Abstract
Cordial relationship between employer and employee is the main objective of every labour legislation. Production must continue in any dispute as it is quintessential for the working of any economy. If production gets disrupted economy will get greatly harmed. But also, rights of labourers cannot be ignored. A labourer’s right to raise voice and to act in a way to protect themselves must be recognised in any democratic nation. Also, a mechanism for dispute redressal must be established. This case, which is significant in the field of labour law, concerns whether or not a fired employee can be regarded as an employee for purposes of Section 2(10) of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, and whether or not a concern raised by him alone will be considered an industrial dispute as defined by Section 2(12) of the Act. The distinction between an individual dispute and an industrial dispute is also explored.
Case no. | : | Civil Appeal No. 320 of 1955 |
Jurisdiction | : | Supreme Court of India |
Case Decided On | : | November 6, 1956 |
Judges | : | N.H. Bhagwati, T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar, S.K. Das and P. Govinda Menon, JJ. |
Legal Provisions Involved | : | Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 |
Case Summary Prepared By | : | Aditya Madhav Jindal Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Panjab |
Facts Of The Case
In June 1950, the respondent was employed by Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd., Nagpur, a public limited corporation. However, he came under suspicion of stealing goods from the company. After a thorough investigation, the respondent was terminated from his position on June 28, 1950, on grounds of misbehaviour and wilful negligence. Subsequently, he faced a trial in court on charges of stealing, but on March 3, 1952, he was found not guilty of the alleged offence.
Following his acquittal, the respondent sought reinstatement from the company. When his request was denied, he appealed to the Labour Commissioner on October 1, 1952, seeking reinstatement and compensation as per Section 16(2) of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. The company, however, contested his claim, arguing that he was no longer an employee at the time of the application since he had been dismissed on June 28, 1950. According to their stance, the proceedings under Section 16(2) were not applicable as there was no “industrial dispute touching the dismissal of an employee.”
The Assistant Labour Commissioner supported the company’s argument and rejected the respondent’s application after conducting a hearing. Undeterred, the respondent decided to appeal this decision to the Provincial Industrial Court under Section 16(5) of the Act. On February 5, 1954, the court ruled in favor of the respondent, stating that a dismissed employee still fell within the definition of an employee as per Section 2(10) of the Act. Consequently, a dispute raised by such an employee qualified as an industrial dispute under Section 2(12) of the Act, making the application under Section 16(2) maintainable.
The dismissal ruling was overturned, and the case was remitted for a merits-based investigation. The company attempted to appeal this decision to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, but their appeal was dismissed by the tribunal on October 10, 1954. Not willing to accept defeat, the company then filed an appeal against the tribunal’s ruling with the Supreme Court of India, exercising its right under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution.
While the appeal was still pending, the company went into liquidation. As a result, the State of Madhya Pradesh took over its operations, and it continued to function under the name Central Provinces Transport Services, now under government ownership, in Nagpur.
Issues Involved
- Whether a dismissed worker is an employee under Section 2(10) of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.
- Whether an issue raised by a single worker alone qualifies as an industrial dispute under Section 2(12) of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.
- Whether the view taken by the Industrial Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal as to the meaning of “industrial dispute” in the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 was correct.
Judgement Of The Court
The key takeaways from the Judgement are as follows:
- Firstly, it is to be understood that the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act’s Sections 2(12) and 2(13) are essentially pari materia with Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that defines an ‘Industrial dispute’ and the ruling in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, 1949 FCR 321 will be equally applicable to both Acts.
- Section 2 (10) defines an ‘Industry’, and it is not possible to interpret the inclusive clause in Section 2(10) of the Act as implying a general intention to exclude dismissed employees from that definition. Rather, it was added ex abundanti cautela, i.e., out of an abundance of caution. As it was anticipated that there will be major arguments that employees discharged under Section 31 and Section 32 of the Act would not fall within the definition of Industrial dispute. Section 31 and Section 32 deal with penalties for other offences and offences by companies.
- But on the other hand, this would render Section 16 of the Act meaningless, which specifically offers reinstatement and compensation as forms of remedies for dismissed workmen. Because of this, it was determined in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, 1949 FCR 321 that, “a person who has been fired is included in the definition of ‘employee’ in the Act, and the respondent could not be denied relief for this reason alone because he was unemployed on the application date.”
- Although the language of Section 2(k) is broad enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, and not employees as a class. That is to say that the scheme of the act does not intend to only resolve disputes when workmen are involved as a class but it also protects the rights of workmen in case of individual disputes. When a dispute was an individual dispute and not an industrial dispute it was then not adjudicated by the act. If that was the case, the applicant would not have been eligible to submit an application under Section 16(2) of the Act since the workers in the sector had not taken up his issue as their own and, as a result, had no cause of action against the business.
- The C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, however, is the law that governs this situation. Therefore, even though it referred to several examples, the court was not required to express an opinion on whether an individual dispute would qualify as an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- Like the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act of 1947 has laws pertaining to arbitration, adjudication, awards, strikes, and lockouts. Additionally, it enacts in Chapter IV rules designed to govern the employment contract between an employer and employee, a topic that is handled by a separate piece of Central law called the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946. It is therefore appropriate to interpret the term “industrial dispute” in a much broader sense than that under the Industrial Disputes Act in order to include both disputes of workmen as a class and their individual disputes. This is because the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act covers the territory occupied by both Acts.
- In Section 53 of the Act, it is stated that except with the permission of the authority holding any proceeding under this Act, no employee shall be allowed to appear in such proceeding except through the representative of employees; Provided, however, that where only one employee is concerned, he may appear personally. This viewpoint is reiterated in this judgment. This is blatant evidence that the Act takes individual employee applications into consideration. It gives Section 16 the authority to enable an employee to enforce his individual rights when there is an order of dismissal, discharge, removal, or suspension, and “industrial dispute” must be interpreted to include an employee’s claim for reinstatement and compensation in such situations when there is an order of dismissal, discharge, removal, or suspension.
- The Industrial Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal’s interpretation of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947’s definition of “industrial dispute” was found to be accurate, and the appeal was rejected with costs.
Conclusion And Analysis
A person who is still employed is typically referred to as an employee or a workman. A trade union or a group of employees may take up any matter that has an impact on the whole industry in question as an industrial dispute. All of India’s labour laws aim to control, oversee, or promote a fruitful relationship between an employer and employee. They also provide a venue for the resolution of any disputes of a sort that could have an impact on the whole sector in question. In order to guarantee that the production need is not impacted, this forum is only made available for the benefit of the employee and employer. Is a grievance from a fired employee thus admissible in this forum? Even though it has not been taken up by a trade union or other coworkers, can the problem surrounding such an employee be considered an industrial dispute? In determining the legal implications of these issues, this case will be crucial.
The upkeep of amicable ties between the employer and employees is of utmost importance for industrial success and profitability. Every employee must be treated fairly and justly in this day and age considering the various welfare guises that the State and its organisations have adopted. This case, which was resolved 66 years ago, is still relevant today because the ruling represents a significant advancement in the recognition of an individual worker’s ability to pursue his grievance in the absence of a labour organization, even after being fired from their position.
Section 4(9) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 which states that “Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, or otherwise terminates the services of an individual worker, any dispute or difference between that worker and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or termination shall be deemed to be an employment dispute”, makes the court’s ruling in this case even more significant. The Industrial Relation Code, 2020 currently has a comprehensive definition of the phrase “industrial dispute” that was made possible in large part by this judgement.
This article is written and submitted by Aditya Madhav during his course of internship at B&B Associates LLP. Aditya is a BA.LLB 2nd Year student at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Patiala.