of power is only partly based on moral persuasion and the assent of institution and their members, the bottom line being the statutory powers exercised by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Bank of England. In this context I should be very disappointed if the courts could not recognise the realities of executive power and allowed their vision to the clouded by the subtlety and sometimes complexity of the way in which it can be exerted.

Given that it is really unthinkable that, in the absence of legislation such as affects trade unions, the panel should go on its way cocooned from the attention of the courts, in defence of the citizenry, we sought to investigate 739 whether it could conveniently be controlled by established forms of private law e.g. torts such as actionable combinations in restraint of trade, and, to this end, pressed counsel for the applicants to draft a writ. Suffice it to say that the result was wholly unconvincing and, not surprisingly, counsel for the panel did not admit that it would be in the least effective.” At page 584 it is held:

“More recently in R.v. BBC, ex p Lavelle, (1983) 1 AU. ER 2451 (1983) 1 WLR Woolf J had to consider an application for judicial review where the relief sought was an induction under Ord 53, 1 (2). The case was brought by an employee of the BBC. In refusing relief Woolf J said (1983) 1 AD ER 241 at 249, 1983 1 WLR 23 at 31:

“Paragraph (2) of r 1 of Ord 53 does not strictly confine applications for judicial review to cases where an order for mandamus, prohibition or certiorari could be granted.

It Merely requires that the court should have regard to the nature of the matter ‘in respect of which such relief may be granted. However, although applications for judicial review are not confined to those cases where relief could be granted by way of prerogative order, I regard the wording of Ord 53, r 1 (2) and sub- s (2) of s 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 as making it clear that the application for judicial review is confined to reviewing ac- titivities of a public nature as opposed to those of a purely private or domestic character. The disciplinary appeal procedure set up by the BBC depends purely on the contract of employment between the applicant and the BBC, and therefore it is a procedure of a purely private or domestic character.” 739 PRIVATE COLLEGES AND THEIR ROLE.

The Union of India takes the stand that the Central Government does not have the resources to undertake any additional financial responsibility for medical or technical education. Taking the case of medical 740 education, the total plan outlay for the health sector is

3.2 per cent and medical education gets a pro-rata share after apportionment of priorities and allocation of available funds. Priorities include promotions of primary health, hospital services etc. The Government in particular is unable to aid any private educational institution financially at levels higher than at present. Certain statistical details regarding the cost of medical education have been given in the counter affidavit of the Central Government. Paragraphs 5 to 9 of the affidavit may kindly be seen in this connection.

It has, therefore, been the policy of the Central Government to involve private and voluntary efforts in the sector of education in conformity with accented norms and goals. The adverse consequences which will follow if private educational institutions have to limit themselves to a fee structure which is charged in Government medical and technical educational institutions have been enumerated in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit of the Union of India.

The Central Government’s policy on education was formulated in the year 1986. Modifications were undertaken in 1992.

The relevant extracts from the National Policy on Education, being paragraph 6.20, 10.1, 10.9 and 11.2 are set out herein below:

“6.20 In the interests of maintaining standards and for several other valid reasons, the commercialisation of technical and professional education will be curbed. An alternative system will be devised to involve private and voluntary effort in this sector of education, in conformity with accepted norms and goals.” “10.1 An overhaul of the system of planning and the management of education will receive high priority. The guiding considerations will be:

(a) Evolving a long- term planning and management perspective of education and its integration with the country’s developmental and manpower needs:

(b) Decentralisation and the creation of a spirit of autonomy for educational institutions;

741 (c)Giving pre-eminence to people, involvement, including association of non-governmental agencies and voluntary effort;

(d)Inducting more women in the planning and management of education;

(e)Establihing the principle of accountability in relation to given objectives and norms.” “10.9 Non-Government and voluntary effort including social activist groups will be encouraged, subject to proper management, and financial assistance provided. At the same time, steps will be taken to prevent the establishment of institutions set up to commercialise education.” “11.2 Resources, to the extent possible, will be raised by mobilising donations, asking the beneficiary communities to maintain school buildings and supplies of some consumables, raising fees at the higher levels of education and effecting some savings by the efficient use of facilities. Institutions involved with research and the development of technical and scientific manpower should also mobilize some funds by levying a cress or charge on the user agencies, including Government departments, and entrepreneurs. All these measures will be taken not only to reduce the burden on State resources but also for creating a greater sense of responsibility within the educational system. However, such measures will contribute only marginally to the total funding. The Government and the community in general will find funds for such programmes as; the universalisation of elementary education; liquidating illiteracy; equality of access to educational opportunities to all sections throughout the country; enhancing the social relevance, quality and functional effectiveness of educational programmes;

generating knowledge and developing technologies in scientific fields crucial to self-sustaining economic development and creating a critical consciousness of the values and imperatives of national survival.” 742 Therefore, as on today, it would be unrealistic and unwise to discourage private initiative in providing educational facilities, particularly for higher education. The private sector should be involved and indeed encouraged to augment the much needed resources in the field of education, thereby making as much progress as possible in achieving the constitutional goals in this respect. It could be concluded that the private colleges are the felt necessities of time.

That does not mean one should tolerate the “so-called colleges” run in thatched huts with hardly any equipment, with no or improvised laboratories, scarce facility to learn in an unhealthy atmosphere, far from conducive to education.

Such of them must be put down ruthlessly with an iron hand irrespective of who has started the institution or who desires to set up such an institution. They are poisonous weeds in the field of education. Those who venture are financial adventurers without morals or scrupules. Their only aim is to make money, driving a hard bargain, exploiting eagerness to acquire a professional degree which would be a passport for employment in a country rampant with unemployment. They could be even called pirates in the high seas of education.

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to the Resolution passed at the 48th AR India Medical Conference:

“Resolution No. 2 Racketeering in Medical Education:

Whereas, a number of institutions have sprung up in the country that style themselves as Medical College; and Whereas, such institutions charge large sums as capitation fees, a practice which the Indian Medical Association and the Medical Council of India have opposed a number of times; and Whereas, such institutions neither have suitable buildings, nor proper equipment and even lack adequate staff of requisite qualifications and further it has come to light that these institutions swindle the public by taking large sums, of money from students although these institutions have not been recognised by the authorities;

743 This 48th All India Medical Conference urges upon the Governments to take stringent measures against persons/institutions who/which run such medical colleges and close them and recommend to the Medical Council of India not to grant them recognition.

(48th Conference Dec. 29, 31, 1972 at Ahmedabad)” However, a word of caution requires to be uttered. Not all the private instutions belong to this category. There are institutions which have attained great reputation by devotion and by nurturing high educational standards. They surpass the colleges run by the Government in many respects.

They require encouragement. From this point of view regulatory controls have to be continued and strengthened.

The commercialisation of education, the racketeering must be prevented. The State should strive its utmost in this direction.

Regulatory measures must so ensure that private educational institutions maintain minimum standards and facilities.

Admission within all groups and categories should be based only on merit. There may be reservation of seats in favour of the weaker sections of the society and other groups which deserve special treatment. The norms for admission should be pre-determined, objective and transparent.

Before the scheme, a question may arise whether a mandamus could issue for the enforcement of scheme if proposed by the Court. For this, we may look up at Suman Gupta and Ors. v.

State of J & K and Ors., [1983] INSC 124; [1983] 3 SCR 985 at page 991:

“The Medical Council of India is directed to formulate a proper constitutional basis for determining the selection of candidates for nomination to seats in Medical Colleges outside the State in the light of the observations contained in this judgment.

Until a policy is so formulated and concrete criteria are embodied in the procedure selected, the nominations shall be made by selecting candidates strictly on the basis of merit, the candidates nominated being those, in order of merit, immediately below the candidates selected for admission to the Medical Colleges of the home State.” 744 It cannot be gainsaid that profiteering is an evil. If a public utility like electricity could be controlled, certainly, the professional colleges also require to be regulated.

In Kerala State Electricity Board v. S.N. Govinda Prabhu, [1986] 3 SCR it is held:

“It is a public utility monopoly undertaking which may not be driven by pure profit motive not that profit is to be shunned but that service and not profit should inform its actions. It is not the function of the Board to so manage its affairs as to earn the maximum profit even as a private corporate body may be inspired to earn huge profits with a view to paying large dividends to its shareholders. But it does not follow that the Board may not and need not earn profits for the purpose of performing its duties and discharging its obligations under the statute.

It stands to common sense that the Board must manage its affairs on sound economic principles. Having ventured into the field of Commerce, no public service urdertaking can afford to say it will ignore business principles which are as essential to public service undertakings as to Commercial ventures.” At pages 650-51 it is held:

“The Board may not allow its character as a public utility undertaking to be changed into that of a profit motivated private trading or manufacturing house. Neither the tariffs nor the resulting surplus may reach such heights as to lead to the inevitable conclusion that the Board has shed its public utility character. When that happens the Court may strike down the revision of tariffs as plainly arbitrary.” In Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Anr v.

Association of Natural Gas Conmming Industries of Gujarat and others, [1990] Supp. SCC 397 at 399 it is held:

The notion that the ‘cost plus’ basis can be the only criterion for fixation of prices in the case of public 745 enterprises stems basically from the concept that such enterprises should function either on a no profit no loss basis or on a minimum profit basis. This is not a correct approach.

In the case of vital commodities or services, while private concerns must be allowed a minimal return on capital invested, public undertakings or utilities may even have to run at losses, if need be and even a minimal return may not be assured. In the case of less vital, but still basic commodities, they may be required to cater to needs with a minimum profit margin for themselves. But given a favourable area of operation, “commercial profits’ need not be either anathema or forbidden fruit even to public sector enterprises.” In Hindustan Zinc Ltd v. A.P.S.E.B., [1991] INSC 124; [1991] 3 SCC 299 at pages 306-307 it is held:

“This Court expressly rejected the submission which had found favour with the Kerala High Court that in the absence of a specification by the State Government, the position would be as it was before the 1978 amendment, that is, the Board was to carry on its affairs and adjust the tariffs in such a manner as not to incur a loss and no more. While rejecting the submission, this Court held as under: (SCC pp.

213-14, para 10) “We are of the view that the failure of the government to specify the surplus which may be generated by the Board cannot prevent the Board from generating a surplus after meeting the expenses required to be met. Perhaps, the quantum of surplus may not exceed what a prudent public service undertaking may be expected to generate without sacrificing the interests it is expected to serve and without being obsessed by the pure profit motive of th e private entrepreneur. The Board may not allow its chara cter as a public utility undertaking to be changed into that of a profit motivated private trading or manufacturing household.

Neither the tariffs nor the resulting surplus may reach such heights as to lead to the inevitable conclusion 746 that the Board has shed its public utility character. When that happens the Court may strike down the revision of tariffs as plainly arbitrary. But not until then. Not, merely because a surplus has been generated, a surplus which can by no means be said to be extravagant. The court will then refrain from touching the tariffs. After all as has been said by this Court often enough ‘price fixation’ is neither the forte nor the funtion of the Court.” It cannot be conteded that education must be available free and it must be run on a charitable basis. In this connection, we may usefully quote P.R. Ganapathy Iyer’s The Law relating to Hindu and Mahomedan Endowments, as to the concept of charity which is elastic. At page 46 of Chap.

III it is stated:

“A charitable establishment is a choultry, college, dispensary etc., while a religious establishment is a mosque, temple etc. For these endowments may be made.’ At page 47 it is stated:

“In English law the word ‘charity’ has both a popular and a technical meaning. The popular meaning of the word does not coincide with its legal or technical meaning. Even according to the popular or ordinary meaning the word is used in more senses than one. In a narrow and limited sense the ordinary acceptation of the word is “relief of physical necessity or want”. (Per Lord Shand in Baird’s Trustees v.

Lord Advocate, 15 Sess. Cas. 4th Series 682) In a somewhat more extended sense, the ordinary and popular acceptation of the word is ‘refief of poverty’ and “a charitable act or purpose” consists in refieving poverty or want. (bid per Lord President (Ingfis). In a still more extended sense and in its popular and ordinary acceptation ‘charity’ comprehends all benefits, whether religious, intellectual or physical bestowed upon persons who, by reason of their poverty, are unable to obtain such benefits for themselves withou t assistance. (Per Lord Watsom in Commissioners for special purposes of Income-tax v. Pemsel [1891] UKHL 1; (1891) A.C. 531 (557).” 747 At page 49 it is stated:

“Charity in its legal sense as understood in the English Law comprises four principal divisions:- (1) trusts for the relief of poverty-, (2) trusts for the advancement of education; (3) trusts for advancement of religion; (4) and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads.’ In B.K. Mukherjee on the The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust at page 58 para 2.7A it is stated:

“2.7A. Education:- The second category on charitable trusts in Lord McNaghten’s classification comprises trusts for education.

These trusts need not be meant exclusively for the poor. Of course, there must be a public purpose, something tending to the benefit of the community. There must be general public benefit through the advancement or furtherance of some educational purpose. But if this important condition is satisfied, the scope of “education” would appear to be fairly wide in several respects.’ In St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, [1992] 1 SCC 558 at page 609-10 it is held:

“The educational institutions are not business houses. They do not generate wealth. They cannot survive without public funds or private aid. It is said there is also restraint on collection of students fees. With the restraint on collection of fees, the minorities cannot be saddled with the burden of maintaining educational institutions without grant-in-aid. They do not have economic advantage over others. It is not possible to have educational institutions without State aid. This was also the view expressed by Das, CJ., in Kerala Education Bill case[1970] INSC 151; , (1970) 2 SCC 417: [1971] 1 SCR 734.

The minorities cannot, therefore, be asked to maintain educational institutions on their own.” The time is not yet ripe to hold that education must be made available on a charitable basis. It is true whenever trusts are made for 748 advancement of education it was held to be a charitable purpose. In Special Commissioners of Income-tax v. Pemsel, 3 Tax Cases 53 at 96 the dictum of Lord Macnaghten is as follows:

“No doubt, the popular meaning of the words “charity’ and “charitable” does not coincide with their legal meaning, and no doubt it is easy enough to collect from the books a few decisions which seem to push the doctrine of the Court to the extreme, and to present a contrast between the two meanings in an aspect almost ludicrous. But still it is difficult to fLx the point of divergence, and no one has yet succeeded in defining the popular meaning of the word “charity’. The learned counsel for the Crown did not attempt the task. Even the paraphrase of the Master of the Rolls is not quite satisfactory………. “Charity’ in its, legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the advancement of religion, and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed every charity that deserves the name must do, either directly or indirectly.” The next case to which reference can be made is The King v.

The Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income-tax, 5 Tax cases 408. The question arose whether the University College of North Wales could be held as established for charitable purposes. Fletcher Moulton, LJ. relying on Pemsel’s case (supra) held that a trust for advancement of edur-ation was charitable.

In The Abbey Malvem Wells, Ltd v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, 1951 (2) All England Law Reports 154 at pages 160-161 it was held:

“In the present case, it seems to me that one is entitled, and indeed, bound, to look at the constitutional of the company to see who, in fact, is in control. I find that, by Art. 3 of the company’s articles, the company is controlled 749 entirely by a body called a council a body of persons, and, by Art. 64 that body of persons must be the trustees of the trust deed.

Therefore, while the company, theoretically, has the power to apply its property and assets for the purpose of making profits and devoting the resulting profit to the distribution of divident among the members, I find that the persons who regulate the operations of the company are not free persons unrestricted in their operations, but are the trustees of the trust deed, and, under the terms of the trust deed, they may use the property of the company only in a particular way and must not make us of the assets of the company for the purpose of a profit-making concern. I find that they are strictly bound by the trusts of the trust deed, and that those trusts are charitable trusts. It seems to me, therefore, that, while nominally the property of the company is held under the provisions of the memorandum and articles of association, in actual fact the property of the company is regulated by the terms of the memorandum and articles of association plus the provisions of the trust deed, and, therefore, the company is restricted in fact in application of its property and assets and may apply them only for the charitable purposes which are mentioned in the trust deed.” This may be so, for the purpose of defining charity, but’ in a country like ours it is impossible to hold that such theories could be advanced or implemented.

The post Unni Krishnan vs State of Andhra Pradesh appeared first on B&B Associates LLP.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

GOUTAM KUNDU …PETITIONER
Vs.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR. …RESPONDENT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/05/1993

BENCH: MOHAN, S. (J) AHMADI, A.M. (J)

CITATION:
1993 AIR 2295 1993 SCR (3) 917
1993 SCC (3) 418 JT 1993 (2) 443
1993 SCALE (2)994

ACT:

% Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :

S. 125-Maintenance-Granted to wife and child-Paternity of child-Disputed-Husband’s application for blood group test of wife and child-Held, purpose of application to avoid payment of maintenance–Prayer rightly refused by courts below.

Evidence Act, 1872 Ss. 4, 112-Child born during continuance of valid marriage- Paternity-Presumption-Held, presumption can only be displaced by strong, preponderance of evidence and not by mere balance of probabilities. Blood group test-Evidention value of-When can be ordered- courts must examine consequence of ordering blood group test.

HELD: 1.1 Courts is India cannot order blood group test as a matter of course. Unlike the English law* in India there is no special statute governing this. Neither the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Evidence Act empowers the court-; to direct such a test, *Affiliation Proceedings Act., 1957; Family Reforms Act., 1969; Family Reforms Act, 1987.

1.2 Wherever applications are made for blood group test in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer cannot be entertained. Bhartiraj v. Sumesh Sachdeo & Ors: 1986 AIR Allahabad 259, approved.

2.1 Section 112 read with s.4 of the Evidence Act debars evidence except in cases of non-access for disproving the presumption of legitimacy and paternity. It is a rebuttable presumption of lam, that a child born during the lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parties. This presumption can only be displaced by a strong preponderance of evidence and not by a mere balance of probabilities.

2.2 There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under s. 112 of the Evidence Act. Vasu v. Santha: [1975] Kerala Law Times 533 and Raghunath v. Shardabai, [1986] AIR Bombay 388, referred to. Morris v. Davies [1837] EngR 1126; 1837 5 Cl. & Fin. 163. cited.

3 The Court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman. Smt. Dikhtar Jahan v. Mohammed Faroog. [1987] INSC 18; AIR 1987 SC 1049, referred to.

4.1 Blood group test is a useful test to determine the question of disputed paternity. It can be relied upon by courts as a circumstantial evidence which ultimately excludes a certain individual as a father of the child.

4.2 No person can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis and no adverse inference can he drawn against a person on account of such refusal. 919 Hargovind Soni v. Ramdulari, AIR [1986] M.P. 57, approved.

Vasu v. Santha, [1975] Kerala Law Times 533, Polavarapu Venkeeswarlu v. Polavarapu Subbayya, [1951] 1 Madras Law Journal 58, referred to.

Subayya Gounder v. Bhoopala, AIR [1959] Madras 396;

Venkateswarlu v. Subbayya, AIR [1951] Madras 910; Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalan-and Singh, (1905) ILR. 33 Cal. 927, cited.

Wilson v. Wilson, Lancet [1942] 1.570; Re L 1968 [1] All England Reports 20; B. R. B. v. J. B., [1968] 2 All Eng.

Reports 1023, referred to Tauylor’s ‘Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence (Vol. 2); ‘Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (8th Edition) by Rai Bahadur Jaising P. Mod, cited.

`Forensic Sciences’ edited by Cyril H. Wecht, referred to.

5. In the instant case the purpose of the application for blood group test was nothing more than to avoid payment of maintenance, without making any ground whatever to have recourse to the test. The High Court was right in confirming the order of the court below rejecting the application.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 443 of 1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.4.92 of the Calcutta High Court in Crl. Revision No. 800/92.

A.K. Sen, S.C. Ghosh, Rajiv K. Dutta and B.B. Tawakley for the Appellant.

Amlan Ghosh and Ranjan Mukherjee for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN, J. leave granted.

The appellant herein was, married to second respondent on 16th January, 1990 according to Hindu Rites and Customs.

They lived together for sometime until second respondent left the matrimonial home to reside with her parents in order to prepare for Higher Secondary Examination which commenced on 5.4.90 920 and continued upto 10.5.90. In the month of April, 1990 she conceived, on coming to know that she was pregnant, the appellant and the family members did not want her to beget a child. Therefore she was forced to undergo abortion which was refused by the second respondent. During the stay She was meted out cruetreatment both physically and mentally.

She came back to the matrimonial home during Durga Pooja in the month of October, 1990. A female child was born on 3.1.91. She filed a petition under section 125 Cr. P.C.

before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore in Misc. Case No. 143 of 1991 both for herself and the child.

By an order dated 14.8.91 which was passed ex-parte he awarded a sum of Rs. 300 per mansum to the mother and Rs.

200 to the child. Against that order, he moved a revision to the High Court. That revision is pending as 1837 of 199 1. Thereafter the petitioner filed a Crl. Misc. Case No.

143 of 1991 for blood group test of the second respondent and the child.

In that proceeding the petitioner herein disputed the paternity of the child and prayed for blood group test of the child to prove that he was not the father of the child.

According to him if that could be established he would not be liable to pay maintenance. That application was dismissed on two grounds: (i) there were other methods in the Evidence Act to disprove the paternity (ii) moreover it is settled law that medical test cannot be conclusive of paternity.

Aggrieved by this order, a revision was preferred before the High Court. Dismissing the revision it was held that section 112 of the Evidence Act says where during the continuance of valid marriage if a child is born that is a conclusive proof about the legitimacy. This section would constitute a stumbling block in the way of the petitioner getting his paternity disproved by blood group test.

The English law permitting blood test for determining the paternity of legitimacy could not be applied in view of section 112 of the Evidence Act. Therefore it must be concluded that section 112 read with section 4 of the said Act debars evidence except in cases of non-access for disproving the presumption of legitimacy and paternity.

It is the contention of Mr. Ashok Sen, learned counsel for the appellant that the only way for the father to disprove the paternity is by blood group test. Having regard to the development of medical jurisprudence to deny that request to the appellant will be unreasonable. As a matter of fact, in England, this is commonly resorted to as it will leave no room for doubt. In 1968 (1) All England Reports p. 20 Re.

1 it was held that even without the consent of the guardian ad litem, the court had power to order an infant be subjected to a blood group test.

921 There is no justification for the court below to refuse the same on the ground that section 112 of the Evidence Act would be an obstacle in seeking relief of blood group test.

Before we deal with the arguments, we will examine the law as available in England. At the beginning of the century scientists established that human blood had certain characteristics which could be genetically transmitted. The first recognised system was ABO blood group. The blood group of a child is determined by the parents’ genetic make- up but the number of possibilities is such, that it is not possible to prove that certain individuals are the father on the basis of comparing blood groups, only, that they are not the father.

By 1930s other immunological test became available. As a result the possibility of establishing paternity increased.

An attempt by way of statutory provision to make blood test compulsory in En-land failed in 1938. However, in 1957 the Affiliation Proceedings Act was passed. Under that Act, it was assumed that a man was the father once a sexual relationship with the mother at the time of conception was proven unless he could show another man had intercourse with her at that time. Failing the father’s attempt, the mother’s evidence had to be corroborated by facts such as blood test etc.

Under the Act either party could ask for a blood test and either was entitled to refuse to take part, although only the mother can apply for maintenance.

The Family Reforms Act, 1969 conferred powers on the court to direct taking blood test in civil proceedings in paternity cases. Courts were able to give directions for the use of the blood test and taking blood samples from the child, the mother and any person alleged to be the father.

Since the passing of 1969 Act the general practice has been to use blood tests when paternity is in issue. However, it is to be stated the court cannot order a person to submit to tests but can draw adverse inferences from a refusal to do so. Now under the Fan-lily Reforms Act, 1987 in keeping with modern thinking on the continuing and shared responsibility of parenthood, ‘parentage’ rather than paternity has to be determined before the court. Fathers as well as mothers can apply for maintenance. Therefore contests can include mothers denial of paternity. This Act finally removed the legal aid for corroboration of mother’s statement of paternity.

Two cases may be usefully referred to: Re L Lord Denning M.R. [1968] All England Reports p. 20 stated thus 922 “but they can say positively that a given man cannot be the father, because the blood groups of his and the child are so different.” (emphasis supplied).

In B.R.B. v. J.B. [1968] 2 All England Reports 1023 applied this dictum and held as under:- “The Country court judge will refer it to a High Court Judge as a matter suitable for ancillary relief, and the High Court Judge can order the blood test. Likewise, of course, a magistrate’s court has no power to order a blood test against the will of the parties.

The magistrate can only do it by consent of those concerned, namely, the grown-ups and the mother on behalf of the child; but, nevertheless, if any of them does not consent, the magistrate can take that refusal into account1 adhere to the view which expressed in Re L. that (6) “If an adult unreasonably refuses to have a blood test, or to allow a child to have one, I think that it is open to the court in any civil proceedings (no matter whether it be a paternity issue or an affiliation summons,or a custody proceedings) to take his refusalas evidence against him, and may draw an inference there from adverse to him. This is simple common sense.” “The conclusion of the whole matter is that a judge of the High Court has power to order a blood test whenever it is in the best interests of the child. The judges can be trusted to exercise this discretion wisely. I would set no limit, condition or bounds to the way in which judges exercise their discretion.

To object of the court always is to find out the truth. When scientific advances give us fresh means of ascertaining it, we should not hesitate to use those means whenever the occasion requires.” “Having heard full argument on the case, lam satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt (to use the expression used in rebutting the presumption as to legitimacy) that LORD DENNING, M.R., was right in saying that such an order may be made in any case where the child is made a party to the proceedings and in the opinion of the judge of the High Court it is in the child’s best interests that it should be made.” 923 As regard United States the law as stated in Forensic Sciences edited by Cyril H. Wecht is as under:- Parentage testing is the major (but not the exclusive) involvement of forensic serology in civil cases. The majority of disputed parentage cases involve disputed paternity, although an occasional disputed maternity, or baby mix-up case does arise, and can be solved using the tools of forensic serology described in this chapter. Blood typing has been used to help resolve paternity cases since the mid- 1920’s. According to Latters, there were 3,000 cases tested in Berlin in 1924, and Schiff and Boyd said that the first case went to court in Berlin in 1924. Ottenberg, in this country published paternity exclusion tables in 192 1, as did Dyke in England in 1922. It took somewhat longer to satisfy the courts, both in Europe and in country, that parentage exclusions based upon blood grouping were completely valid. Wiener said that he had obtained an exclusion in a paternity case in this country which reached the courts early in 1933. In January of 1934, Justice Steinbrink of the New York Supreme Court in Brooklyn ordered that blood tests be performed in a disputed paternity action, using a s precedent a decision by the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, but his order was reversed upon appeal. Soon afterward, however, laws were passed in a number of states providing the courts with statutory authority to order blood testing in disputed paternity cases.

Paternity testing has developed somewhat more slowly in the Unitted States than in certain of the European countries, but today the differences in the number of systems employed, and judicial acceptance of the results, are no longer that great. A number of authorities have recently reviewed the subject of paternity testing in some detail, and in some cases have summarized the results of large number of cases that they have investigated.

Walker points out that failure to exclude a man, even at the 95 percent level of paternity exclusion does not mean that the alleged father is proven to be biologic father, because absolute proof of paternity cannot be established by any known blood test available.

Although this fact is well known and appreciated by workers it), the field of blood grouping and by attorneys active in this area, it is not generally understood by the lay public. However, blood group 924 serology, using proven genetic marker systems, represents the most accurate scientific information concerning paternity and is so recognised in the United States, as well as in a number of countries abroad.” In India there is no special statute governing this.

Neither the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Evidence Act empowers the court to direct such a test to be made. In 1951 (1) Madras Law Journal p.58O Polavarapu Venkteswarlu, minor by guardian and mother Hanwnamma v. Polavarapu Subbayya in that case the application was preferred under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure invoking the inherent powers of the Court to direct a blood test. The learned judge was of the following view:- Section 15 1, Civil Procedure Code, has been introduced in to the Statute book to give effect to the inherent powers. of Courts as expounded by Woodroffe, J., in Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalan and Singh. Such powers can only be exercised ex debito justice and not on the mere invocation of parties or on the mere volition of courts. There is no procedure either in the Civil Procedure Code or in the Indian Evidence Act which provides for a test of the kind sought to be taken by the defendant in the present case. It is said by Mr. Ramakrishna for the respondent before m e that in England this sort of test is resorted to by Courts where the question of non-access in connection with an issue of legitimacy arises for consideration. My attention has been drawn by learned counsel to page 69 of Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Volume 2, where it is stated thus :

“In Wilson v. Wilson, Lancet [1942] 1. 570, evidence was given that the husband’s group was OM, that the wife’s was BM and that the child’s was ABN. The Court held that the husband was not the father of child, and granted a decree for nullity.” “It is also pointed out by learned counsel that in the text books on Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Rai Bahadur Jaising P. Moi, (8th Edition), at page 94, reference is made to a case decided by a Criminal Court at Mercare in June, 194 1, in which the paternity and maternity of the child being under dispute, the Court resorted to the results of the blood grouping test.” 925 That may be. But I am not in any event satisfied that if the parties are unwilling to offer their blood for a test of this kind this Court can force them to do so.” The same view was taken by the Kerala High Court in Vasu v.

Santha 1975 Kerala Law Times p. 533 as “A special protection is given by the law to the status of legitimacy in India. The law is very strict regarding the type of the evidence which can be let in to rebut the presumption of legitimacy of a child. Even proof that the mother committed adultery with any number of men will not of itself suffice for proving the illegitimacy of the child. If she had access to her husband during the time the child could have been begotten the law will not countenance any attempt on the part of the husband to prove that the child is not actually his. The presumption of law of legitimacy of a child will not be lightly repelled. It will not be allowed to be broken or shaken by a mere balance of probability.

The evidence of non-access for the purpose of repelling it must be strong, distinct, satisfactory and conclusive see Morris v.

Davies[1837] EngR 1126; , (1837) 5 Cl. & Fin. 163. The standard of proof in this regard is similar to the standard of proof of guilt in a criminal case.

These rigours are justified by considerations of public policy for there are a variety of reasons why a child’s status is not to be triffled with. The stigma of illegitimacy is very severe and we have not any of the protective legislations as in England t o protect illegitimate children. No doubt, this may in some cases require a husband to maintain children of whom he is probably not their father. But, the legislature alone can change the rigour of the law and not the court. The court cannot base a conclusion on evidence different from that required by the law or decide on a balance of probability which will be the result if blood test evidence is accepted.

There is an aspect of the matter also. Before a blood test of a person is ordered his consert is required. The reason is that this test is a constraint on his personal liberty and cannot be carried out without his consent.

Whether even a legislature can compel a blood test is doubtful. Here no consent is given by any of the respondents. It is also doubtful whether a guardian ad litem can give this consent. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned Munsiff was right in 926 refusing the prayer for a blood test of the appellant and respondents 2 and 3. The learned Judge is also correct in holding that there was no illegality in refusing a blood test.

The maximum that can be done where a party refuses to have a blood test is to draw an adverse inference (see in this connection Subayya Gounder v. Bhoopala, AIR 1959 Madras 396, and the earlier decision of the same court in Venkateswarlu v. Subbayya AIR 1951 Madras 910. Such an adverse inference which has only a very little relevance here will not advance the appellants case to any extent. He has to prove that he had no opportunity to have any sexual intercourse with the 1st respondent at a time when these children could have been begotten. That is the only proof that is permitted under S. II 2 to dislodge the conclusive presumption enjoined by the Section.” In Hargavind Soni v. Ramdulari AIR 1986 MP at 57 held as:- “The blood grouping test is a perfect test to determine questions of disputed paternity of a child and can be relied upon by Courts as a circumstantial evidence. But no person can be compelled to give a sample of blood for blood grouping test against his will and no adverse inference can be drawn against him for this refusal.” Blood grouping test is a useful test to determine the question of disputed paternity. It can be relied upon by courts as a circumstantial evidence which ultimately excludes a certain invididual as a father of the child.

However, it requires to be carefully noted no person can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis against her will and no adverse inference can be drawn against her for this refusal.

In Raghunath v. Shardabai 1986 AIR Bombay 388, it was observed blood grouping test have their limitation, they cannot possibly establish paternity, they can only indicate its possibilities.

In Bhartiraj v. Sumesh Sachdeo & Ors., 1986 AIR Allahabad 2591 held as:- “Discussing the evidentiary value of blood tests for determining paternity, Rayden on Divorce, (1983) Vol. 1) p. 1054 has this to say “Medical Science is able to analyse the blood of individuals 927 into definite groups: and by examining the blood of a given man and a child to determine whether the man could or could not be the father. Blood tests cannot show positively that any man is father, but they can show positively that a given man could or could not be the father. It is obviously the latter aspect the proves most valuable in determining paternity, that is, the exclusion aspect for once it is determined that a man could not be the father, he is thereby automatically excluded from considerations of paternity.

When a man is not the father of a child, it has been said that there is at least a 70 per cent chance that if blood tests are taken they will show. positively he is not the father, and in some cases the chance is even higher:

between two giver men who have had sexual intercourse with. the mother at the time of conception, both of whom undergo blood tests, it has likewise been said that there is a 80 per cent chance that the tests will show that one of them is not the father with the irresistible inference that the other is the father.

The position which emerges on reference to these authoritative texts is that depending on the type of litigation, samples of blood, when subjected to skilled scientific examination, can sometimes supply helpful evidence on various issues, to exclude a particular parentage set up in the case. But the consideration remains that the party asserting the claim to have a child and the rival set of parents put to blood test must establish his right so to do. The court exercises protective jurisdiction on behalf of an infant. In my considered opinion it would be unjust and not fair either to direct a test for a collateral reason to assist a litigant in his or her claim. The child cannot be allowed to suffer because of his incapacity;

the aim is to ensure that he gets his rights.

If in a case the court has reason to believe that the application for blood test is of a fishing nature or designed for some ulterior motive, it would be justified in not acceding to such a prayer.” “The above is the dicta laid down by the various High Courts. In matters of this kind the court must have regard to section 112 of the Evidence Act. This section is based on the well known maxim pater est quem nuptioe demonstrant (he is the father whom the marriage indicates). The presumption of legitimacy is this, that a child born of a married woman is deemed to be legitimate, it throws on the person who is interested in making out the illegitimacy, the whole burden of proving it. The law presumes both that a marriage ceremony is valid, any that every 928 person is legitimate. Marriage or filiation (parentage) may be presumed, the law in general presuming against vice and immoratility.” It is a rebuttable presumption of law that a child born.

during the lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parents. This presumption can only be displaced by a strong preponderannce of evidence, and not by a mere balance of probabilities.

In Smt. Dukhtar Jahan v. Mohammed Faroog [1987] INSC 18; AIR 1987 SC 1049 this court held.

“Section II 2 lays down that if a person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man or within two hundren and eighty days after its dissolution and the mother remains unmarried, it shall be taken as conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at anytime when he could have been begotten. This rule of law based on the dictates of justice has always made the courts incline towards upholding the legitimacy of a child unless the facts are so compulsive and clinching as to necessarily warrant a finding that the child could not at all have been begotten to the father and as such a legitimation of the child would result in rank injustice to the father. Courts have always desisted from lightly or hastily rendering a verdict and that too, on the basts of slender materials, which will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and its mother an unchaste woman.” This section requires the party disputing the paternity to prove non-access in order to dispel the presumption.

“Access” and “non-access” mean the existence or non- existence of opportunities for sexual intercourse; it does not mean actual cohabitation.

The effect of this section is this: there is a presumption and a very strong one though a reubttable one. Conclusive proof means as laid down under section 4 of the Evidence Act.

From the above discussion it emerges:- (1) that courts in India cannot order blood test as matter of course;

929 (2) wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained.

(3) There must be a strong primafacie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under section 112 of the Evidence Act.

(4) The court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman.

(5) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.

Examined in the light of the above, we find no difficulty in upholding the impugned order of the High Court, confirming the order of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore in rejecting the application for blood test. We find the purpose of the application is nothing more than to avoid payment of maintenance, without making any ground whatever to have recourse to the test. Accordingly Criminal Appeal will stand dismissed. Cr, M.P.No. 2224/93 in S.L.P.(cr No.

2648/92 filed by Respondent No. 2 will stand allowed. She is permitted to withdraw the amount without furnishing any Security.

R.P. S.L.P. dismissed.

The post Goutam Kundu Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr appeared first on B&B Associates LLP.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

JAWAHAR LAL WALI …PETITIONER
Vs.
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND ORS. …RESPONDENT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/03/1993

BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)

CITATION:
1993 SCR (2) 218 1993 SCC (2) 381
JT 1993 (2) 183 1993 SCALE (1)789

ACT:

Jammu & Kashmir Government Servants’Prevention of Corruption Act, 1975 : Section 4(d)–Charge under–Officer to pay the value of ice-making plant of 70 kg. capacity and installation charges–Officer making payment accepting supply of 35 kg. Capacity of plant–Whether corruption–Plea of bonafide belief whether could be established without examining himself in enquiry–Exoneration of another officer of similar charge of corruption–Effect Of.

HELD:1.01. The appellant was an officer who was required to accept supply of ‘Ice-making plant of 70 Kgs. capacity with one motor’, after obtaining satisfaction that the plant supplied was the desired plant and was according to the specifications. But, the very explanation given by the appellant in defence of the charge makes it evident that he accepted the 220 supply of making plant knowing it to be of 35 Kgs. capacity and not of 70 Kgs. capacity. Such conclusion is Inescapable because of the fact of non–denial by the appellant in his explanation that the Ice-plant applied and accepted was not of 35 Kgs. capacity. [224C-D] 1.02. The plea of the appellant being that he accepted the 35 Kgs. plant because of Its capacity to produce 70 Kgs.

ice if put to use twice In a day, goes against his accepting supply under the bonafide belief that it was a plant of the capacity of 70 Kgs. Whatever might have been spoken by his witnesses with regard to the production in a day by 35 Kgs.

capacity plant, it cannot be a substitute for what should have been spoken by him as the belief entertained by him in accepting a lower capacity plant for higher capacity plant.

[224E-F] 1.03. In the instant case, unfortunately, nothing can be said to have been established as to the bona fide belief entertained by the appellant at the time of accept* supply of Ice plant as to its capacity, for, he had not chosen to enter the witness-box to speak about such belief. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the And-Corruption Tribunal was, in any way, unjustified in disregarding the plea put-forth by the appellant by way of the defence of the charge of corruption levelled against him and recommending to the Governor, the imposition of penalty of demotion on the charge of which he was found guilty. [224G-H, 225A] 1.04. The Enquiry Officer, if had found that another Officer who had received similar supply, could not be found responsible for the insertion of certain words made by a clerk in the office of the Director, and had exonerated the Officer concerned of the charge levelled against him on an improper appreciation of the material on record, the same cannot form the basis for exoneration of the appellant of similar charge levelled against him as urged by the appellant, particularly when the material received by the Officer in the other inquiry to exonerate the Officer concerned therein is not available in the instant case.

[223H, 224A-B]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2791 of 1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 143.79 of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in W.P. No. 49 of 1979.

221 Ms. Alpana Podar and Kailash Vasdev for the Appellant.

Ashok Mathur for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALA, J. This Civil Appeal by Special Leave is preferred by an officer of the Government of Jammu & Kashmir questioning an order dated 14.3.1979 of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir dismissing in limine his Writ Petition No.

49 of 1979, in which he had impugned the Order dated 6.1.1978 of the Anti-Corruption Tribunal finding him guilty of corruption under the Jammu & Kashmir Government Severants’ Prevention of Corruption Act, 1975, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Prevention of Corruption Act’, and recommending to the Governor of the State of Jammu & Kashmir imposition of penalty of demotion in his post to the next below lower time-scale of pay for a period of five years.

The facts which have given rise to this Appeal, briefly stated are The Director of the Animal Husbandry Department in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, who wanted for Central Artificial Breeding Stations of his Department “Ice-making plants of 70 Kgs. capacity complete with motor”, issued a notification on 9th August, 1968 inviting quotations therefor from the intending suppliers. M/s. Ashoka Brothers is a firm which responded to that notification by quoting the lowest rate for supply of such plants needed by the Department. The Director accepted that quotation after obtaining necessary approval therefor from a departmental committee set-up for the purpose and communicated such acceptance to the said firm. He, thereafter, informed the Officers-in-Charge of the Central Artificial Breeding Stations of both Srinagar and Jammu of the acceptance of the quotation from the firm M/s. Ashoka Brothers for supply of “Ice-making plant of 70 Kgs. capacity complete with motor” and authorised each of them to place the necessary order for supply of one such plant and accept supply and make payment there for on obtaining satisfaction that the plant so supplied was of the desired make and specifications by indicating that the amount to be paid therefor was Rs.8,600 being the value of the plant, and Rs. 450 being charges of installation of the plant. The appellant, who accordingly placed an order with the firm M/s Ashoka Brothers for supply of the Plant covered by the quotation, accepted such supply from the firm on 17th January, 1969 and passed for payment the bill of costs relating to the plant subject to retention of Rs. 1,556.72 ps. towards guarantee of 222 proper performance of the plant. Subsequently, the Department of Anti-Corruption of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, which investigated into a complaint against the Officer-in-Charge of the Central Artificial Breeding Station, Srinagar, discovered that that Officer had obtained supply of an Ice-making plant from the same firm, the aforesaid quotation of which had been accepted, of 35 Kgs.

capacity Ice-making plant as against 70 Kgs. capacity plant required to be supplied, and had paid the price of the latter. The said discovery, it is said, led the Anti- Corruption Tribunal to investigate the actual capacity of the Ice-making plant the supply of which had been obtained by the appellant for his Station from the said firm on the basis of the self-same quotation, having paid for 70 Kgs.

capacity plant. That investigation, since disclosed that the appellant had received a 35 Kgs. capacity Ice-making plant instead of 70 Kgs. capacity Ice-making plant and paid for the latter, a charge of corruption under clause (d) of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act came to be levelled against the appellant by the Anti-Corruption Tribunal and an explanation had come to be sought for therefore in that regard from him. The appellant, who denied the said charge levelled against him by filing a written statement thereto, sought to defend his action of accepting supply of 35Kgs. capacity Ice-making plant instead of 70 Kgs. capacity Ice-making plant from the firm and making payment for 70 Kgs. capacity Ice-making plant, by putting forward a plea therein that he, being a non- technical man, accepted supply of 35 Kgs. capacity Ice- making plant from the firm under the bona fide belief that it had to be regarded as 70 Kgs. capacity Ice-making plant because of its capacity to produce 70 Kgs. ice, if put to use twice in a day. He sought to support that plea at the inquiry by examining two ‘witnesses one from the firm which had supplied the plant and another from the Cold Storage Division of Jammu & Kashmir State Agro Industries Development. However, the appellant did not enter the witness-box to establish the truth of his bonafide belief set out in his defence plea.

By its order dated 6.1.1978, the Anti-Corruption Tribunal which refused to accept the defence plea of the appellant against the aforesaid charge levelled against him under clause (d) of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, found him guilty of the charge, and recommended to the Governor of the State of Jammu & Kashmir for imposition of a penalty therefor of demotion of the appellant from the post held by him to the next lower time-scale of pay for a period of five years. The said order of the Anti-Corruption Tribunal was impugned by the appellant before the High 223 Court of Jammu & Kashmir in a Writ Petition filed by him.

But, that Writ Petition being dismissed in limine by the High court on 14th March, 1979, a Special Leave Petition being filed by him in the matter before this Court, this Civil Appeal has arisen for our decision after grant of Special Leave.

Shri M.L Verma, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the Anti-Corruption Tribunal was wholly unjustified in finding the appellant guilty of the charge of corruption under clause (d) of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act for obtaining supply of Ice- making plant for the Central Artificial Breeding Station of Jammu of 35 Kgs. capacity against 70 Kgs. capacity, while another Officer who had accepted supply of the same type of plant from the same firm supplied on the basis of the said same quotation and paid for it, had been exonerated of the similar charge of corruption. It is true that another Officer against whom similar charge had been levelled was exonerated of that charge on appreciation of evidence which had come on record in the course of inquiry held against him, as was pointed out by the learned counsel. What that Officer (Dr. D.N. Pandita) is said to have done after obtaining supply of the Ice-making plant on 24th March, 1969 from the said firm and making 90 per cant payment out of the amount of Rs. 12,773.20 ps. payable to the firm, cannot but be regarded as an intrigue. When he received a letter dated 25th August, 1969, from the firm for releasing to it the balance amount of 10 per cent of the cost of Ice-making plant he is said to have, in turn, written another letter to the Director indicating that the plant had the capacity to produce 70 Kgs. ice in two installments of 24 hours and sought clarification and guidance whether the supply was to be treated as one supplied according to the specifications and the balance amount retained could be released in favour of the firm. That letter, although is seen to have been written on 28th August, 1969, is returned on the same date with an endorsement : “Returned. The specifications indicated in the approved rate list are clear. There is no need for further elucidation. The plant should have the capacity to produce 70 Kgs. of Ice per day…………. This endorsement signed for the Director by Dr. Mohd. Ramzan, although, was made use of by the Officer for making balance payment to the firm, Dr. Mohd. Ramzan stated in that inquiry that the words ‘per day’ in the endorsement had been inserted by his clerk, Shri Pawalal, subsequent to the signing of that endorsement by him. The Enquiry Officer, if had found that the Officer who had received the supply could not be found responsible for the insertion of certain words made by a clerk in the office of the 224 Director, and exonerated the Officer concerned of the charged levelled against him on an improper appreciation of the material on record, the same cannot form the basis for exoneration of the appellant of similar charge levelled against him as urged by the learned counsel for the appel- lant, particularly when the material received by the Officer in the other inquiry to exonerate the Officer concerned therein is not available in the instant case.

Besides, the appellant, in the instant case, it was not disputed, was an Officer who was required to accept supply of ‘Ice-making plant of 70 Kgs. capacity with one motor’, after obtaining satisfaction that the plant supplied was the desired plant and was according to the specifications. But, the very explanation given by the appellant in defence of the charge makes it evident that he accepted the supply of Ice-making plant knowing it to be of 35 Kgs. capacity and not of 70 Kgs. capacity. Such conclusion is inescapable because of the fact of non-denial by the appellant in his explanation that the Ice plant suppled and accepted was not of 35 Kgs. capacity. What he has said in the explanation was that the Ice plant, the supply of which he accepted, was capable of producing 70 Kgs. ice, if put to use two times a day, and, therefore, he cannot be held guilty of accepting a plant of 35 Kgs. capacity. It could have been something different, if the appellant’s plea was, as suggested by the learned counsel that the appellant did not know at the/ time of obtaining supply that it was of 35 Kgs. capacity plant and not of 70 Kgs. capacity plant but accepted its supply under a bonafide belief that it was of 70 Kgs. capacity.

But, the plea of the appellant being that he accepted the 35 Kgs. plant because of its capacity to produce 70 Kgs. ice if put to use twice in a day, goes against his acception supply under the bonafide belief that it was a plant of the capacity of 70 Kgs. Whatever might have been spoken by his witnesses with regard to the production in a day by 35 Kgs.

capacity plant, it cannot be a substitute for what should have been spoken by him as the belief entertained by him in accepting a lower capacity plant for higher capacity plant.

In the instant case,. unfortunately, nothing can be said to have been established as to the bonafide belief entertained by the appellant at the time of accepting supply of Ice plant as to its capacity, for, he had not chosen to enter the witnessbox to speak about such belief. In the circumstances, it is difficult for us to think that the Anti-Corruption Tribunal was, in any way, unjustified in disregarding the plea put-forth by the appellant by way of the defence of the charge of corruption levelled against him and recommending to the 225 Governor the imposition of a penalty of demotion on the charge of which he was found guilty. In this view of the matter, there can be no good reason for us to hold that the High Court, again was unjustified in rejecting the appellant’s Writ Petition in which he had impugned the order of the Anti-Corruption Tribunal.

For the foregoing reasons, this Civil Appeal has to fail and it is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

V.P.R.

Appeal dismissed.

The post Jawahar Lal Wali Vs. State of Jammu And Kashmir & Ors appeared first on B&B Associates LLP.